

The State of Africa

*Parameters and Legacies
of Governance and Issue Areas*

2010/11



Korwa G Adar, Monica K Juma and Katabaro N Miti

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Abbreviations, Acronyms and Concepts

ACD	African Charter on Democracy
ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACHPR	African Commission on Human People's Rights
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Assistance
ACP	African-Caribbean-Pacific
ACRF	Africa Crisis Response Force
ACRI	Africa Crisis Response Initiative
ADD	Attention Deficit Disorder
AEC	African Economic Community
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AIG	American International Group
AISA	Africa Institute of South Africa
AISS	Africa Institute of Space Science
AL	Arab League
AMCOST	African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISON	African Union Peacekeeping Force
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANACDP	African Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact
ANC	African National Congress
APE	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APPER	Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARCSTE-E	African Regional Centres for Space Science and Technology Education-English
ASAL	Agence Spatiale Algérienne
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
ATNMC	Alliance Touareg Nord-Mali pour le Changement
AU	African Union

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BSAS	Basic Space and Atmospheric Science
CACF	China-Africa Cooperation Forum
CASA	Centre for Atmospheric Sciences and Astronomy
CBSS	Centre for Basic Space Science
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CENTCOM	Central Command
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFA	Communautaire Financière Africaine
CFAF	Communauté Financière Africaine Franc
CGG	Centre for Geodesy and Geodynamics
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CLO	Civil Liberties Organisation
CM	Chicoco Movement
CMA	Common Monetary Area
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
CNECC	China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corporation
CNTS	National Space Technology Centre
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COPE	Congress of the People
COPEX	Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique Centrale
CPA	Cairo Plan of Action
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CPSCA	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
CRAAG	Centre of Research in Astronomy, Astrophysics and Geophysics
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
CSSTE	Centre for Space Science and Technology Education
CSTD	Centre for Satellite Technology Development
CSTP	Centre for Space Transport and Propulsion
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EAC	East African Community

EACTI	East African Terrorism Initiative
EBA	Egbesu Boys of Africa
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFA	Education for All
EGS	Emerging Global South
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
EWS	Early-Warning Systems
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDLR	Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FNDIC	Federal Niger Delta Ijaw Communities
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FOMAC	Force Multinationale d'Afrique Centrale
FRCN	Federal Radio Corporation
FTA	Free Trade Area
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDI	Gender Development Index
GPS	Global Positioning System
HCA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HDI	Human Development Index
HEGRA	High Energy Gamma Ray Astronomy
HESS	High Energy Stereoscope System
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/Aids	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HOSG	Heads of State and Government
HPI	Human Poverty Index
IBSF	India-Brazil-South Africa Forum
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IFC	Interstate Forecasting Centre

IFI	International Financial Institution
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISSA	International Social Security Association
ITNs	Insecticide-treated Nets
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MARAC	Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide de l'Afrique Centrale
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt-Relief Initiative
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MNJ	Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Congo
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRU	Mano River Union
NADECO	National Democratic Coalition
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAN	News Agency of Nigeria
NARSS	National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences
NASRDA	National Space Research and Development Agency
NASSP	National Astrophysics and Space Science
NCLO	National Civil Liberties Organisation
NCRS	National Centre for Remote Sensing
NCWS	National Council of Women's Societies
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
Nepad	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRIAG	National Research Institute of Astronomy and Geophysics
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCE	Ogaden Communities of Europe
ODA	Official Development Assistance

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMPADEC	Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PGFA	Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RCMRD	Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECTAS	Regional Centre for Training in Aerospace Surveys
RIA	Regional Integration Arrangement
RS/GIS	Remote Sensing/Geographic Information System
RTA	Regional Trade Associations
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAC	Satellite Applications Centre
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALT	South African Large Telescope
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SATCOM	Satellite Communication
SATMET	Satellite Meteorology
SDC	Satellite Development Centre
SHD	Sustainable Human Development
SKA	Square Kilometre Array
SLA/M	Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
SLR	Satellite Laser Ranging
SME	Small to Medium-sized Enterprise
SNM	Somali National Movement
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSCB	Surrey Space Centre of Britain
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Movement
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
ULF	Ultra-low Frequency
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UNAMID	United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur

UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VLBI	Very Long Baseline Interferometry
WCNH	World Culture and National Heritage
WFP	World Food Programme
WGSSA	Working Group on Space Science in Africa
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WST	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

Conceptual and Issue Areas in Context

Korwa G Adar, Monica K Juma and Katabaro Miti

The State of Africa series project was conceived by the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) during its 2003–2004 financial year for purposes of mapping out on a regular basis critical issue areas relating to intra- and inter-African as well as extra-African relations. The first and second volumes of the series were published in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Volume 1: *The State of Africa: Thematic and Factual Review* served as an exploratory piece and covered a broad range of issues relating to politics and governance, millennium development goals (MDGs), peace and conflict and regional development. Volume 2: *The State of Africa: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development* focused thematically and examined – from critical and comprehensive perspectives – issues associated with post-conflict in Africa. The volume was grounded on the continent’s quest for conflict prevention, management and resolution as a means of creating an enabling environment for the consolidation of democracy and reconstruction of societies affected by crisis in general and war in particular. This volume, Volume 3: *Parameters and Legacies of Governance and Issue Areas* takes a multi-pronged and multi-faceted approach to some of these issues by providing in-depth analysis of dynamics at national, regional, continental and international levels.

The global transformation in the 1980s and 1990s, which witnessed the crumbling of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and opened a window of opportunities for East–West bipolar rapprochement, particularly between the United States and Russia, also had impact on Africa at the national, regional and continental levels. Focusing on conceptual units, such as the state, indigenous organisations, regional and continental organisations as well as selected priority issues – in particular gender and empowerment, the global South, and space science – the chapters in the book provide useful insights into the nature and impact of the transformation and its impact on the socio-economic and politico-security situation in Africa.

National dimensions

As the chapters in Part 1 demonstrate, at the national level the state remains the key player in development. However, the state in Africa has failed to live

up to this expectation. Since the 1960s the state has acquired various characteristics and was employed differently by the African leaders in the name of benefiting the African people. Overall, it was used by the neo-patrimonial ('big man') and clientele African ruling elite for its own benefits and, in the process, deprived the people their eco-political rights.¹ The control of the state by a small clique of leaders, who in most cases were strengthened by external actors, impacted negatively on development. Significantly, the attempts by the Bretton Woods institutions to rescue the economies of Africa through so-called 'structural adjustment programmes' (SAPs) were not only ill-conceived, but also perpetuated, if not structurally aggravating the situation. Other than weaken the state in terms of its ability to deliver, SAPs promoted free-market economies that legitimised the deprivation of the majority of African people. Since then, major shifts have occurred in the internal dynamics of states in Africa that impact on the way power is exercised and whom the preferred of the power and related services is and/or should be. Most significant in these developments is the reality of 'people's revolts' and the potential of social movements to impact positive change, as discussed in Chapter 3. Critical to this phenomenon and scholarship is the growing demand for a more interventionist state that directs development. It is not our purpose here to discuss in detail the concept of the developmental state (see Chapters 1 and 2).² However, given the resurgence of the debate on the developmental state, a brief treatment would suffice.

The concept of the developmental state is premised on the idea that state intervention is determined by socio-economic and political context. In other words, the developmental state is neither anti-market nor does it favour the idea of leaving market forces to determine social welfare and benefits.³ In this case, the state does not – at least in theory – accumulate rent for itself (predatory state) but for the general good of the society.⁴ For the state to have its developmental relevance and acumen it has to have clear ideology and functioning institutional structures for the operation of policies and autonomy.

Fundamentally, 'the developmental state bases accumulation on a growth-led model, supported by a number of "capturing" and "nurturing" mechanisms that allow welfare transfers to be made from one segment of the economy to another, and one group of citizenry to another'.⁵ The developmental state intervenes on behalf of the people when circumstances warrant and is convinced that certain constituencies are excluded from the socio-economic and political benefits (discussed in Chapter 9). As the chapters in this book demonstrate, the developmental state does not operate parochially, but instead straddles national and transnational developmental agenda and issue areas pursued for the benefit of the people.⁶

The linkages between national and international issue areas, whether at the micro- or macro-levels, cannot be over-emphasised. As Huntington observes:

Culture and cultural identities ... are the shaping patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold War world ... In the post-Cold War world,

the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural ... The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations ... And the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the lines between Western and Eastern civilizations.⁷

The internal civil war of attrition that has raged in Somalia since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991, for example, is premised on – among other issues – the desire to establish an Islamic state in conformity with the perceived Somali cultural identity.⁸ More specifically, the conflict has historical roots in that it is linked with what the Somalis consider as imperialist subjugation of their cultural identity. In fact, the leader of the Somali Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Sheikh Hassan Al-Harsi, put this cultural view more succinctly during an interview on 30 September 2007, when he stated:

I am not a terrorist. The terrorists are the infidels. We are reformers, not terrorists. The *mujahedeen* support one another, and the infidels also support one another ... When a Muslim is among his Muslim brothers, he is not considered a foreigner ... So, if a Muslim enters Somalia for any reason, he is not a foreigner ... The Prophet Muhammad said: The Muslim is brother of the Muslim.⁹

The views expressed by Sheikh Hassan Al-Harsi are not any different from those of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah Hassan dubbed the ‘Mad Mullah’ by the British for fighting a 20-year war against the colonialists or what he called ‘infidels’ in Somalia in the 1900s.¹⁰ A state that links its people socio-culturally and eco-politically has a better foundation for its *raison d’être* as opposed to the states acquired at the time of independence which ignored these virtues (See Chapter 2).

The attempts to democratise the African state since independence, and more so during the ‘third wave’, is aimed at empowering the African peoples.¹¹ Made possible by the collapse of global East-West competition and its corollaries, Africa’s second liberation has opened up opportunities and challenges for the democratisation of the state, rejecting the 30-year experiments with single-party political systems dominated by the *anciens régimes*. Whether this ‘third wave’ is impacting positively on African peoples is an issue that continues to generate debate among scholars, policy-makers and practitioners. Some scholars have argued that the multiparty political system has ushered in the democratisation of disempowerment wherein the ruling elites recycle themselves during elections and in other sectors of African society.¹²

Notwithstanding the competing viewpoints, the ‘third wave’ appears to have opened the door for a number of indigenous movements, which are advocating for the transformation of the state in its holistic sense to empower African peoples. At the centre of the agenda of these indigenous movements and working in concert with regional, continental and global organisations, are the issues of the liberalisation of the eco-political systems, human rights,

the rule of law, good governance and accountability. These issues and their related factors are discussed extensively in Chapters 3, 4 and 13.

A democratised state that recognises and upholds its cardinal and custodial duties and responsibilities to the people is bound to broaden the scope for human and material development. As Nzongola-Ntalaja observes ‘democracy is a moral value or imperative ... that is, basically a permanent aspiration of human beings for freedom, for a better social and political order, one that is more human and more or less egalitarian’.¹³ Suffice to say, the African state cannot operate in isolation and as such the people’s aspirations are in many ways linked to the regional, continental and global issue areas.

Regional dimensions

Since acquiring their sovereignty and becoming subjects of international law with rights, duties and the capacity to enter into and assume international obligations, African states have played important roles – albeit with mixed success – in the transformation and reconstruction of national, regional and continental eco-political milieu for the benefit of the African peoples. Significant in these were the attempts at creating regional and continental organisations to facilitate the development of Africa and its peoples.

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the acceleration of supra-national cooperation, commonly referred to as ‘new regionalism’. The concept refers to a process in which a region is transformed from a heterogeneous to a homogeneous entity.¹⁴ Regional organisations, whether newly established or existing, have become proactively involved in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and development in general (see Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 12). For example, in 1986, the East African and Horn of Africa countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda established the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to deal with the common challenge of prolonged drought and instability affecting their region. In response to the continued internal civil wars affecting some of its member states, such as Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, IGADD was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996 with a view to focus its attention on conflict resolution. Article 7(c) of the IGAD agreement empowers the regional organisation ‘to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue’.¹⁵ Since then, IGAD has played constructive roles in conflict-resolution initiatives in Somalia and Sudan, culminating in the conclusion of peace agreements in the two countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively.¹⁶ The East African Community (EAC), which collapsed in 1977, was also revived and has, since the ratification of the treaty in 2000, remained an active player in the region, more so on the issues of development. Burundi and Rwanda ratified the treaty in 2006, bringing

the number of member states to five, which include the founding members, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

In southern and West Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been directly involved in conflict-resolution initiatives, going a step beyond the EAC and IGAD. Specifically, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened militarily in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. SADC has played similar roles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho in 1998. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which remained at low ebb since its establishment in 1984, revised and revisited its role in the region in the 1990s. For example, the ECCAS created the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (CPSCA)/*Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique Centrale* (COPAX), with the mandate to deal with defence and security in the region. The main ECCAS organs responsible for the operationalisation of the COPAX mandate include the Rapid Conflict Monitoring Unit/*Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide de l'Afrique Centrale* (MARAC) and the Central African Multinational Force/*Force Multinationale d'Afrique Centrale* (FOMAC). The ECCAS security operational structures are yet to be tested. In North Africa, the Maghreb Union, or the *Union du Maghreb Arabe* (AMU), has no conflict-resolution structures and authority and has maintained a low-key status since its establishment in 1989.¹⁷

Besides acting as first responders in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR), African regional organisations have also become key drivers for integration in terms of promoting trade, and dealing with migration and service provision, among other issues. The significance of this formation within the continent is underpinned by the African Union (AU) framework, which identifies regional economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks for the pursuit of an Africa that is peaceful, united and prosperous.

Continental dimension

At the continental level, through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), African states became the main custodians and instruments for norm-building in Africa. Notwithstanding its limitations, the OAU Charter provided useful prescriptions which established a normative regime for continental behaviour. The concepts of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states inherent in the Westphalian tradition to this day continue to provide legal and norm-setting reference points in Africa as well as the continent's relations with other actors in the international system (see Chapter 11).

In a continent riven by perpetual internal conflicts and territorial disputes, let alone their own weaknesses and newness, the normative

principles provide the African states with mechanisms and means for pursuing regional, continental and global bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. The adoption of the *uti possidetis* principle by the OAU Heads of State and Government (HOSG) in their meeting in 1964 in Cairo, Egypt, was as a result of the concerns for the fragility of the boundaries acquired at the time of independence. The intangibility and inviolability notions attached to the boundaries enshrined in the *uti possidetis* principle have since then established African rule of international law and are also recognised by the UN. This law-creating normative principle was (and still under the AU framework) frequently invoked by the African states in their bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations.¹⁸

In 1993 the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) for mediation purposes. The MCPMR's mandate was 'to bring to the processes of dealing with conflict in our continent a new institutional dynamism, and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur'.¹⁹ The MCPMR mandate was superseded by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) once it became operational in May 2007. However, the OAU's role in conflict resolution and collective security in general did not go beyond the strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. To put it differently, it was the sacrosanct duty of the OAU to ensure, through the organisation's normative prescriptions, the protection of the African leaders and their hold on power. The disasters and genocidal situations in Burundi, the DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan are a few cases in point.

These efforts, pursued for purposes of the transformation of Africa through normative and legal prescriptions by the OAU during its existence, have been taken over by the AU. In fact, the African states have taken a bold step by incorporating in article 4(b) of the Constitutive Act:

The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and 4(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.²⁰

This is a clear paradigm shift in comparison with the OAU's persistent observance of the sanctity of sovereignty.²¹ The AU's Constitutive Act advocates, at least where circumstances would warrant, the permeability of sovereignty thesis. The other sections of the Constitutive Act that permit legitimate intervention by the AU include:

- Article 4(e): Peaceful resolution of conflicts between member states of the AU through appropriate means as may be decided upon by the AU Assembly
- Article 4(f): Prohibition of the use or threat of force among member states of the AU

- Article 4(*i*): Peaceful co-existence of member states and the right to live in peace and security
- Article 4(*m*): Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance
- Article 4(*o*): Respect for the sanctity of human life, and condemnation and rejection of impunity, political assassination, acts of terrorism, and subversive activities
- Article 4(*p*): Condemnation of unconstitutional changes of governments²²

These principles indicate a clear shift of responsibilities away from the member states, the OAU model, to the regional body. This is not to argue that the member states cannot use the AU framework to stall the decision-making process that requires intervention but in which the issue of national interest is at stake.

The PSC is one of the key organs of the organisation that is endowed with the responsibilities to act, with the acquiescence of the UN and the AU Assembly, on matters that require intervention. Article 17(1) of the PSC protocol states, in part:

In fulfilment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.²³

Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UN Security Council (UNSC) to maintain international peace and security with the option of the use of force. Apart from the PSC, the organs of the AU as well as the constituent bodies examined in this book include, for example, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) (see Chapters 5, 6, 9, 10 and 12).

Some scholars have argued, however, that irrespective of this paradigm shift, the Constitutive Act still views its member states as sovereign and independent and, in many respects, legitimising the post-colonial boundaries.²⁴ In a similar vein, it has been argued that the right of intervention by the AU is incompatible with the use of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which is accepted by member states as *jus cogens*, that is, binding law irrespective of the will of the parties. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stipulates that: 'All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.' No derogation is permissible 'except from norms of a similar character ... The consent given by AU member states to the organisation is void for it allows the AU to use force on their territories.'²⁵

The critical question is the extent to which the structures and operations of the AU and its organs can mobilise common African positions and

approaches in dealing with the growing influence of its traditional partners (and mainly colonial powers), new partners such as the G8 and now the G20, the emerging US strategic interests, particularly in relation to its security and energy needs, and the now growing new actors, such as China, India and Brazil. An adjunct question is: How will the interaction of this plethora of actors on the global stage impact on actions and outcomes at the continental, regional and national levels?

Global dimension

An analysis of global trends indicates the onset of what some scholars have termed the ‘second’ (after the 1884 Berlin conference), ‘new’ (following the end of the Cold War) or the 21st century (associated with the new imperialist discourse) scramble for Africa. The economic, political and strategic interests of the United States, Europe, China and Japan, among others, in Africa will continue to generate competition and rivalry as the global demand for Africa’s resources increases. The fundamental question is whether Africa can counter the ongoing but organised assault on its resources. For instance, on its part, the US strategic interests in Africa are influenced by a number of factors, namely, its domestic demand and global responsibility, China’s resurgence in the continent, Africa’s wealth in natural resources, terrorism, piracy, illicit trafficking, humanitarian crises, HIV and Aids and armed conflicts. Africa comes second after the Middle East in oil exports to the United States. Stability in Africa is therefore of paramount importance to the US foreign policy-making establishment. Therefore, US interests in Africa, as elsewhere in the globe, are accompanied by military strategies and structured attempts to institutionalise them.

In the 1990s, following the fall of bipolar rivalry, the United States under the Clinton administration established the Africa Crisis Response Force (ACRF) – later renamed Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The central mandate of the ACRI was to train African armed forces in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid activities and in the techniques of fighting terrorism. The ACRI was replaced by the Bush administration with the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) in 2002, the objective of which was to train African armies. US strategic interests are conducted through these proxy arrangements.²⁶ During his second term in office, President Bush re-conceptualised the United States’ strategic role in Africa by establishing the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 (see Chapter 5).

AFRICOM’s mandate is to protect and promote US strategic interests in Africa and the contiguous waters. Initially, it was supposed to be housed in Africa. However, due to the unwillingness of the African countries to accommodate its physical presence in the continent, AFRICOM found its base in Stuttgart, Germany. It monitors US interests in all the African countries, except Egypt.²⁷

Prior to the establishment of AFRICOM, US military interests in Africa were co-ordinated and monitored through the US European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM) and the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The AFRICOM military activities are managed in conjunction with the Djibouti-based, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA has a military contingent of more than 2 000, and covers land and air space in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles and the coastal waters, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) established in 2008 under the auspices of AFRICOM, coordinates, with the help of Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia, the challenge of terrorism in the region.

On the economic front, the United States under the Clinton administration, signed into law the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, the objective of which was to promote trade and reduce the heavy reliance on aid by African countries (see Chapter 3). Notwithstanding the challenges AGOA has faced, the policy has opened up the US market to African commodities.²⁸ It is not only the issue of trade that has dominated the AGOA process – what is also important to note is that it has provided opportunities for the transfer of appropriate science and technology, a sector extensively discussed in Chapter 14.

Under the AGOA rules, a sub-Saharan African country becomes eligible after the determination by the president of the United States that the country has established or is making progress towards the establishment of:²⁹

- a market-based economy that protects private property rights, incorporates an open-rules-based trading system and minimises government interference;
- the rule of law, political pluralism, the right to due process, a fair trial and equal protection under the law;
- the elimination of barriers to US trade and investment;
- economic policies to reduce poverty;
- a system to combat corruption and bribery;
- protection of internationally recognised worker rights.

By 2005, 37 sub-Saharan African countries had benefited from the AGOA process, with more than 98 per cent of products from the eligible countries entering the United States duty free.³⁰ Specific provisions which prohibit an African country from benefiting from the AGOA process are also incorporated in the document. A sub-Saharan African country is prohibited from benefiting if the country:

- is a Communist country;
- is a party to an arrangement or withholds or has the effect of withholding vital commodity resources or raises their prices to unreasonable levels;

- affords preferential treatment to products of a developed country which has, or is likely to have significant adverse effects on US commerce;
- has nationalised, expropriated or otherwise seized property;
- does not recognise or enforce arbitral awards to US citizens or corporations;
- aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution, any individual or group which has committed international terrorism;
- has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognised rights;
- has not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labour.³¹

Africa's endeavour to enter into the free trade area is not confined to the United States, but also includes the other industrialised countries within the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (see, Chapters 8, 10 and 12).

The resurgence of China's economic interest, with its potential dividends for Africa, cannot be taken lightly. On the other side of the global lens, Africa should tread carefully not to fall into the trap of what have been called *government-driven elite networks* (our emphasis), particularly with respect to China-Africa relations at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).³² Africa is still yearning for acquisition of appropriate science and technological development (see Chapter 14), which in many respects is still inchoate in the continent. The direct involvement of Africans in this endeavour, through partnerships with Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so-called BRIC countries), whether at the small and medium business levels should be encouraged (see Chapter 12).

In contrast to the Western countries, China pursues what can be characterised as a non-conditionality thesis, wherein Beijing puts greater premium on its own economic, political and strategic interests in Africa than the internal eco-political situations in the continent. One of the economic gains Africa received at the end of the 2003 China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) was debts forgiveness to 31 African countries amounting to more than US\$2 billion. China also exempted duties of over 190 commodities exported by the poorest African countries to Beijing.³³ During his visit to Africa in 2004, Chinese President, Hu Jintao, reiterated the Chinese foreign policy stance that China-Africa cooperation is 'free of political conditionality', which in his view will serve the 'interests of Africa and China'.³⁴ This trend of thinking has historically dominated China's foreign-policy behaviour in Africa.

African countries are still heavily dependent on mono-crop and mono-mineral commodities as their main sources of foreign exchange earnings. The attempts to move away from the historical trap of mono-economies and dependence on the traditional partners remain a major challenge for Africa (see Chapter 8). China's exertive entry into the continent and the role played by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) is gradually going

to assist Africa in continuing to diversify its external trade relations (See Chapters 9, 11 and 13). In fact China's increasing global role is likely to influence the way the Western industrialised countries handle their interests vis-à-vis Africa. The admission of Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa into their ranks in the G8 process can be understood in this context.

Part 1: Local and National Demensions

Part 1 of the book focuses on conceptual issues relating to the African state and the extent of its ability to address the complexities inherent in its countries and globally. Matlosa in Chapter 1 examines, from a theoretical perspective, the role of the state in managing diverse and competitive politics in Africa. The author identifies and elaborates on four main interrelated factors that hamper progress towards proper management of nation-building. These are: weakness of the African states; a lack of progress in the quest for the consolidation of multiparty democracy in the post-single party and praetorian state systems; a failure to transform African economies in conformity with political liberation; and perpetual conflicts in Africa and their inherent implications for sustainable eco-political development. Matlosa critically analyses the pros and cons of what he calls the 'soft state' and the 'hard state' in relation to nation-building. The author argues that a hard and interventionist state is necessary for the achievement of stability, sustainable eco-political development and consolidation of democracy.

In Chapter 2 De Kock focuses on the role and capacity of the state in dealing with conflicts, by examining the dynamics of rebel movements in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Ethiopia, Niger and Nigeria. He argues that historical burdens limit the ability of African states to exercise the attributes of the social contract and state, and therefore are unable to function optimally. Employing the Hobbesian philosophical and theoretical dispositions, De Kock posits that mobilisation of cooperative action among the populace for purposes of creating a hierarchical power constellation has the potential of empowering the state to enable it to control its territorial space and serve the needs of its diverse constituencies.

Ogom in Chapter 3 analyses the relation between indigenous organisations and social movements/constituencies with a special focus on the Nigerian state. Following on De Kock, Ogom contends that the relationship between the state and societal organisations depends on the type of government in power. The author observes that the democratisation trends taking root in Africa in the post-Cold War era have the potential of laying the foundation for cordiality and compromise between the indigenous organisations and the state. *Aiyede* in Chapter 4 adds an interesting dimension to the debate on the African state and its *raison d'être*, particularly with respect to the management of security.

The author contends, among other things, that there is a correlation between poverty, insecurity, insurgency and the weakness of the African state.

Part 2: Regional and Continental Reconstruction – Governance, Security and Economic Dimensions

In Chapter 5 Akokpari argues that a lack of good governance and accountability, with leaders who are intransigent to democracy at the helm of leadership, undermines continental development and integration. However, the author admits that the challenges that shape governance in Africa are ubiquitous and complex and are as such difficult to isolate. The author posits that good governance at the national level is an important ingredient for continental integration.

Following on Akokpari, Uzodike in Chapter 6 provides a historio-graphical trajectory of attempts to achieve good governance from the 1960s to the advent of the AU, as underpinned by the pan-African ideology. Although the institutional and operational structures of the OAU and AU contain fragments of pan-African governance, its success is dependent on a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities in terms of cooperation between local, national and supra-national institutions at regional and continental levels. The current efforts at creating a union government offer an opportunity to address this first-order question as a basis for establishing effective Afro-governance at all levels.

The role the AU plays in conflict resolution, mediation and peacekeeping, as well as the reincarnation of African Renaissance into the African body politic are explored in Chapter 7 by Okolo. The idea of African solutions to African problems, the author argues, should be complemented with partnerships with the West and other regions. Focusing on intra-African trade, Akinkugbe in Chapter 8 argues that, in order to deviate from the colonial pattern of trade, African countries have embraced regional integration mechanisms. However, regional integration schemes are yet to yield useful dividends for Africa, particularly with respect to intra-African trade. Most significantly, Africa still depends heavily on the exports of traditional commodities, namely cash crops and minerals, for its foreign earnings. The volatility of the international market for these commodities, which are traditionally destined for Europe and North America, make African countries vulnerable to price fluctuations. This trend makes Africa uncompetitive in the global trade arena. For this reason, Africa's growth prospects are dependent on the growth of, and harnessing opportunities for, inter-African trade.

In Chapter 9, Adejumbi and Rosalie deal with the relationship between the liberalisation of the market and the socio-economic costs of development. More specifically, the authors posit that market reforms inherent in the Bretton Woods institutions have impacted negatively on socio-economic

issues. The reforms increased, among other things, poverty and unemployment, and contributed to declining living standards and poor access to education and health facilities in Africa.

Part 3: External Relations and Issue Areas

As we have explained, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War ushered in a new epoch in international affairs. In many respects, these transformations, which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, had implications at national, regional and global levels. In Europe, for example, the Warsaw Pact countries were faced with intense internal pressure and revolutions that gradually succeeded in toppling Communism. The casualties in this trend of transformation were the demise of the régimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which paved the way for the reunification of Germany.

These transformations laid the foundation for the ‘new world order’ and opportunities for the realisation of what has been called emerging ‘*pax universalis*’ or the UN new world order dominated by normative principles.³⁵ Africa was not left out in these transformations. While Namibia joined the community of nations as a sovereign state in 1990, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1991 and was recognised by, among others, the African states, putting into question the *uti possidetis* principle, the life blood of the OAU. The apartheid régime also crumbled in 1994, ushering in a new era of democratic dispensation in South Africa. The chapters in this section address some of these and other issue areas.

In Chapter 10, Khadiagala contends that although a window of opportunity exists for Africa in various forums, such as the G8 and the UN, African leaders have not succeeded in making progress in their demand for agenda-setting. Notwithstanding their engagement in multilateral diplomatic interactions, particularly with the Western world, global asymmetries with adverse implications for Africa still persist. The recalcitrance of the Western-dominated institutions, the author observes, has forced Africa to turn to Asia, particularly China. The big question is of course whether China is Africa’s driver to sustainable development or whether its engagement with Africa will leave the continent worse off than it is currently.

The relationship between Africa and the West is discussed in detail by Lumumba-Kasongo in Chapter 11. The author assesses the Afro-Western countries’ traditional partnerships and the possibilities of the transformation of the relationships. The structural weaknesses of African states coupled with the Euro-American dominance of the global economy continue to undermine Africa’s development initiatives, with its external debt problem augmenting the crisis. For Africa to confront these challenges, the author contends, the continent needs to open its door to the liberalisation of its eco-political

milieu and positively engage its civil society. Lumumba-Kasongo suggests that a vibrant civil society and an interventionist state (see also Chapter 1) are prerequisites for Africa's development. While not disengaging with the traditional Western partners, the author argues, Africa should strengthen its multilateral diplomacy with other partners which are also experiencing global asymmetrical constraints.

In Chapter 12 Agbu explores, with specific examples, the 'place' of Africa in South-South relations. More specifically, the author puts into proper perspective the benefits – or lack thereof – Africa derives from its interactions with the emerging global South (EGS). The decisions emerging out of these South-South interactions, if properly and holistically implemented by Africa, have the potential to promote development in its holistic sense. Africa can also learn from other countries of the South on how to transform its institutional structures for the purposes of development, both human and material. Specifically, the author suggests that Africa should engage with the BRIC countries and learn from their historical successes.

In Chapter 13 Adadevoh focuses on institutional structures that need transformation to open the door for the empowerment of women. These institutional structures are historically entrenched in, among others, the socio-cultural, eco-political and religious praxes. The author suggests that for women to achieve tangible developmental empowerment, complementary integrative and institutional structures with both sexes working side by side should be the guiding normative principle in every sector in Africa. In the era of globalisation and technological development, in which opportunities are ubiquitous, a level playing ground for both sexes, Adadevoh argues, is a *sine qua non*.

In Chapter 14 Mhlahlo provides a detailed analysis of the development, or lack thereof, of space science in Africa as well as policies and challenges. The author also identifies and analyses the social benefits African states have experienced and gained from space science and technology. Mhlahlo contends that the issues of lack of funds and other challenges should not be used to prevent initiatives on technological development and innovation. Space science and technology can be employed to alleviate poverty and other societal problems.

In conclusion, we are of the view that the establishment, transformation and revitalisation of the African state – as well as the formation of continental and regional organisations, such as the AU and its corollaries, Nepad, the APRM and RECs – have since the 1990s been the focus of policy questions that address the issues of African conflict and security. Conflict-resolution initiatives by the AU in Togo (2005), Darfur (2003–present), Kenya (2008) and Madagascar (2009); SADC in Lesotho (1998) and the DRC (1999); ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990s); and IGAD in Somalia (2004); and Sudan (2005) serve as good examples in this endeavour. Nevertheless, security challenges continue to confront Africa, particularly regarding the continental and regional integration agenda. With all the efforts by the African leaders to

establish numerous bodies to manage continental affairs, the sticking question remains: are the people of Africa being brought on board to own these processes? More fundamentally, are these initiatives improving the lives of African people?

Policies that empower Africans, in our view, are enduring and have the potential of broadening the scope of democratisation trends and by implication, conflict resolution in the continent. Specifically, ownership by the people, through direct elections of regional representatives, for example, in the EAC, ECOWAS, ECCAS and SADC, would ensure the durability and legitimacy of the regional bodies. To what extent, for example, are the RECs, such as the EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS, laying the groundworks for empowerment of Africans through the exercise of sovereign rights by the citizens? The reality on the ground is not encouraging. Policies that address these issues have the potential of laying the foundation for the enlargement of regional sovereignty, democratisation and economic development. The involvement of Africa in international forums (See Chapter 10) can be achieved only through continental unity where consensus dictates the policy priorities of Africa. Suffice it to say, well-coordinated African multilateralism can strengthen the negotiating position of the continent and would guard against neo-colonial exploitation. The chapters in this book have attempted to address these interrelated complexities and in our view have opened the door for further research and debate.

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CHAPTER 1

**Managing Diversity and
Competitive Politics****Dilemmas of Nation-Building in Africa***Khabele Matlosa***Introduction**

Nation-building remains a major development challenge for many African states in the post-colonial epoch, particularly now in the context of accelerated globalisation bedevilled by the current global economic meltdown. Part of this challenge manifests itself in the failure of many African governments to manage the internal diversity that comes by way of social cleavages along various lines (class, race, ethnic, religious, region, gender, etc). Besides the challenge of managing diversity, many African states are still grappling with finding the right formula to conduct competitive politics – especially elections – in a peaceful manner in the era of a globalised democratisation wave. Abundant evidence is emerging from all the countries that have now undergone the governance self-assessment through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that one of the daunting hindrances to democracy, development and peace is the failure to manage diversity and competitive politics.

This chapter grapples with the politics of nation-building in contemporary Africa and how managing diversity and competitive politics is central to the nation-building and state-making projects. More specifically, the main thesis that this chapter proposes is that at the heart of the problem of managing diversity and competitive politics in Africa are four main dilemmas. First, in a majority of cases, African states are weak and therefore unable to be effective drivers of the nation-building project. This problem has been accentuated by decades of imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in many of these countries. Secondly, following decades of either military dictatorship, mono-party or one-person rule that pervaded the continent between the 1960s and late 1980s, the reintroduction of multiparty democracy that began in the early 1990s still remains a distant mirage in many African states and poses a challenge to nation-building and state-making. The recent post-election crises in Nigeria (2007), Kenya (2007/08) and Zimbabwe (2008) illustrate this point poignantly. Thirdly, Africa's political liberation has not been accompanied by the economic liberation critical for people-centred, sustainable human development. Management of diversity and competitive politics effectively requires the simultaneous achievement of democracy and

meaningful socio-economic development. Fourthly, sustainable peace and security continue to elude the continent despite the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid. Whereas inter-state conflicts have receded considerably since the onset of the current post-Cold War global era, intra-state conflicts – some of them triggered by politics of identity – still remain, and Somalia is a classic case in point here. There is no doubt that in countries engulfed by protracted violent conflict and war, diversity is more pronounced, and competitive politics tends to lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of violent conflict.

The above four main strands of the argumentation in this chapter are organised into various sections. The first section following these prefatory remarks discusses the problem of stateness in contemporary Africa. Does Africa need a ‘soft’ (read regulatory) or ‘hard’ (read interventionist) state? We pose these questions with a view to arguing that the nature and role of the state is crucial in the management of diversity and competitive politics in the continent. The second section analyses trends in the democratisation process in Africa and proposes that, whereas democratisation may amplify diversity, compared to authoritarianism, it allows for constructive management of diversity and peaceful political competition over control of state power. The third section argues that the economy and development strategy matter greatly in the process of managing diversity and competitive politics. In situations where economic inequalities are too wide and economic benefits are distributed in a skewed manner along lines of social cleavage, such as class, race, religion, region, etc., this may complicate the management of diversity. The fourth section argues that although there is now relative peace in Africa compared with the era of the Cold War, there are still pockets of intra-state conflict in a number of countries and these amplify the crisis of identity politics. The final section concludes the discussion and re-states the main thesis of the chapter.

The centrality of the state in Africa

The state is fundamental for nation-building. The state is central to the pursuit of democracy, development and peace. Controversy has raged over the years regarding the role of the state in economic development in Africa. Although to a considerable degree the tenacity of the ideological contestation on the state-development nexus has subsided today, debate on the balance between state and markets, as critical agencies for development, still rages. Throughout the three decades of its post-colonial existence, Africa has been driven principally by market forces. Many market fundamentalists have argued that states have no business in business, meaning that the state should stay away from the economic life of African societies. This view has been championed forcefully

by the Bretton Woods institutions, that is, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, especially during the 1970s and 1980s.

However, the stark reality is that market forces have no business interest in nation-building. So long as political stability exists, markets are happy, even if such stability prevails under conditions of authoritarian regimes. Hence our main contention in this chapter: that the state remains a key factor in nation-building, democracy, development and peace in Africa. This reality is borne out by years of failed experimentation with market-led economic adjustment programmes on the continent.

It is worth noting that following political independence the majority of African states followed a deliberate development strategy premised on *dirigisme* and tending ideologically towards economic nationalism. Good examples of this trend include Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda. At the time, this economic development strategy was also considered beneficial, as it was assumed to have great potential for promoting nation-building in tandem with the social advancement of the people. Why was the state so purposefully interventionist in those early days of post-colonial Africa? Quite obviously, the politico-economic environment at independence propelled state interventionism in Africa that was profoundly hostile to development. Hence the conflicting development agendas between the nationalist political elite, which enjoyed some modicum of political power, yet lacked an autonomous economic base, and foreign capital with massive political power and economic leverage over the African state. Paradoxically, the state appeared to have made token gestures towards development while trying to pass the responsibility for development on to foreign patrons. This is reflected by the manner in which most nationalist elites eagerly and wholeheartedly embraced economic dependence despite being eloquent on the fragility of political independence and the need to buttress it by being self-reliant. This shows that development as an ideology serves the interests of powerful foreign capital, and secondarily those of the dominant hegemonic class within Africa. It is this situation where the foreign powers through their financial support to development paradigms continue to dictate the pace of development, alienating and isolating the state in the economy.

The continued discomfort with Western influence upon the continent's development paradigm through their resources led the African ruling elites to adopt the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980.¹ The plan not only discusses the role of the state in development in the context of a deepening economic crisis, but also provides the framework through which nationalist elites continue to engage foreign powers on issues of exploitation arising from colonialism and apartheid. The plan emphasises self-reliance and self-sustaining growth, although states acknowledge their vulnerability to external forces. The Lagos Plan lays emphasis on self-reliance and aims to change the pattern of production from primary commodities to manufactured goods. Economic

nationalism is designed to stimulate production through promoting internal demand and reducing reliance on imported inputs. Significantly, it provides a road map for the attainment of Africa's economic development and independence.

Meanwhile, the World Bank in 1981 produced another development model through its 'Agenda for Action'², which focuses on the eradication of internal constraints to agricultural production, which include underdeveloped human resources and adverse climate conditions. As is typical of neo-liberalism, the model emphasises dynamism and efficiency of marketism, specialisation in primary production and more effective use of public-sector resources. This is despite the continuous downward spiral of commodity prices and the increase in the debt burden.

The search for an appropriate developmental paradigm continued with African political elites adopting Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) (1980–1990) which was not only rooted in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, but also aimed at radically changing the production and consumption patterns of the continent, enhancing socio-economic transformation, accelerating economic growth and development, and intensifying regional economic integration and cooperation.³ However, APPER was preoccupied with identifying and correcting policy errors of the past while encouraging free-market forces. The focus of the development paradigm was to remove identifiable constraints from the economies of the continent through policies, including better prices for the agricultural products and provision of extension services and infrastructures.

The Bretton Woods institutions soon introduced the economic adjustment model of development (a combined dosage of stabilisation and SAPs) that was uniformly implemented across the continent, regardless of the prevailing conditions. The economic adjustment programmes insisted on austerity measures, based on market forces. Economic adjustment policies would ensure that the continent remained the supplier of primary commodities to the global market while importing manufactured products from other regions. The programme was widely adopted in Africa in a manner suggesting that the IMF/World Bank medicine was suitable for all African states despite their very different economic ills. The Bretton Woods institutions argued that development would occur faster if marketism assumed a central role in the economy. Subsequently, the state was forced to restructure its state-owned enterprises and rationalise its operations and withdraw from economic and social activities. In a word, the state was forced to retreat from economic processes and simply become a regulator of markets. This is the type of state that in this chapter we perceive as a 'soft state'. This trend was much more pronounced in those countries that adopted the IMF/World Bank adjustment programmes. The state thus became a facilitator rather than a driver in the development process. As the economic conditions of Africa remained unresolved, and in many instances were exacerbated by IMF/World Bank austerity measures, other international organisations, such as the

UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), criticised the SAPs for lacking a human face. Thandika Mkandawire poignantly sums up the policy conundrum posed by the adjustment programmes:

The dethroning of the state as the driver of development led to a greater reliance on social provision by social actors. Increasingly, service provision is being transferred to NGOs. Much of the commercialization of service provision is premised on the regulatory capacity of the state, the responses of the bureaucracy to the new religion of adjustment, and the development and performance of the private sector. It also ignored the historical lessons learnt that showed that voluntary service provision would face difficulties in scaling up activities that may have worked at the micro-level, to national level, and that voluntarism tended to entail inherent institutional limits to coverage.⁴

Adjustment became the dominant policy framework in the continent largely because of the manner in which global forces were able to mobilise resources to support its implementation. Most African states have balance-of-payment difficulties, while the donor community finances a significant proportion of their budget. As a result, African states have become vulnerable to Western-driven ideologies and grandiose economic reforms. While some leaders might appear to strongly resist economic adjustment, particularly as it exposes the state to the electorate, they remain silent on the strengths of readily available resources.

A slight shift in policy was noticed in 1997 when the World Bank began to de-emphasise marketism as the driving force for development. The World Bank report⁵ sees the state as being central to socio-economic development, not as a direct provider of growth, but as a partner, catalyst and facilitator to development. This policy shift is explained, in part, by the failure of the economic adjustment programmes to deliver socio-economic development. As Mkandawire puts it 'the failure of structural adjustment programs has compelled even the most dogmatic institutions to recognise the positive role the state can play in the process of development, beyond acting as a "night watchman"'.⁶ This is the same position that has been maintained in a recent World Bank report, 'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?', which advocates for assertive leadership that complements the role of market forces in development.⁷ The same state should subscribe to the new political conditionality of good governance, the rule of law, transparency and democratisation, which are invariably the linkages between economic liberalisation and political liberalisation, both of which still aim to whittle the state and reify the supremacy of markets. If Africa is to succeed in institutionalising mechanisms for the constructive management of diversity and competitive politics, then surely there is need for a strong, not a weak state, an interventionist state and not merely a regulatory state and for a democratic and developmental rather than an authoritarian state. It is this

type of state that in this chapter is referred to as the 'hard state'. Hardness here denotes three main elements of such a state:

- Interventionist rather regulatory
- Balancing pursuit of people-centred socio-economic development with the free market rather than mortgaging human development to the illusive magic wand of market forces
- Democratic rather than authoritarian

It is to the last point above that the next section now turns its spotlight.

Democracy as a tool for managing diversity

There is no doubt that today the dominant mode of governance worldwide is democratic. Countries in every corner of the globe have jettisoned authoritarian governance and are increasingly aspiring for democracy. Democracy, therefore, has become a truly universal value and pursuit. Judging by the fascinating research findings from Afro-barometer surveys, evidence abounds suggesting that citizens of the various African countries – with few exceptions – have more trust and confidence in democracy than autocracy. One measure of this enthusiasm of citizens for the democratic governance process is their participation in regular elections to express their democratic right of choosing their leaders. There is no gainsaying that today regular multiparty elections have become an embedded political culture of the great majority of the 53 member states that form the African Union (AU). However, although a critical ingredient of democratic governance, an election on its own does not make democracy, as will become clear shortly.

This point brings us to the controversy that often surrounds our understanding and explanation of democracy. Democracy is not easy to define or explain. The simplest definition or explanation is one provided by the 16th President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, which perceives democracy as the 'government of the people, by the people, for the people'.⁸ Even despite Lincoln's useful guide, the term 'democracy' still remains a fairly nebulous concept to grasp and operationalise.

There are, basically, three different ways according to Landman⁹ in which democracy can be defined, explained and probably visualised. First, a minimalist definition (explanation and visualisation) of democracy locates the principle and practice of democracy around two principles or values, namely political competition or contestation and participation. This definition reduces democracy to elections and the existence of formal institutions, such as executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs), etc. The notion of competition or contestation 'captures the uncertain peaceful competition necessary for democratic rule, a principle

which presumes the legitimacy of some opposition, the right to challenge the incumbents ... the existence of free and fair elections and a consolidated party system'.¹⁰ The notion of participation presupposes political control of the citizens over the people who govern on their behalf. This notion 'captures the idea of popular sovereignty which presumes the protection of the right to vote as well as the existence of universal suffrage'.¹¹ This is what electoral democracy is all about. This is surely the narrowest and shallowest version of democracy throughout the globe, yet this has tended to be the dominant form of democracy in contemporary Africa. There is no doubt that the majority of the AU's 53 member states embrace this minimalist form of democracy. In many instances, the political class in Africa tends to erroneously equate democracy with elections. They tend to emphasise political stability over and above institutionalisation of democratic governance. In a country such as the landlocked Kingdom of Lesotho elections have been held regularly since its independence in 1966. However, most of these elections have had little, if any, direct impact on democracy-building. They have, instead, triggered violent conflict. Consequently, the ruling political class tend to consider imperatives for political stability as paramount over the pursuit for democratic governance. In fact, there tends to be a convenient conflation of democracy and stability as coterminous.

Secondly, the liberal notion of democracy extends its essence beyond just contestation and participation to include the protection and promotion of political rights and civil liberties and an institutional framework for a human rights culture in between elections. It includes other institutional dimensions (guarantees) such as accountability, transparency, constraint over leaders, representation of citizens, the rule of law, property and minority rights. It is clearly a slightly higher pedestal or form of democracy compared to electoral democracy per se. This is what liberal democracy is all about. While some African countries have embraced liberal democracy and in the process mimicked the Western world, others have actually adopted an illiberal democracy that has brought about what many scholars now refer to as 'electoral authoritarian regimes'. The Kingdom of Swaziland is one such regime, with its no-party elections held under conditions of autocracy premised on absolute monarchy.

Thirdly, the structuralist definition (explanation and visualisation) of democracy extends the whole ideation, principle and practice of democracy beyond procedural (electoral) and institutional (liberal) dimensions found in the earlier two definitions, and introduces the socio-economic (structural) dimensions. In this definition, issues of social justice and respect for socio-economic rights loom larger in social or developmental democracy than in electoral and liberal democracies. This is the defining feature of what is usually referred to variously as 'social democracy' or 'developmental democracy'. Compared to the earlier definitions, this is the maximalist ideation of democracy, and no single African state has attained this form of democracy

as yet. There are a few countries – including South Africa – that aspire to institutionalise a democratic developmental state and therefore have a vision towards this form of democracy, but they are not yet social or developmental democracies. Ideally, this is the best form of democracy for the management of diversity and competitive politics as it combines political rights, civil liberties with social welfare and redistributive issues and in the process down-plays social cleavages, especially those premised on identity.

In a nutshell, a useful approach to our understanding of democracy and its intersection with management of diversity and competitive politics in contemporary Africa is basically to have in mind these three different paths or trajectories of democratisation globally and how they manifest in the continent, namely that:

- at the lowest (minimalist) level, democracy is simply just procedural and limited to elections (electoral democracy);
- at a slightly higher (intermediate) level, the institutional dimensions of democracy have emphasised its liberal form with emphasis on civil and political rights during and in between elections (liberal democracy);
- at another relatively higher (maximalist) level, democracy transcends its procedural and institutional forms and transforms the socio-economic condition of the people by way of improving the living conditions of the citizens (social or developmental democracy).

Representative democracy has now become the dominant form of governance worldwide. The three principal ideas behind representative democracy are:

- government must be elected by the people for it to enjoy the moral title to rule;
- government must be subject to political control by citizens;
- all citizens must be equal before the law of the land, enjoying human rights that are respected and protected by government.

Adebayo Adedeji rightly observes that ‘democracy, defined principally as the right of the people to choose their own government, through institutionalized multiparty system and periodic secret ballots, has become mandatory for the legitimacy of every state and, most importantly, for qualifying for donor support, debt relief and debt forgiveness from donors and multilateral monetary and development institutions, a phenomenon which cynics have labelled as donor democracy’.¹²

In essence, a democratic government is one that allows for a multiparty political system, is accountable to the people, runs national affairs in a transparent and responsive manner and, above all, its legitimacy rests upon a credible electoral process. These are the major tenets of a thriving and vibrant liberal democracy. It should be emphasised that while the above basic

elements of a liberal democratic model are universally accepted, a true democracy ought to ensure the promotion, protection and observance of all the four generations of human rights, namely:

- civil liberties;
- socio-cultural rights;
- the right to development;
- the right to a clean environment.

Promotion and protection of the above rights in a democracy therefore clearly suggests that democracy (not authoritarianism) is a fundamental prerequisite for development and stability throughout the world. The converse is also true; namely that undemocratic governance (authoritarianism) breeds mal-development and instability. During the Cold War, due in large measure to the ideological bi-polarity of the time, authoritarian régimes found fertile ground to germinate and prosper in many parts of the African continent. The principal Cold War patrons, namely the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), would support various regimes throughout the world giving due regard to their political allegiance to a particular ideological world-view (socialism or capitalism) and not their democratic credentials.

The world is now a totally different place in terms of its political outlook since the transformative developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s.¹³ These transformative developments have witnessed a paradigmatic and systemic shift away from undemocratic to democratic forms of governance. Today, every country considers itself (either rightly or wrongly) as democratic. Some governments even go to the extent of using the adjective 'democratic' in the official name of a country, just to make the point (for example, the 'Democratic' Republic of Congo).

The end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in particular, accelerated the democratic momentum in Africa. Not only had apartheid set South Africa apart from the rest of Africa, but it had also prompted the South African regime to pursue a militaristic foreign policy anchored upon the deliberate destabilisation of the African continent (especially the immediate southern Africa region) with a view to frustrate efforts towards liberation and freedom of the majority of the citizens of South Africa. This strategy (commonly known then as Total National Strategy), purportedly meant to ward off liberation forces, could not redress the existential crisis of the apartheid regime for long and in the early 1990s a process towards a political settlement of the liberation war in South Africa started in earnest. The Cold War and apartheid ideologies alike promoted militaristic politics across various regions of the African continent. They accentuated inter-state and intra-state conflicts, in the process both fanning identity-based conflicts and at the same time compromising efforts towards nation-building and state-making.

Since the demise of the Cold War and apartheid, democratic transitions in Africa have been underway accompanied by the holding of regular elections. Although elections constitute an important ingredient of democracy, on their own they are not tantamount to democracy. Put somewhat differently, although critical to the current democratic process in African countries, elections, as such, are not synonymous with democratic governance. An election is just one of the key ingredients of democracy and democratisation. As the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report reminds us, 'true democratisation means more than elections. It requires the consolidation of democratic institutions and the strengthening of democratic practices, with democratic values and norms embedded in all parts of society.'¹⁴ Therefore, the challenges for democracy and democratisation in Africa are still many and varied and indeed daunting, so to speak. The UNDP Human Development Report isolates six such challenges as follows:

- a system of representation, with well functioning political parties and interest associations;
- an electoral system that guarantees free-and-fair elections as well as universal suffrage;
- a system of checks and balances based on the separation of powers, with independent judicial and legislative branches;
- a vibrant civil society, able to monitor government and private business – and provide alternative forms of political participation;
- free and independent media;
- effective civilian control over the military and other security forces.¹⁵

Democracy has both intrinsic and instrumentalist values. The intrinsic value of democracy lies in its promotion of civil liberties and political freedoms. Its instrumentalist value lies in the fact that democracy is not, to all intents and purposes, an end in and of itself. Democracy must (or at least ought to) be a means to an end. That end should be nation-building, development and peace. To wind up this section, it is worth reiterating that it is easier to manage diversity and competitive politics under democratic regimes than situations marked by authoritarian regimes. Democracy is more a conflict resolution mechanism compared to dictatorship. This is because democracy is mediated through the politics of consensus and persuasion while dictatorship is imposed upon the people through coercion and force. Without development and peace, democracy will forever remain a hollow concept out of reach of ordinary people and understood only by the political elite and serving the partisan (at times self-serving) political interests of a small coterie of the powerful elites.

It is to the centrality of development (particularly people-centred development) to the nation-building and state-making projects that we now turn.

Development as an instrument for redistribution of national resources

As with the concept of 'democracy', the notion of 'development' presents conceptual challenges with regard to its exact meaning. We noted above that often democracy can be wrongly reduced to electioneering whereby so long as a country holds regular elections it can be erroneously regarded as democratic. Such narrow analysis suffers from what in the extant literature is often referred to as 'the fallacy of electoralism'.¹⁶ That is to say it is a wrong assumption that the holding of regular elections (their quality aside) is all what democracy is about. Democracy, as we argued in the previous section, by far transcends elections. A country can hold regular multiparty elections, yet remains undemocratic. Conversely, no country can be considered democratic without credible, acceptable and legitimate elections.

A similar confusion can be observed in the debate on development. Development simply explained refers to the progressive improvement of the socio-economic livelihoods of a people in a given country, especially in meeting their basic human rights, namely: food, shelter, health, education and employment. These are the most basic needs that every human being requires in order first to ensure his or her dignity and second to enjoy other rights such as civil liberties and socio-economic rights. In the extant literature, there is a tendency by some to treat development as though it is synonymous with economic growth. Economic growth simply refers to the aggregate expansion of the economy often measured by such indices as gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP). It is perfectly possible for a country to achieve fairly high economic growth rates over the years, yet its development remains stagnant, or worse still, deteriorates. This observation suggests that a country can have economic growth without development, yet no country can achieve development without economic growth. However, is there a link between democracy and development? How does development relate to management of diversity and competitive politics in contemporary Africa?

The interface between democracy and development has remained a heated subject globally.¹⁷ The bone of contention has revolved around whether or not there is a causal relationship between political development (democracy) and economic progress (development). This may sound like the 'chicken-and-egg' paradox. However, the debate is a serious one, which teases out the interconnectedness between politics and economics in the quest for the achievement of sustainable socio-economic development. Two schools of thought have dominated this discourse on the interface between democracy and development. The first espouses the idea that non-democratic regimes are better suited to drive development. Amartya Sen refers to this belief as 'the Lee hypothesis' given that the former president of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was the staunchest advocate of this school

of thought. Sen argues that ‘there is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian governance and suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to economic development ... Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence to show that what is needed for generating faster economic growth is a friendlier economic climate rather than a harsher political system.’¹⁸ The second school of thought supports the view that democracy is a *sine qua non* for sustainable socio-economic development. Adedeji poignantly observes that:

The fundamental transformation that is required in the development domain is a holistic developmental strategy. This will in turn require an equally holistic back-up in the domain of democracy. As I have reiterated again and again, the deconstruction and reconstruction of politics and governance is imperative. And for optimal effectiveness, both must be treated – both in conception and operationalisation as two blades of a pair of scissors. Just as there can be no genuine and sustainable democracy in the absence of a democratically determined development, so also can there be no genuine and sustainable development in the absence of social mobilization, popular participation, economic and political empowerment and the uninhibited exercise of political rights. People all over the world are yearning for freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity.¹⁹

A more useful approach for the realisation of the linkage between democracy and development is the sustainable human development approach introduced by the UNDP. For Adedeji, sustainable human development (SHD) is a larger and more encompassing paradigm. It is development that not only generates economic growth, but also redistributes its benefits equitably. It empowers people rather than marginalising them. It regenerates rather than destroys the environment. Finally, it prioritises the poor by enlarging their choices and opportunities. Without doubt, SHD is pro-people, pro-nature, pro-jobs and *ipso facto* pro-youth and pro-women. As such, it umbilically links economics and politics together, like the horse and the carriage.²⁰

SHD does hinge upon democratic governance in a fundamental way. The SHD has become one of the most important notions in development discourse in earnest since the first global human development report was produced in 1990. It has been used widely as one of the most reliable and clearly measurable indicators for social development. For this and other related reasons, the SHD concept has added to the criticism of the reliability and utility of such indicators as GDP and GNP as adequate indices for measuring socio-economic development *à la* World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In contrast to economic and narrow indices such as GDP and GNP, the concept of SHD has introduced better-refined indices such as the human development index (HDI), the gender development index

(GDI) and the human poverty index (HPI) with well-defined measurable variables and components.

Thus, SHD essentially denotes a process of enlarging peoples' choices in a manner that enables them to enjoy *long, healthy and creative lives*.²¹ SHD, therefore, denotes a decent standard of living for people and has three main components used to measure socio-economic progress in countries, namely:

- longevity, measuring life expectancy and state of health;
- knowledge, measuring literacy rate; and
- per capita income, measuring standard of living and poverty incidence.

In pursuit of the SHD agenda in 2000 the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Declaration, committing member states to achieving eight millennium development goals (MDGs), as depicted in Table 1.1. Judging by the wide-ranging commitments, the MDGs constitute a global social contract which if successfully implemented, would transform societies in a positive direction both socio-economically as well as politically.

When progress on the achievement of the MDGs was reviewed in September 2005, during the UN General Assembly in New York, it was evident that in all the eight areas the gap between declaration, on one hand, and political commitment and policy practice, on the other, remained wide. Consequently, the MDGs have not yet been achieved and the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report points an accusing finger at three interrelated factors for this failure: ineffective aid, unequal trade, and conflict and instability. The report argues that achievement of the MDGs will not be realised unless 'we can decisively resolve the bottlenecks currently retarding progress at the pace and scale that are needed over the next decade in three broad areas: aid, trade and conflict'.²²

The pursuit of SHD and concerted efforts towards achieving the MDGs can go a long way in helping African countries manage diversity and competitive politics much more constructively. Redistribution issues are crucial for nation-building and state-making. Whereas economics matters a great deal in nation-building, the state of peace and security in contemporary Africa matters as well. It is to this that in the next section we now turn our spotlight.

Peace as a pre-condition for managing competitive politics

Democracy cannot prevail and endure under conditions of violent conflict and war. By the same token, development is impossible under conditions of war. It then goes without saying that both democracy and development require, as their condition *sine qua non*, peace and constructive management of conflicts (both violent and non-violent; both overt and covert). While recognising the

negative impact of violent conflict to both democracy and development, it is important to also appreciate the impact of conflict on the management of diversity and competitive politics.

Although conflict exists everywhere as one of the defining features of power relations in all African countries, once it becomes violent and belligerent states seek violent means of resolving it, conflict then turns counter-productive for nation-building, democracy and development. In a nutshell, if well managed through constructive mechanisms, conflict could become a dynamising force for democracy and development, but violence induces negative impacts of societal conflicts with detrimental consequences for nation-building and state-making. This observation is important in order for us to recognise that not all conflicts are counter-productive and to drive the point home that conflict is part and parcel of societal power relations and cannot be wished away.

In this scheme of things, the challenge facing African countries is to devise mechanisms for the constructive management of conflict at three main levels, namely:

- conflict prevention to pre-empt conflict through early-warning systems;
- conflict management/resolution to deal with existing conflict aiming to avoid a violent rupture; and
- conflict transformation to manage a violent conflict constructively and bring about peace.

All these three approaches to managing conflict are useful in the realisation and sustenance of peace that is a fundamental prerequisite for democracy and development in Africa. These approaches are also important in the process of managing diversity and competitive politics more constructively. Given that diversity and conflict cannot be wished away, the challenge for states is to find viable mechanisms for managing conflict through constructive and peaceful approaches that may involve peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

It is worth noting that during the Cold War period African countries were trapped in the iron grip of superpower-induced inter-state and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts were generally violent and costly to these countries, especially in relation to democracy and development. These conflicts were also often not managed constructively with a view to bringing about sustainable peace. Since the collapse of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, a new trend has been underway in terms of conflict and peace in Africa. Clearly, there is a noticeable trend in the reduced incidence of protracted and violent inter-state conflict. Be that as it may, intra-state conflict in many African countries still constitutes a major challenge. Thus, more than the ideology-based spectre of violent inter-state conflict of the Cold War era, today resource-based intra-state conflicts constitute a hurdle

Table 1.1 MDGs and targets

MDGs	Targets
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than US\$1 a day
	Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	Target 3: Ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality rate
Goal 6: Combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases	Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and have begun to reverse the spread of HIV/Aids
	Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and have begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
	Target 10: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water
	Target 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development	Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system
	Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries
	Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states
	Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries
	Target 16: Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
	Target 17: Provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries
	Target 18: Make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication technologies

Source UNDP (2003) *Human Development Report 2003*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 1–3

in the quest for sustainable democracy and socio-economic development. Violent conflict (whether inter-state or intra-state) accentuates diversity and postpones democratic and competitive politics. Under such conditions, a number of African countries may not achieve nation-building and state-making. They may not achieve the vision of institutionalised and consolidated democratic governance. They may not achieve sustainable human development. And above all, they may not achieve sustainable peace and security.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the various challenges facing contemporary Africa in its daunting tasks of nation-building and state-making since the achievement of political independence in the 1960s. The chapter recognises that the management of diversity and competitive politics rests at the heart of nation-building and state-making. The key challenges for managing diversity and competitive politics have been isolated into four main categories. The first relates to the nature and role of the state given that it is crucial in the management of diversity and competitive politics in the continent. The chapter concludes that Africa needs a strong rather than a weak state, an interventionist rather than a merely regulatory state, and a democratic and not autocratic state if efforts towards a constructive management of diversity and competitive politics are to bear palatable fruits. This has been referred to in the chapter as a 'hard' as opposed to a 'soft' state. Soft states may not be capable of managing diversity and competitive politics as they tend to defer their social responsibility easily to market forces. In a nutshell, Africa needs a democratic developmental state.

The second category relates to trends in the democratisation process as part and parcel of the global democratic wave. The basic conclusion is that although democracies open up societies to diverse views and opinions, and as such amplify diversity, democracies are more amenable to the constructive management of diversity and competitive politics. The state of 'democraticness' of Africa varies markedly from one region to another and from one country to another. The deepening and consolidation of democratic governance should remain on the radar screen of nation-building and state-making in Africa. Authoritarianism should be jettisoned by all states in line with the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.²³ Democracy, unlike authoritarianism, has greater potential for the promotion of constructive management of diversity and competitive politics. It is important that all AU member states accede to the APRM and undergo the governance self-assessment process and implement the national plan of action emanating from the assessment. Such initiatives could prove useful for the deepening and sustainability of democratic

governance and constructive management of diversity and competitive politics.

The third relates to the state of the economy and the trajectories of development strategies. Economic development, and especially redistributive issues, matter greatly for the management of diversity and competitive politics. In situations where economic inequalities are too wide and economic benefits are distributed in a skewed manner along lines of social cleavage such as class, race, religion, region, etc. management of diversity and competitive politics is complicated. There have to be deliberate efforts to redistribute wealth in an equitable and fair manner so as to tackle poverty and inequality. African countries need to make concerted efforts towards achieving SHD through such targets as the MDGs. In that way, African countries will go a long way in institutionalising effective mechanisms for the management of diversity and competition, especially where structural factors loom large in driving internal conflicts which then are accentuated by electoral politics, as was the case in Kenya in 2007.

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CHAPTER 2

The African Post-Colonial State/Post-Adjustment State and the Social Contract

Petrus de Kock

Introduction

Any interrogation of the reality of the post-colonial/post-adjustment state, and its associated social reality in Africa, has to subject the very idea of the state to thorough scrutiny. The word that will, of necessity, have to occupy centre stage in that process is: war. This is no simple task, given the fact that in many remote parts of the continent pitched battles are fought for recognition, economic opportunity, political power, food, access to resources, and against injustices committed not by outside forces or colonial powers, but by African leaders, armed militias, guerrilla movements, criminal networks and warlords. The so-called ills and failures of the African state make for good media stories, but images of starving people displaced by fighting between government and guerrilla armies, and those of the expensive shoes worn by the wives of corrupt leaders do little to answer the more fundamental root questions concerning the relative state of health of the state in Africa today.

The first historical fact that has to be acknowledged in any engagement with the question of the state in Africa is that the state which rises from the rubble left behind by colonial administrations as they departed African shores during the 20th century, was from its very inception at colonisation, built upon the logic of command and control with the secondary objective of extracting as much value from the territory as possible. Dossou Zounmenou sheds light on this issue when he argues that: 'Already fragile at independence in their structure, nature and composition, many states in Africa could not resist the post-Cold War multi-dimensional challenges, which shook them in their very existence.'¹ However, the specific challenges faced by the post-Cold War state are preceded by the violent history associated with the creation of states in Africa. Zounmenou argues that the colonial borders drawn by European powers put mere empty shells of states in place over internally diverse populations.² This lays the foundation for much of the post-colonial violence, revolution and rebel activity that continues unabated in many parts of the continent to this day. In addition to the acts of political, military and economic violence that accompany the creation of the state in Africa, the institution itself was often minimalistic, unable to establish control over

territories, and limited in its reach to serve the needs of inhabitants. The African state is thus ambushed by its own unfortunate history.

This chapter proposes that the challenges of economic growth, continental integration and social development in Africa depend on imagining and implementing state systems that can accommodate and serve vastly different social forces and constituencies present in African states. The task awaiting political leaders, activists and intellectuals calls for an engagement with the basic questions of: why should there be a state and on what conditions do citizens/people consent to being governed? What are the benefits and the goal of states and governments? What are the rebel movements telling us? What role does, or can, political imagination play in the engagement with the state in Africa?

These questions are answered below.

Why the state?

The basic question that forms the foundation of this interrogation of the state is: why should there be a state and on what conditions do citizens/people consent to being governed? The basic issue to be discussed here follows on this question, and is informed by an indicator of the extent to which African states are unable to control territories under their sovereign jurisdiction; this being the number of internally displaced people (IDP) on the continent. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) notes in a recent report that: 'At the end of 2007, there were around 12,7 million IDPs in Africa, close to half of the people forcibly displaced worldwide. During that year, 1,6 million people were newly displaced across the continent, the highest number in any of the regions discussed in this report, as new or continuing armed conflicts and generalised violence caused displacement in 13 countries.'³ The fundamental political question underlying these statistics concerns the ability of the state to project its power internally to protect citizens, and to play a constructive developmental role.

The state is, in the core of its philosophical logic, a political superstructure that binds power structures together, administers space and facilitates relations between the rulers and ruled. In addition to this, it forges legal frameworks and institutions to regulate relations between individuals, groups, communities and sectors of the population. Pervading these zones of state activity is economic activity, which is, of course, in many cases of rebellion, civil war, or political violence, the wellspring of political discontentment. But, with instability and war comes the basic choice individuals and groups have to make. This choice is articulated by Thomas Hobbes when he argues that the first and basic goal of the state is to establish peace within its own realm.⁴ Individual members of the society have to choose to surrender part of their individual will and power to a common or unified power, which will ultimately work to protect society. From this common consent to being governed by a higher power arises what Hobbes calls an 'artificial man'. This artificial man

thus binds the will of all members of society together as a collective embodiment and central source of power. Thus Hobbes states:

But as men, for the attainment of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificial Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificial Chains, called *Civil Lawes*, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Sovereign Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.⁵

To be governed is therefore a major psychological, communal and individual step to take seeing that, above all, it requires a primal act or moment of submission to a higher human power. Hobbes justifies the idea of submitting to the higher power thus: 'For in the act of submission, consisteth both our obligation, and our liberty ...'⁶ By submitting to the state and agreeing to follow its laws, the individual gains freedom from being subjected to acts of random violence, extortion, intimidation, or threats to his or her person and property. The state ensures that relations among people are regulated in such a manner as to afford every person with the opportunity of going about his or her lives in a condition of social or collective peace.

The goal of the state is to provide a stable foundation upon which life can be preserved, and security for all guaranteed through imposing a collective constraint on all. The basic philosophical foundation, and also reason for the creation and imposition of the state, is the need for collective security. Hobbes argues: 'The final cause, end or designe of men, (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others), in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby ...'⁷ If Hobbes's logic holds, humans act in a manner to safeguard their future. The collapse and fragmentation of Somalia in the late 1980s and early 1990s provides the most dramatic illustration of the failure of collective restraint. Today Somalia boasts more than a million IDPs, and large areas that can be aptly described as ungoverned spaces.

David Laitin provides a basic historical matrix of roleplayers each with a significant stake in the process of imploding the Somali state. He contends that in the late 1980s the Siad Barre regime and its inner coalition of three clans (Marreexaan, Ogaadeen and Dhulbahante ([MOD]) '... were in full scale war against Isxaaqs of the former British colony in the North-West (organised into the Somali National Movement, the SNM), the Majeerteens in the North-East (organised as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the SSDF) and the Hawiyas to Mogadishu's immediate west and south (organised as the United Somali Congress, the USC)'.⁸ The beginning of the penultimate fall of the Somali state came when the USC army drove Siad Barre from the country

and installed Cali Mahdi as president. Mohammad Farah Aideed, a military leader of the USC, eventually, by late 1991, challenged Cali Mahdi's right to be president, and Laitin argues that 'by late 1992, due to the civil war, the entire infrastructure of the country was ruined, mass killing, starvation and disease afflicted many of the population, there was no central government that could negotiate on behalf of the state, and international relief workers were nearly as vulnerable to attack as was the Somali population'.⁹ The case of the collapse of the Somali state provides insight in the immediate humanitarian and dire long-term consequences of the reverse-engineering of the state. It shows the extent to which a collapsing and/or failing state can expose inhabitants to a retreat into Hobbes's 'state of nature' where no common law or commonwealth is present to protect citizens.

Given the human and economic cost of internal conflict, and as a result of the fact that such conditions perpetuate economic underdevelopment while they also put a serious break on processes of regional and continental integration, it is necessary to understand the unique challenge African states have to confront. This implies that an engagement with the 'problems' of state formation in Africa asks of one to acknowledge the reality of rebel movements as well as the institutional inability of states to maintain internal cohesion. This will essentially deepen one's view on the spark of revolt, and thus provide insight into the socio-political territory the state has to stabilise in order to achieve national unity, administrative functionality and peace within its socio-cultural realm.

The war machine and the state

A war machine is, according to Deleuze and Guattari,¹⁰ in the first instance irreducible to the state apparatus, while it operates outside of its sovereignty and prior to its law. Rebel movements and armed militias that draw invisible battle lines to either attack a state or preserve a community's natural rights against the neglect or abuse forthcoming from states and governments can be defined as 'war machines'. It should be acknowledged, however, that the context in which they develop the idea of the war machine relates to a consideration of historical social forces, usually of a nomadic nature, which resist and prevent state formation. Rebel movements are not necessarily out to prevent state formation, but the presence of mobile, armed militias and groups in a state's territory allows for an interpretation of such movements as war machines.

Not only do the existence of armed groups outside of the formal structures of the state pose security threats, but, more importantly, an analysis of the rationale such movements give for their existence can shed much light on the depth of the internal fault lines that have to be bridged by state systems in Africa. Analysis of the state in Africa often focuses solely on systemic interrogations of the formal structural shortcomings, or the relative level of non-existence and dysfunctionality of state infrastructures in Africa. The analysis

embarked on in this chapter is not intended to be an intervention in managerial functionality and bureaucratic institutionalisation, but will instead trace the faint outlines of the intellectual, theoretical and very practical/concrete battlefronts that shape the operational spaces wherein states have to forge internal coherence to achieve Hobbes's lofty goal of collective peace.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that: 'It is not enough to affirm that the war machine is external to the state apparatus. It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of interiority we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in the habit of thinking.'¹¹ During the past two decades Africa has made some progress on the front of ending long-running civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sudan and Burundi, to name but a few. This means that not only have state systems had to change to accommodate erstwhile enemies and to address the needs of political opponents, but they have had to implement new principles of governance in the process. This is why Deleuze and Guattari's illustration of the war machine as an entity that operates completely outside of the sovereignty of the state apparatus contributes to analyses of rebel movement activity in Africa. It does this by showing that the state supposedly embodies and incorporates 'legitimate' violence. Yet, the state in Africa is challenged in several cases by war machines because it covers the illegitimate use of the instruments of violence (armed forces, police and intelligence) by appealing to the principle that the state is supposedly the embodiment and sole arbiter of the 'legitimate' use of means of violence.

It is, however, important to arrive at a preliminary understanding of what exactly it is that a central power, or state, has to do in order to lock systems of total territorial control into place. Deleuze and Guattari argue that '... the central power of the State is hierarchical, and constitutes a civil-service sector; the centre is not in the middle (*a milieu*), but on top, because the only way it can recombine what it isolates is through subordination'.¹² The state, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has to make the diverse points of power encompassed by the state 'resonate together'. This means that the task the state has, is to incorporate segments of a society, different classes, and divergent modes of production, linguistic, religious and other identities, war machines in some cases, into the fold of the state. This is what they call a '... phenomenon of *intra-consistency*'. This intra-consistency of the state requires that the divergent interests present in the territory of the state each have to be isolated, infiltrated and, to some extent, controlled or co-opted by the state. Following on this act of creating a hierarchical power constellation, the state has to recombine all the isolated cogs of a society within the wider canopy, or umbrella, the state unfolds across its sovereign territorial space. This frames the peculiar challenge the post-colonial state is confronted with. It furthermore implies that the post-colonial African state has to reconstruct its intra-consistency from a myriad of pieces which, unlike a jigsaw puzzle, do not come in a box of discordant pieces that are designed to fit snugly together

in a pre-fabricated pattern. War machines that challenge state authority, sovereignty and legitimacy are therefore discordant elements (pieces) that confront the post-colonial state with its inconsistencies.

A vast body of literature exists that traces the intricate relationship between socio-political instability and economic underdevelopment. The concentration of power and wealth at the apex of governmental and state structures can, in a weird twist of political fate, sow the seeds of the destruction of both state and government by providing subjugated groups with the spark for open revolt. If the basic reason for the existence of the state is collective popular consent to allow greater powers to enforce laws, then it stands to reason that there must be reasons why political leaders and individuals decide to mobilise themselves in armed guerrilla movements (war machines). Misra indicates that: 'The act of rebellion ... requires effective mobilization strategies: strategies to facilitate the consolidation of grievances and which articulate it as one unified whole.'¹³ It is the mobilisation strategies adopted by guerrilla and rebel movements that effectively draw people away from the interior zone of the sovereign state, towards the exterior zones occupied by the conceptual and physical space under rebel control.

A brief series of examples forthcoming from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Niger, Nigeria, and the Ogaden region (Ethiopia), are explored below to animate the complexities implied in the process of state formation. Space does not allow for a full historical narrative on the examples, movements, conflicts and issues implied in each case, however, the main purpose of the examples is to underscore Misra's proposition that civil war is fundamentally actor-oriented.¹⁴ This implies, further, that an actor-oriented analysis will be needed when engaging with challenges to statehood in Africa on a case-by-case basis. The examples will, additionally, show how African states or societies, as Misra contends, may have inherited deep fault lines capable of destabilising them. A multitude of fault lines can be identified, but this discussion will focus on the fault lines around mining activities and associated conflicts where natural resources such as oil are concerned.

In his analysis of theories which deal with reasons why civil wars break out, Misra identifies factors such as relative deprivation and grievance; institutional imbalances; greed; and the politics of identity (for example, ethnicity, religion, poverty).¹⁵ One or a combination of all these factors are to be found in the examples outlined below.

Examples of war machines

Democratic Republic of Congo

The eastern DRC has, as a result of historical and regional factors, been witness to wave upon wave of war, rebel activity and general instability. Not only

are there war machines that operate and challenge the sovereignty of the DRC, but movements present in the region also pose a threat, and are intimately related to conflicts in neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Burundi. Some of the rebel groups active in North and South Kivu province are the: *Patriotes Résistants du Congo* (Pareco); *Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR); *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP). The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) notes that North and South Kivu provinces remain at the centre of the above rebel movements' activities.¹⁶ The most prominent figure in this region is renegade General Laurent Nkunda who acts like a law upon himself. Until the beginning of 2009, when Rwanda and the DRC's government made a surprise deal to form a joint military operation to thwart the FDLR, and to arrest General Nkunda, fighting between FDLR and government forces has been responsible for the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people and the death of civilians. Stephanie McCrummen writes about the deal between Rwanda and the DRC and notes that:

The operation is part of the wide-ranging military, political and economic deal between Congo and Rwanda, which represents a significant rapprochement between the two countries ... Rwanda agreed to pull the plug on its proxy, rebel leader Laurent Nkunda, whose advance across eastern Congo, last year, displaced at least 250 000 people ... Congo, in turn, agreed to allow Rwandan troops in to fight the Hutu militias whose leaders allegedly participated in the genocide and are now entrenched in lucrative mining businesses in the East.¹⁷

The main challenges facing the DRC and Rwandan states include trans-border rebel activity, and local ethnic and political allegiances that challenge the sovereignty of both states. Underlying these current conflicts is, among other issues, access to mineral deposits and mining activity in the eastern DRC. Africa Mining Intelligence reports that Hutu rebels of the FDLR control a significant share of mining in North Kivu province. According to this report, 2 948 kg of cassiterite was exported through Goma in 2006 while the FDLR controls the extraction and trade of cassiterite and gold in Walowa-Yungu, as well as cassiterite extraction and trade at Wassa in North Kivu.¹⁸

Mali

The main security concern in northern Mali encompasses two types of extra-state political activity. The first relates to the growing activity of *Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) – based in southern Algeria and northern Niger. The more direct threat to Mali's internal sovereignty concerns the activities of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga's *Alliance Touareg Nord-Mali pour le Changement* (ATNMC). The EIU indicates that although Mali's president is engaging with the ATNMC, the underlying motivation for rebel groups to form and act against the state is to force the government into giving economic concessions.

It further states that: 'A long-lasting peace may be more difficult to achieve if new Tuareg groups emerge hoping to emulate Mr Ag Bahanga's success in using force to extract economic concessions from the government.'¹⁹ On 21 May 2008 a Tuareg rebel attack on a military base in Abeibara left 22 people dead, and it has been reported that attacks have also occurred further south in the country, raising concerns that some rebel groups may be increasing their operational zones further south to pressurise the government. In this example, as is the case in the DRC, it is possible to identify the central feature of mobilising rebel forces to access economic opportunities and income from resources.

Ethiopia

One of the more obscure rebel movements active in Africa today is the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). It is obscure for the simple reason that the struggle of the ONLF has been subsumed under the waves of tragic reports of conditions in neighbouring Somalia. The Ogaden is home to approximately 4 million ethnic Somalis; it is predominantly a Muslim area, and is currently under Ethiopian control. To understand the extent of the long-standing struggle about control over the Ogaden, it is necessary to examine the history of the people and the region.

The Abyssinians, with the support of European colonists, gained control over the Ogaden region in 1884. At this time, the Somali people of the Ogaden were independent, which led to resistance against the acts of aggression perpetrated against them by Abyssinia. From 1886 to 1948, Abyssinia, later re-named Ethiopia, continued to wage war against Somalis living there. In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia and captured the Ogaden as well. The British, on their part, drove the Italians from Ethiopia and gained control over the Ogaden. In 1956 all parts of the Ogaden under British control were transferred to Ethiopia. Not only does this history show the manner in which African communities have been exposed to the international ping-pong match of colonisation, but also how repeated attempts by Ogaden residents to establish an autonomous region, or to gain independence from Ethiopia, have failed. If one moves the hand of the clock forward in time, from the 1950s to now, one witnesses how the Ogaden Communities of Europe in 2007 wrote a letter to the Ethiopian Prime Minister in which it is indicated that attempts made by the Regional Assembly of the Ogaden to arrange for an internationally monitored referendum concerning the right to self-determination of the Ogaden were met with the Ethiopian government deciding to step up oppressive measures aimed at disrupting the region by way of violence. In the letter the Ogaden communities also express their concern about the fact that international and local human rights organisations have compiled thick reports on a litany of rights abuses, such as the illegal imprisonment of people; enforced disappearances, torture, extra-judicial

executions, abductions, forced labour, hostage-taking, abusive dismissals, ethnic discrimination and religious persecution.²⁰

The ONLF made headlines by attacking Chinese oil and gas installations in the Ogaden in an attempt to promote their cause, and to stop the Ethiopian government from allowing multinational corporations into the territory to exploit its oil reserves.

Niger Delta, Nigeria

At the onset of this section it was noted that the focus here falls on rebel movement activity where their actions are inspired by agendas shaped by natural resources. In this regard Tuareg rebel groups, such as the *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice* (MNJ), are a good example of a war machine which targets foreign mining interests in the country. In 2007 the MNJ attacked foreign mining interests and part of its agenda is to bring more of the income forthcoming from mining to local people. The MNJ targeted and claimed to have forced the staff of the China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corporation (CNECC) to evacuate its Tegguida concession. During the same year, the government acted against the monopoly that French firm Areva had on uranium deposits in the country by awarding 29 exploration licences to companies from Russia, Canada and South Africa. The EIU indicates that the apparent reason for the government decision to act against Areva by expelling its national director from the country ‘... was the allegation that the company had engaged in secret negotiations with the Tuareg rebel group, *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice*, after attacks on its sites earlier this year’.²¹ This example shows two elements, the first being an active rebel group targeting multinational corporate interests active in mining, and additionally, the political undercurrents with international political and corporate links which run through conflict zones in African states where resources are located.

A long-running and well-known resource war in Africa is located in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Omotola indicates that ‘... the Niger Delta harbours Nigeria’s crude oil reserves to the tune of 33 billion barrels, while the natural gas reserves are 160 trillion cubic feet (2003 figures)’.²² He goes on to remark that between 1970 and 2000 alone, Nigeria generated US\$300 billion in oil revenues, amounting to 96 per cent of Nigeria’s total foreign earnings. Due to economic exclusion, and the environmental impact oil and gas operations have in the Niger Delta, Omotola indicates that there has been a marked increase in the amount of ethnic militias in the region. The most notable groups he cites in this regard are the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Chicoco Movement, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities and the NDPVF.²³

Of specific interest in the case of the Niger Delta rebel movements is the fact that communities in this region are confronted with three sets of challenges: multinational oil corporations, national government and the direct

environmental and adverse economic impact of oil wells, pipelines and related activities in the delta. Omotola indicates that between 1976 and 1999 approximately 3 000 oil-spill incidents were reported, which translates into more than 2 million barrels of oil being spilled into the country's inland, coastal and sea environments. He furthermore argues that gas-flaring has caused a dramatic deterioration in air quality:

In 1991 when Nigeria's gross gas production was 31 500 000 standard cubic feet (scf), about 24 240 000 scf of it were flared. This amounts to about 76% of gross production of oil. This is unnecessarily high in comparative terms. For example, it was 21, 20, 19 and 4 per cent in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Algeria during the same period respectively. By 1995, 76.79 per cent of gross gas production in Nigeria was flared into the air. Consequently, about 30 to 35 million tons of carbon dioxide and an estimated 12 million tons/year of methane, which is very damaging to the environment, are emitted into the atmosphere.²⁴

According to Duncan Clarke, the spectre of political and social fragmentation in the Niger Delta is the biggest threat confronting the Nigerian state and the region. He singles out the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) as an important manifestation in this regard, seeing that it has access to sophisticated weaponry, and resources. He indicates that '... the Delta states want control over the fields and the oil funds derived ... The Niger Delta has been the epicentre of domestic conflict. It stretches across five littoral states and six internal landlocked ones, and is home to 10 million impoverished villagers and shantytown folk.'²⁵ The spectre of internal fragmentation along the fault line of access to resources, as well as the direct impact that intensive oil extraction has on communities and the environment, should impress on one the need to confront the question of the state in Africa with new vigour.

At the centre of many of these struggles of state formation, installing and maintenance of systems of government, and the delivery of services to under-resourced and malnourished populations are the reality of natural resources and the international corporate and political interests associated therewith. As seen in the brief examples outlined above, one common motivating factor shared by the range of rebel movements mentioned is that their struggles are centred on multinational corporate extractive activities and associated politics of income distribution and economic exclusion. Many further such examples can be exhumed from the African reality, but the most important conclusion pertains to the fact that state formation in Africa runs up against local forces, communities and war machines arranged along fault lines of a historical, political, economic, identity and resource nature. As seen in the examples above, such discontentment and disaffection with decades of neglect, exploitation and internal military-political suppression forms fertile

ground for rebel movements to populate far-flung desert outposts, or the dense undergrowth of tropical rain forests.

Political imagination, the social contract and the state in Africa

The reality of rebel movements as discussed above brings into sharp focus one aspect of the range of challenges confronting African states and governments. Given the range of local conditions, and as a result of the fact that Africa's macro-political economic goals of integration and sustained growth can be achieved only on firm national foundations (competent, administratively organised, internally stable and safe territories), it is an understatement to say that the state in Africa has to be imagined anew. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) announces that signatories are: 'Conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.'²⁶ As seen in the examples above, resources, the rights of individuals and communities, and conflict (either for access to those resources, or for a share of the income deriving from their exploitation) creates a significant political hurdle to the future articulation and development of state apparatuses in post-colonial Africa.

In pursuing the furtherance of the goals of the AU, its Constitutive Act states that the organisation is determined to '... promote and protect human and people's rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law'.²⁷ A multilateral institution such as the AU can exist, and hope to survive, only if members make the principles of cooperation, goals of mutual benefit and the de-escalation of conflict, central to all its decisions and activities. Not only is the scourge of conflicts in Africa a major hurdle to integration, but it implies that if principles of cooperation and mutual benefit have permeated through to the level of the AU as continental organisation, then the same principles should crystallise at grassroots level, where the continuation of war and internal conflicts continue to scar landscapes and people alike. The question in this regard is therefore whether it is possible to imagine, and consequently build, social contracts where states will not make enemies out of their citizens. The post-colonial state in Africa is therefore confronted with stark choices in terms of the necessity to prioritise the needs of its constitutive populations.

State structures or the internal composition of states are not determined by an infallible blueprint. The state is shaped by factors of geography, internal composition and distribution of social, cultural and economic forces within its territory. The development of the state in Africa calls for a move away from antagonistic political foundations, towards cooperative models of political

engagement. This is especially necessary in cases such as those discussed in this chapter where the rights of individuals and communities are in jeopardy where resources are concerned. Debate on the African post-colonial/post-adjustment state can be enlivened if it is acknowledged that there may be one singular idea called 'state/commonwealth', but that it can evolve and be adapted and/or constructed in such a manner that, at all levels of its power constellations, and associated political, economic and administrative levels, it suits specific local circumstances and associated existential realities. Such states will of necessity need to be tolerant of dissent and cooperative in their collective outlook/vision for the society they envelop. It is for this reason interesting to note how Vladimir Illych Lenin in a discussion on Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's respective approaches to the existence of the state, quotes a lengthy passage from Marx wherein the latter argues that the state is a fiction.²⁸ He arrives at this conclusion because, according to Marx, the historical development of states in Europe is by and large shaped or determined by the 'frontiers'. This means that a state has its own internal, historical, cultural and economic realities, which means that the state form adapted for a particular state may differ significantly from that of its neighbours. This calls forth the need to acknowledge the fact that the 'present-day state' is a fiction because it is deeply affected by its local realities.

Marx isolates a crucial element lacking in debates on state formation in Africa, this being the fact that states differ according to their frontiers. The state is therefore not a given, but an outcome of social, economic and political processes. This is of particular interest in the African context where very specific local geographic, ethnic, cultural, economic, class, climate, size and existing economic realities internal to the state have – if one follows Marx on this point – a significant impact on the institutional arrangements and ultimate character of the state. To rethink the nature of the social contract in Africa will require the introduction of a principle of internal differentiation. This means that in as much as a state constitutes a civil service with offices, filing cabinets and bureaucrats these elements can only be established and distributed in territorial space if there is a central idea or institutional vision according to which it is distributed in space to serve the attendant society in all its diversity and regardless of historical and contemporary fault lines and conflicts. What is therefore called for on an analytical, as well as practical, level is that the institutional arrangements of the state will have to mirror the social composition and geo-physical realities internal to the state.

In as much as states take physical shape in reality, it is important to realise that the forces that either cause internal breakdown and/or conflict, or those that cause societies to address internal conflict and seek forms of cohesion and collective peace are the guiding *ideas and principles* upon which the state is conceived. The question to ask in this regard is therefore: *what holds a society together?* Given the realities of internal fragmentation and conflict, this question goes to the heart of the network of problems one is bound to

encounter on the road towards the formulation of a consistent theoretical and axiomatic/practical approach to state formation and maintenance. Cornelius Castoriadis argues in this regard: That which holds a society together is, of course, its institution, the whole complex of its particular institutions, what I call 'the institution of a society as a whole' – the word 'institution' being taken here in the broadest and most radical sense: norms, values, language, tools, procedures and methods of dealing with things and doing things²⁹

It is in the particularity of ways of doing things, and the manner in which a society perceives its reality, that the key to sustainable and internally coherent state formation can be found. The institution of a society, or, the creation of an idea-superstructure that can act as a canopy that spans and includes a society, can only be achieved on the strength of the imaginary foundation presented to the society. According to Castoriadis, the unity of a society is a result, or consequence, of its internal cohesion, '... of the immensely complex web of meanings that permeate, orient, and direct the whole life of the society considered ...' and goes on to argue that: This web of meanings is what I call the 'magma' of *social imaginary significations* that are carried by and embodied in the institution of the given society and that, so to speak, animate it. Such social imaginary significations are, for instance: spirits, gods, God; *polis*, citizen, nation, state, party; commodity, money, capital, interest rate; taboo, virtue, sin; and so forth.³⁰

If the meaning of statehood is to be subjected to warlords, rebel activities and leaders who recruit child soldiers, then it is to be expected that the society will not be 'held together' by any other means than military violence. The challenge implied in Castoriadis's thinking relates to the fact that for states to become effective, they have to distil a common vision forthcoming from the multi-polarity of social meanings embedded in local customs, practices and perspectives. This means that a series of collective principles or imaginary significations have to be drawn to form social contracts between ruler and ruled, state and society. Castoriadis exposes the critical function imagination performs in the process of social structuration. According to this, the *meanings* that float through social space become social imaginary significations, which are, on their part embodied in the institution of a society. Crudely stated, this means that an ideology, a world view, a set of principles, or common objectives permeate a society; while the institution (the state, the council, the regional organisation) has to mirror the meanings of such ideologies, world views, principles or common objectives. Imaginary objectives can therefore be described as the goals a people, or state, can erect inside the psychic or mental map upon which the society moves as it charts a path into the future. The structural function of imagination can therefore be understood as a process whereby ideas and visions appear, providing meaning and direction to the historical motion of a society through time and space.

The process of social-imaginary structuration is an act geared towards the ordering of human reality; political imagination will therefore be needed to

bridge the internal divides at conceptual and identity levels; while systems, procedures, and institutions have to be designed to accommodate the needs and allay the fears of neglected populations and communities. Communities confronted with the adverse effects of extractive industries, and the reality of long-running conflict with central governments and state institutions, as discussed in the example of the Niger Delta above, are concrete manifestations of the phenomenon of disorder internal to a society's institution Castoriadis identifies. He states that disorder is '... in reality, something internal to its institution ...'.³¹ This means that the disorder in the Niger Delta is a result not only of concrete conditions on the ground, but of fault lines and disjuncture in the social institution the Nigerian state is supposed to create.

Charles Taylor argues that by social imaginary 'I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.'³² If the ONLF imagines its circumstances as determined by wave upon wave of colonisation and re-colonisation, only to culminate in a decades-long stand-off with the independent African government of Ethiopia, then it is important to acknowledge the narrative of conflict articulated in the actions of the organisation. The social contract that waits, as yet unformulated, on the African political horizon, calls for political actors, be they of a state, non-state or war machine kind, for an interrogation of the narratives of resistance to state apparatuses in Africa. From this a clear image of the internal differentiation of societies and their attendant fault lines to be erased by the state will emerge. As already noted, the fault line of resources poses the biggest challenge in this regard.

Conclusion

A nuanced approach has to be adopted in the interrogation of the post-colonial African state. The fault lines, as well as the reality of internal diversity in African states, call for social contracts that can mobilise cooperative actions, open space for political discourse and lay the foundation for peace within African states. In conclusion, it can be said that research into state formation, and the general health of the post-colonial state in Africa should also interrogate spaces in Africa where conflicts have already been turned into examples of collective cooperation. In so doing it will be possible to draw lessons on how African peoples and states can engage in collective processes of de-escalating conflict, and introduce principles of cooperation into political action and discourse in African states. Such studies may also yield insight into the approaches African states and societies can take to move away from the collective peace that is imposed by the might of police forces and instruments of military brutality, and

to arrive at that desired condition of internal cohesion and collective peaceful progress by way of mutual consent and cooperation. If this coherence is not achieved, the project of continental integration will constantly fall prey to the potholes of conflict that line the highways of the pan-African project.

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CHAPTER 3

Indigenous Organisations, Social Movements and the Nigerian State*Raphael Ogom***Introduction**

As proclivities that are likely to develop in any organised society irrespective of the existing forms of governance, indigenous organisations and social movements, are not novel in state–civil society discourse. The literature in this area is replete with a plethora of studies that have sought to account for the increasing salience of these phenomena and their implications for the socio-political and economic development of African states. For the most part, social movement theorising has undergone an enormous growth and elaboration in the last few decades.¹ Much of this has centred on different and sometimes contrasting analytical focuses, including political opportunities, framing, emergence and development. Some scholars have focused on the conditions that facilitate or hinder the attainment of their declared goals.² Others have sought to know the causes and rationale for their formation, including who their participants are.³ Mobilisation theorists examine the needs and abilities of these organisations to mobilise resources, the ways in which such resources are deployed and strategies by authorities to frustrate those resources.⁴ Identity-oriented theorists view them as ‘central groups in the new politics and realignments and as sources of new political identities’.⁵

In contrast, not many works have interrogated the relationship between indigenous organisations/social movements and the state in Africa.⁶ Where these exist is on the organisational structures that give rise to the loosely coupled coalitions that form between these two groups and lead to favourable outcomes.⁷ Thus, there is a lacuna in understanding the dynamics surrounding these organisations and movements (be they loose ethnic and hometown associations or formally organised efforts with the moral, material and financial muscle to initiate or resist change in some major aspect of the society) and their relationship to the state. Key and challenging questions around the nature and character of the struggle between people’s aspirations and frustrations and the state, including its accessibility or lack thereof by its citizens; how the people have responded to the state in order to live fulfilled lives, and how the state has, in turn, responded to people who have organised and sought to fulfil their lives in ways the state has been unable to; as well as

the relationship between formal dominance of political elites and the counter-hegemony of non-state actors and institutions against the backdrop of the elitism of the current democratic model on the continent, have yet to be carefully examined.

This contribution focuses squarely on these yet to be addressed issues. Focusing on Nigeria and using examples in other African countries of different types of organisation and movement (particularly, the pro-democracy, ecological, environmental and economic types), it critically analyses the relationship between these collectives and the state with a view to understanding not just its nature and underlying tendencies, but also the way forward in the face of the contemporary political order and governance that African countries have embraced. In so doing, it contends that, although these relations have been in a state of flux, there is an admixture of both state compromise and responsiveness to these collectives, as well as outright antagonism, resistance and repression, depending on the state or type of government in power, and the issues in question. State tendencies toward a constriction of the operating space of, and for, these movements are regrettable because the latter are a necessary feature in society that make for good governance. That is, challenging and perhaps irritable as their objectives and demands on the state might be construed, they are not harmful, neither are they an obstacle to development as some would hold.⁸ If anything, they represent the lubricants of state–civil society relations, the engine without which development and, indeed, effective governance and democratic consolidation, would stall. While it would be artless to aver that the state can, should and must meet every claim of all of these organisations and movements, it would be equally dubious for the state to adopt a conspiratorial and antagonistic approach to these collectives. The state’s needs these organisations just as the latter need the state. After all, politics and social development are not necessarily a zero-sum game and the state resort to increased repression would only lead to (more) resistance to its policies or demands, leading to lower public acquiescence, state legitimacy and its ability to act effectively.⁹

Before bearing out this argument in the African state–civil society context, a situating of these concepts used here, including the various types and the predisposing factors for their emergence, would be in order.

Indigenous organisations and social movements in Africa: An analytical framework

As used here, indigenous organisations and social movements are seen as indispensable features of society. The former refer to collectives or groups of people who are perceived, by themselves and others, as constituting a different or distinct category based on their shared origin and culture¹⁰ and are organised along these lines in furtherance of commonly defined objectives

in cooperation or competition with other organisations, usually against an entity perceived to be responsible for the organisation's unfulfilled predicament – usually, the state. The latter is used here as that inert structure that is composed of the institutions of government and the cultural context of accepted processes, rules and other institutional constraints within which the individuals holding state positions must function.¹¹ Examples of these organisations include ethnic or hometown associations formed for various purposes, but whose key membership qualification is the commonality of ethnicity and/or sharing the same 'hometown'.

Social movements, on the other hand, are seen 'as forms of collective action with a high degree of popular participation which use non-institutional channels to formulate their demands while simultaneously finding forms of action to express them, thus establishing themselves as a collective social category'.¹² As politically and/or socio-economically directed collectives that often involve multiple organisations and networks, they exist largely within the civil society and make series of demands on state actors focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system in which they are located.¹³ Examples include trade unions, environmental, feminist, civil rights, and pro-democracy (political) movements, etc. While these movements are varied, they can be classified along two broad dimensions, first, the locus of change (society or individuals) and, secondly, the amount of change sought (partial or total). Four corresponding categories derived from this classification are transformative, reformative, redemptive and alternative movements. Respectively, these are movements that seek the complete restructuring of society; those which attempt to reform some limited aspects of the existing order; movements which aim to lead members away from a way of life considered unacceptable on doctrinal grounds; and those movements which seek to change only particular traits of individual members.¹⁴

Relative to indigenous organisations, the distinguishing features of social movements are not so much the various types they are and the objectives or foci of their demands, but their composition criteria. Thus, while the former are largely ethnic-composed, the latter cut across ethnicities to include other broad criteria, including the social, economic, political, etc. Yet, given their similarities in respect of their objectives, relationship with the state and the focus of this chapter, the two are used (hereinafter as movements, organisations, or collectives) interchangeably to signify collectives in civil society organised (loosely or tightly and along different criteria) for the purpose of impacting policy directions of the state either for their own benefit or that considered for the society at large.

Why do these movements emerge? The factors accounting for the formation of these movements are as varied as the types of movements themselves and the social formations from which they emerge. While an exhaustive itemisation of all the causative conditions is not the intent here as this has already been done elsewhere,¹⁵ causal explanations for the formation of these

collectives are largely internal or domestic to the systems in which they are located. Although some scholars have located some of these factors in the external environment, for example, international pressures arising from the impact of an expanding economy,¹⁶ the diffusion effects of successful democratic revolutions elsewhere in the world,¹⁷ the political conditionality attached to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank aid,¹⁸ others have predicated their emergence on structural factors such as downturns in national economic activity, IMF/World Bank-imposed austerity measures and severe contractions in living standards.¹⁹ But, while these diffusionist and structural accounts provide valuable insights, they do not, as Bratton and Van de Walle point out, give us the full and comprehensive picture of why these movements form.²⁰ At best, they are more like facilitating tendencies or precipitating conditions, not causal ones. A richer explanation, therefore, must locate these factors in the domestic environments where these movements are formed and located.

In no order of magnitude, one of these domestic factors is the high and growing level of poverty and inequality in African socio-political systems.²¹ In part, this is because of the effects of increasing globalisation where African or developing countries are being negatively impacted through unfavourable terms of trade and other vicissitudes of international capitalism. The net effect has not only been weakened African states and economies, but also the widening gap between the rich who have access to the spoils of government at the expense of the poor. Such inequality in people's access to, and the appropriation of resources, leads to resentment, particularly of the political elites by the citizenry and, depending on the level of conscientisation and resources available to the negatively affected, the tendency to resist and/or change the existing order becomes very high.

Closely related to this is the issue of good governance. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the contemporary neo-patrimonial political order does not make for effective governance. If anything, its propensities actually negate and undermine it. Witness the venality of the political elites who brandish their ill-gotten wealth, and in the process of maintaining their positions as patrons (and the poor as clients), undermine the popularity and legitimacy of governments. In Nigeria, the bankrupt and corrupt governance regimes of both military and civilian governments largely explained the emergence of the students' movements, including indigenous and pro-democracy organisations out to challenge the state's governance excesses. Such poor governance leads to exclusionary tendencies, placing the affected at the most marginal positions in society both materially and socio-psychologically.²²

Similarly, and with particular reference to indigenous organisations, feelings of cultural distinctiveness contribute to the development and maintenance of strong ethnic identities which increase the likelihood of forming organisations based on ethnic considerations to protect and project their collective interests. Organisations that fit this mould include the Arewa

Consultative Forum, Odua People's Congress and Akwaisong Imaisop Ibibio in Nigeria. Also, the existence of a separatist tendency is key in accounting for the formation of these organisations. An ethnic group with a history of autonomy or one that is relatively disadvantaged in a polity, but feels that it unjustly bears the brunt and sacrifices of sustaining that polity and can benefit much more by standing outside the polity would more likely coalesce and seek a change to the status quo. Where such a group is concentrated in one geographic area, the likelihood for it to organise in furtherance of the group's aspirations become higher.²³ The Ogoni people's organisation, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the Niger Delta of Nigeria is one such example.

The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive account of the formation of these movements as each is case-specific, depending on the causes they represent. Notwithstanding, feelings of disadvantage, dissatisfaction, resentment and the willingness to do something about the situation, be it resistance or change initiation, are a common denominator in the formation of these movements. That is, depending on the issues impacting both their lives and/or the society generally, citizens have coalesced at different times to challenge and make demands on the state for change. The nature of these demands and struggles are case-specific, ranging from the social, to the environmental, economic, political, etc. Thus, various corresponding movements have emerged that mirror the different frustrations, causes and objectives people seek to address.

Given the people's response to the failure of governments to fulfil their lives by forming both indigenous organisations and social movements to challenge the state along this direction, what, in turn, has been the state response to such demands? Put differently, what is the relationship between these movements and the state, even as the former challenge and make demands that question the competencies of the latter in ways that it would otherwise avoid?

State response: Cooperation and compromise or resistance and repression?

By definition, social movements generally arise in reaction to some perceived inadequacy or failure of the state to meet certain expectations that either affect members of the movement themselves directly or the society at large. This implies, therefore, that they tend to question the 'performance' of the state on those issues. The courses of action and strategies they adopt vary across different types of movements, goals sought, their resource levels, etc. However, common among them is defiance of the status quo and a desire to seek change. Thus, once sufficiently mobilised, they make demands on the state and the latter reacts in a number of ways.

Although there is a plethora of cases of different types of movements confronting the state and how the latter has responded to them in Africa, attempting to examine all of them would not only be disingenuous, but make for a superficial analysis in a work of this nature. Therefore, for in-depth analysis, we focus on a few of these movements to situate their relations with the state.

That Africans have clamoured for democracy and good governance for decades is well known. As victims of military dictatorships that had held sway in the continent for decades, they're living witnesses of scores of abuses and human rights violations by their governments. On almost every criteria of good governance, African governments have scored below par, and corruption, among other vices that have degraded the human condition, has become a way of life. Not surprising, therefore, that they (Africans) were not left out when the wind of democratisation swept across Eastern Europe, Latin America and other parts of Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. To resist the continued aberration of the military regimes dominating the political apparatus in Africa, active citizens in the civil society coalesced and formed groups or pro-democracy movements across the continent.

In Nigeria, for example, frustrated with government malfeasance and declining living standards, deepening economic hardship, heavy-handedness of military regimes and their prolonged stay in power, particularly after the annulment of the 12 June 1992 national elections that were supposed to have been won by the late Chief MKO Abiola, groups such as the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) galvanised students, civil servants, workers and professionals using different strategies such as strikes, demonstrations, marches and boycotts to demand systemic political change from the state.²⁴

The situation in many other African countries was not very different as these movements were ascendant in their challenge of state mismanagement, official corruption and general performance failure. A few examples will suffice. In 1986, these organisations orchestrated a series of riots when the price of maize meal was doubled following subsidy cuts under an IMF-sponsored economic adjustment plan in Zambia. The Republic of Benin experienced public-sector strikes in much of 1989 as civil servants protested against accumulated arrears in salaries. Similarly, in Gabon there were massive strikes by students over teaching shortages and poor study facilities in 1990, while in Côte d'Ivoire, electricity power supply shortages sparked several protests, and in Zambia and Kenya, these groups catalysed workers and the self-employed to join in public condemnation of the deplorable standards of living. In all, no fewer than 16 African states experienced various forms of demand and/or challenge from these movements for political or economic changes.²⁵ But the question is, how has the state responded to the demands of these movements?

By and large, state responses to the movements have varied from cooperation and compromise to resistance and outright repression, depending on

several factors. Some have argued that when and where the issues involved are considered of an ordinary bread-and-butter types the state has generally tried to placate the movements with piecemeal concessions.²⁶ However, where the issues have clear political undertones, the governments have tended to resort directly to repression. Although this assertion is correct to some extent, evidence exists, however, that even in cases where these challenges have clear political undertones, the state has had to accommodate the demands of these groups, even if involuntarily. For example, amid the atmosphere of sustained resistance from pro-democracy movements in the 1990s, many African governments conceded to the demands of these organisations by embarking upon various forms of political liberalisation in ways hitherto unseen. While ‘the content and extent of political reforms varied across countries, all cases involved concession of rights to political expression, association or concession’,²⁷ and the continent witnessed significant constitutional changes and reforms. In other words, in response to the challenges of these movements, the state responded by compromising its agenda (which the groups challenged) and ‘liberalized the institutions over which they had confident control ... lifted administrative restrictions on political activity by journalists, intellectuals and opposition leaders. In Tanzania, curbs on press freedom were eased, new political publications emerged, and the government-controlled media began to carry a broader range of opinion.’²⁸

In Nigeria, the movements catalysed public opinion against the ruling military regimes of both Generals Ibrahim Babangida and the late Sani Abacha. That the latter’s replacement, General Abubakar, could not procrastinate on political reform much longer (as his predecessors had) but put in place a timetable for return to civilian rule was not unconnected to the activities of these organisations, which successfully mobilised the public and convinced (even) the military itself at the time of its pariah status and that its foray into politics was unacceptable.

But was the state’s opening of such political space as a result of the demands of these movements voluntary or was it coerced? Irrespective of the answer, it speaks of the relations between these movements and the state. This much becomes more apparent considering the argument by some²⁹ that a government (state) is expected to use force whenever it feels threatened by the demands of these movements. Not only did the demands of these movements threaten these governments, in some cases they signalled their replacement and liquidation through national competitive elections that the demands of these movements occasioned. That the state could have, but did not (or could not) use force to repress the demands of these movements is indicative of the fact that while force and repression are not ruled out in state-movements relations, they are not, and have not always been, the only mechanisms that govern these relations in Africa.

The foregoing by no means suggests that state movements’ relations have been one of cordiality, cooperation and compromise. This is far from it. African

states have repeatedly used force and intimidation to repress these movements and their demands. Examples abound. In the heat of the challenges by pro-democracy groups in the 1990s, the Nigerian government responded by repression, branding these movements and their leaders as enemies of the state and went ahead and threw many of them in jail. On 10 December 1998 principal officers of the Nigerian Civil Liberties Organisation (NCLO) were arrested and charged with subversion when the organisation published a report on human rights violations in the country. In the 1990s the government indiscriminately harassed, detained and placed leaders and journalists in the Federal Radio Corporation (FRCN), the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) *Punch*, *Concord* and *Vanguard* newspapers under siege for covering the activities of 'subversive' (re: social) movements in the country. The state security agents sealed off the premises of *Newsbreak* Magazine and seized all the latest editions of the magazine, claiming that they were looking for 'subversive undertones', and were acting on 'orders from above'.³⁰ Subsequently, the government closed the *Daily Champion* and the *Vanguard*, arraigned the editor of the *Daily Champion* before a Lagos magistrate court and charged him with publishing seditious editorial in the 8 June edition of the newspaper.³¹ In repressing these movements, it was apparent that all those who did not hold the same views with government were regarded as traitors, people to be harassed and thrown in jail without trial.

This Nigerian situation was by no means atypical, but symptomatic of what obtained in many other African countries. The governments of Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Rwanda similarly muzzled leaders of social movements, with many of them disappearing mysteriously, while others languished in jails.³² Where outright repression was not possible, the state often resorted to the penetration of these movements with a view to weakening their ranks, regulating their activities and social relationships through strict surveillance of their operations, including curtailing the rights of members of these organisations to associate freely.

In other words, the seeming state accommodation of these movements was not only ephemeral, but also analogous to taking 'two steps forward and one step back'³³ because it was partial and contradictory. For example, while the state granted political concessions by acquiescing to some of the demands of the movements on one hand, it cracked down on them on the other, raising the question whether the state was genuinely interested in meeting the demands of these movements or merely acted as it did for calculated self-interest and political expediency.

It could be argued that the state repression of these organisations in Africa took place in the heydays of military dictatorships, and democratic governments are likely to be less adversarial.³⁴ In its 'true' form where the norms of democratic practice have been institutionalised, and the leadership expects and respects social plurality, including challenges from these groups, this is possible. However, the fledgling African democracies can

hardly be said to have institutionalised these democratic norms. Thus, at the dawn of the 21st century with the embracing of democracy by almost all African countries, state-indigenous organisations relations are not totally cooperative. The case of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), an indigenous organisation formed to resist the perceived injustice of the state towards its people in the Nigerian Niger Delta, is worth elaborating in this regard.

Feeling marginalised and deprived of their key natural resource which sustains the Nigerian economy (petroleum), the Ogoni people have repeatedly resisted the policies of the Nigerian state on oil exploration, drilling and export. Oil, Nigeria's main export, is pumped from the Niger Delta. While the locals, including the Ogonis, receive few of the benefits,³⁵ the federal government distributes oil earnings to more politically powerful ethnics, leaving the Ogonis and the Niger Delta one of the poorest and most backward regions despite being the primary source of the country's wealth.³⁶ In 1990, MOSOP was formed under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa to champion the cause of the Ogonis 'to have the right to control and use a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development'.³⁷ Using a variety of strategies, MOSOP mounted pressure on the Nigerian government. Challenged as it was, the state responded using a combination of compromise and repression. First, to accommodate the organisation's demands, the state created the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 1992 and 2000 respectively.³⁸ However, when the state felt that the organisation was not satisfied with this response, as evident in its increasing demands, the state's response changed dramatically from accommodation and dialogue to outright violent repression, using police and military units. Thus, the state issued a decree that declared disturbances of oil-producing activities to be acts of treason punishable by death, announced a ban on all public gatherings and sent in troops to contain the Ogonis.³⁹ In October 1990 about '80 people were reportedly killed as a result of indiscriminate shooting by mobile police and nearly 500 homes destroyed'.⁴⁰ Additional military units were moved into the Ogoni area in June 1993 and the following month Ken Saro-Wiwa was arrested, charged with treason (for calling for the Ogoni's right of self-determination, secession and break-up of the country), arraigned before a kangaroo tribunal, tried and sentenced to death by hanging in 1995.

If the repression of this indigenous organisation was perpetrated under military rule in the 1990s, is the situation different now that the country enjoys democracy? State response to this organisation, unfortunately, has not changed much. Under the Obasanjo (civilian) administration, the Ogoni town of Odi was literally 'wiped out' in a military operation in 1999. In pursuing their demands using tactics that the state objected to, the government declared a state of emergency, deployed soldiers to Odi and proceeded to raze the town. The troops occupied the town for ten days, and demolished every

single building. When President Obasanjo visited Odi in 2001, he not only confirmed the military operations, noting that the soldiers may have gone 'beyond their brief', but also maintained that the state 'did what it had to do'.⁴¹ Entreaties from civil society, including international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for the state to redress the Odi massacre, fell on deaf ears. Even when impeachment proceedings were initiated against the president for authorising 'the deployment of military troops to massacre innocent citizens' in Odi 'without recourse to the National Assembly contrary to section 217(2)(c) of the 1999 Constitution', the president justified the repression on the grounds that the demands of the organisation posed a threat to national security, citing the constitutional provisions that empowered him as Commander-in-Chief to determine the operational use of the armed forces.⁴²

While the president's constitutional powers are not contested, their manner of use is questionable. Constitutionally, some conditions first have to be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly before the military can be used in that regard.⁴³ This procedure, however, was brushed aside in a bid to quell the challenges of this indigenous organisation. If this is happening under a democratic government, what then can we say about African democracy and the operative space and environment for these movements? Specifically, do these movements have political space in the 21st century? And, in view of the elitism of the current democratic model on the continent, what is the relationship between the formal dominance of political elites and the counter-hegemony of non-state actors and institutions?

Social movements – state relations in Africa – the way forward

That military dictatorships that held sway in Africa through to the 1980s and 1990s have gradually given way to democratic governments is not in doubt. This should bode well for state-social movements' relations because, relative to military regimes, democratic dispensations generally have the constitutional provisions that better social movements and accommodate and have more dialogue with. Thus, it is expected that democracy would not only make for less repressive state reaction to, but also more accommodation and compromise in its future relations with, these movements, occasional exceptions – for example, the Odi case in Nigeria – notwithstanding. That said, however, it is important to note that how accommodating these relations will be depends to a large extent, on the nature of the challenges these movements make on the state, and the strategies they use to pursue them. This is because it is arguable whether any government, democratic or not, would respond without some form of resistance to the kinds of demands that challenge its longevity or very existence. Even in developed countries in the West where the norms of democratic practice are supposed to have taken root,

their governments hardly opt for self-immolation, unless they are coerced by circumstances beyond their control. Notwithstanding, the embrace of democracy by African countries today, even if the experience has yet to consolidate, holds good potential for state–movement relations.

Analytic support for this conclusion derives from the fact that as democracies, African states are typically composed of nested and segmented administrative units that house many competing actors. This structural framing makes it possible for these movements to take advantage of the complex and decentralised nature of these democracies to create state–actor–society movement coalitions in ways hitherto impossible under military regimes.⁴⁴ Social movements do not exist in a vacuum, but in concrete social reality composed of state actors, who, as individuals, may support these movements either because of shared goals or for their own personal short- or long-term gains. This possibility presents opportunities for the movements to form coalitions with these (institutional) activists who occupy formal statuses within the government to pursue the goals of the movements through conventional bureaucratic channels, thereby increasing the probability of producing positive outcomes for the movements.⁴⁵ Secondly, in spite of the tortuous issue of political accountability in African democracies, the governments are still mindful of their vulnerability to public opinion, particularly in periods of national elections. The state or ruling class would rather not be seen as being totally alienated and unresponsive to civil society; hence it has often initiated populist agendas to elicit public acceptance. This tendency presents yet another space which the movements could exploit successfully in furtherance of their demands.

More importantly, the democratic dispensation embraced by African countries in today's globalising world presents an even higher potential of furthering the change of state-movements' relations from one of repression to cordiality and compromise. In part, due to the 'globalised' world and the impact of communication technologies, these movements easily maintain linkages to global civil society that enhance mobilisation. Thus, with access to global civil society, the movements are more likely to use the 'boomerang process' to pressure their governments through the international community.⁴⁶ This is possible because the contemporary democratic 'world culture of human rights has created an international context in which a poor human rights record can have serious political implications for rights-violating governments'.⁴⁷ For instance, poor human rights records are often used as a reason to exclude a country from powerful international organisations (such as was the case with Nigeria when it was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations for its violent repression of MOSOP and the hanging of its leader in 1995), and impart a host of other punitive measures, including halting financial and military aid for such countries. Thus, conscious of the implications of the linkages of these movements with the international environment, and the ability of the movements to influence public opinion, employ disruptive

actions and create electoral uncertainty,⁴⁸ democratic African states will likely opt for less adversarial relations with these organisations.

These positive dividends of democratic practice for more cooperative state-movements' relations not only strengthen the movements, but also the state itself. Embracing the democratic form of governance, therefore, should give us good reason to believe that the state is likely to see these movements not as subversive organisations, but use them as channels of communication and representation, according them a place in the policy-making and implementation processes. This would more likely facilitate a further improvement in state-movements' relations in no small measure. Yet, and as noted earlier, much of this depends on the types of demands these movements make of the state and the strategies they adopt. If history holds any lessons and steps to a successful future can be shaped from the past, then there is room, even if guarded, for improved and more cooperative state-movements' relations in Africa.

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CHAPTER 4

Human Security in Africa

Remi Aiyede

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be the most endangered region in the world. This is partly the result of the overall poor performance of African countries in key indices of development and the numerous challenges that threaten its development and stability. A large number of the civil wars in the world after the end of the Cold War occurred in Africa. Many states in the continent appear in the list of failed and failing states. These developments and their devastating consequences tend to cloud the achievements of the continent in economic growth, democratic development and regional integration in the last decade. Indeed, there are serious grounds to worry about the future of the continent, and the capacity of existing organisations and structures to provide a conducive and secure environment for the pursuit of happiness by individual Africans at both national and regional levels.

The complex and diverse threats to the peace, stability and growth of African states and of the individuals that constitute their citizenry have generated concern about human security in Africa. This concern is reflected not only in the attempt by scholars to understand the nature of the security problems besieging Africa, but also in the emergence of several organisations dedicated to practically addressing the elements and factors implicated in the security quagmire. This chapter examines the concept of human security in Africa. It identifies the elements and dimensions of human security. It further traces the trajectories of developments in the essential factors of human security across the continent, paying attention to national, regional and global dimensions. It identifies key issues to be addressed and offers suggestions.

What is human security?

The traditional view of security emphasises military defence. The militaristic conception of national security is often state-centric and concerned largely with protecting the territorial integrity of the state system against internal

violence and external aggression. Owing to its limitation in the face of new threats, recent engagements with the security question have preferred the concept of human security. This is largely a reflection of the immediate post-Cold War world that witnessed a decline in international war and a rise in civil war. Even the rise in civil wars was reversed in the 1990s, recording a dramatic decline in these conflicts.¹ Since 11 September 2001 when terrorists attacked the United States, it has become generally agreed that contemporary threats to national security are no longer located in the context of inter-state relations. Terrorists are not state actors, even though failed or failing states may provide a fertile ground for terrorist activities. The 2002 US National Security Strategy observes that 'poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.'² In a similar vein, Cilliers observed that state security, in most of Africa, is not faced by conventional armed attack by other countries, 'but by more insidious measures many of which flow from the very weakness of the state and its absence of control over its territory'.³

The concept of human security was first used by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to refer to:

... safety for people from the both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition of state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in the perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or government. Like other security concepts – national security, economic security, food security – it is about protection. Human security thus entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerabilities to threats to freedom, safety and livelihoods. It is about minimizing risks and taking remedial action where preventive measures fail.⁴

The Commission on Human Security notes in its maiden report that human security is a concept that combines 'human protection and development and interconnects peace, security and sustainable development'.⁵ It emphasised that human security should not focus on macro-state level but also at community and individual level. The Southern African Human Security programme conceives of human security in terms of 'a concern for individual as opposed to state "security"'. It involves 'a shift away from the kind of thinking that sees security in terms of territorial security or the protection of national interests from internal or external threats'.⁶ This view follows from that of Mahbub ul-Haq,⁷ who sees human security as an alternative to traditional approaches to state security. But this shift appears to be too extreme, for, as Cilliers rightly observed, 'without the provision of national security, neither

citizens nor communities can be personally secure in the broader sense of the term. Without secure and stable countries and a body of practice or law – whereby countries can regulate their interaction – individual, community, regional and international security remains elusive.⁷⁸

In an age of globalisation, it must be recognised that national security is no longer the preserve of the national state alone. This is not necessarily because the spread of information and communication technology has weakened the capacity of the contemporary state to police its borders. It is rather that globalisation has created a ‘risk society’ with new structures and mentalities as well as associated security technologies that affect the nature of governance. On the one hand, it has unleashed supranational and trans-national structures outside of the control of national governments, and thereby the character of international relations as expressed in the trans-national processes of regionalisation and civil-society activism. On the other hand, it has affected the very substance of domestic policies and cultures, including the governance of the security sector. Technological and institutional innovations are spreading globally through epistemic communities, knowledge networks and discourse networks, transforming societies, including security technologies as well as the discourse and practices of management and security, from self-protection to the hiring of private armies.⁹ What this means is that both national security and the role of the state in it have changed. Thus, the notion of human security which recognises people as being at the centre of the security question advances the integration of approaches among a variety of organisations to provide concrete and sustainable benefits to individuals and communities. Human security challenges in Africa are often traced to internal and external agency and efforts to confront its challenges have come from within and outside the continent. This is to be expected given the reality of globalisation that has so integrated the world that events in one region have practical implications for life and wellbeing in other regions.

One of the most important elements of the human security concept lies in its use to distinguish elite or regime security and the security of citizens in general at the national level. In this sense, it acknowledges the agency of the state or political elites in human security conditions and calls for political responsiveness and responsibility. Hence, participation is highly valued in the discourse on human security. Within this context, the state does not just provide security for individuals and communities as everyone is involved in several protection efforts, from neighbourhood watch to peacebuilding initiatives. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and private organisations also carry out protection activities beyond the state. In the words of Cilliers, ‘while the concept of national security largely refers to the security of the state against armed attack or insurrection, the “referent object” of the broader concept of human security – which includes overlapping systems of security at the individual, national and international levels – is the security of the individual in his or her personal surroundings and within the community: the ability thus

of people and communities to pursue a safe livelihood on equal terms with others.¹⁰ The former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, in the 2005 report titled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, emphasised the point that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent. He underscored the concept of human security in terms of freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. Human security implies that individuals are free from the death sentences of extreme poverty and infectious diseases. It also means that the lives and livelihoods of individuals are not ripped apart by violence and war. Finally, human security implies the responsibility of states and multilateral institutions to protect the rights of the individual, and protect him or her from crime, violence and aggression.¹¹

The major limitation of the human security concept is that, for practical and analytical purposes, it is too expansive. For instance, the African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact defines human security as the 'security of the individual in terms of the satisfaction of his or her basic needs. It also includes the creation of the social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his or her full development.'¹² This very broad definition of human security creates a challenge for the monitoring and setting of targets.

In general, there have been no clearly defined indices of human security. It is usually related to such broad concepts as governance, social stability and economic opportunity, and to specific items like hunger, disease (especially HIV/Aids), crime (including transnational crime), armed conflict and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This is because in addition to the point made earlier, the issues implicated in the condition of human security vary from country to country and from one period to another. For the practical purposes of analysis and specific policy measures, each organisation or individual has adopted different approaches. One of the approaches is to select specific dimensions for emphasis in terms of the more fundamental needs of the country under consideration¹³ or to locate human security within the context of the role of a responsive state to provide the appropriate environment for equality and individual participation in public decision-making, paying attention to the internal and external constraints to the institutions and processes that enable or make it difficult to achieve a responsive state that effectively plays that role,¹⁴ or identify and focus on key issues in human security such as conflicts, migration, protection and empowerment of the vulnerable, post-conflict reconstruction and governance.¹⁵ In this chapter we adopt the last two methods. In the first instance, we look at the effort to improve the capacity and legitimacy of the state in Africa and then examine some elements of human security, assessing how they play out in Africa. Specifically, this chapter looks at:

- the state and the regionalisation of security;
- conflicts and conflict resolution;
- terrorism, natural resource and superpower intervention;
- safety of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); and
- general welfare and human development.

The state and the regionalisation of security in Africa

Human security problems occur within the context of the state system. The character of the state, its material and historical circumstance and the nature of politics affect how these problems occur and are addressed in terms of policy statements and actions. The state is at the centre of the human security problem in Africa. This is because of the status of the state as the custodian of law and order and the provider of the framework for the pursuit of happiness by individuals and communities. One of the greatest challenges to the state in Africa is its lack of legitimacy as a result of its origin in colonial exploitation and the failure by the post-colonial elite to transform the state into an agent of development and broad welfare.

Post-colonial predation demonstrates the difficulties of transiting from a colonial state to a state embedded in African society. Colonial rule did a lot to consolidate linguistic and cultural differences into the structure of the state. In some countries, like Nigeria, regional cleavages coincide with group or sectional inequalities. These provided fertile ground for political entrepreneurs, who turned regional differences and inequalities to political capital. Thus, the management of diversity has become a major challenge to the effort to improve interaction between state and society. Some states have adopted federalism, transformed the content of citizenship, and democratised in the last decade, but there is still a lot to do to achieve political stability and consolidate democracy in many more states. Mutual distrust in civil society has led to civil strife, and some states, such as Nigeria, are perpetually threatened by outbreaks of violence arising from struggles over distributive resources and political offices. Outbreaks of violence drive from the intense character of political contestation. Political contestation is intense because the state is the chief source of economic advancement in a situation of widespread material poverty. Those who hold political power put in everything to retain it. Those who do not hold political power put in everything to capture it. Politics becomes a zero-sum game, a matter of life and death, as we found in Nigeria, where the 2007 general elections were declared a 'do or die affair' by an incumbent president.¹⁶ In other instances marginalised groups seek to replace the state in a particular region, such as Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and sometimes with severe repercussions arising from the response of those who hold power, as we have seen in the crisis in Darfur since 2003.

The struggle for political power becomes so absorbing that it confounds development. This is the case because as the struggle for power intensifies, the more strategic state-building challenges become relegated to the background. Conflicts thrown up by the politics of survival weaken the state and threaten its very foundation. Thus, fierce and violent contestations lead to bad policies and poor governance, reinforcing developmental failures. Some scholars have questioned the seriousness with which African political elites have approached development, and others have described the type of state craft practised by African patrimonial leaders as responsible for developmental failures. Others have traced the governance crisis and the widespread conflicts to the pre-colonial African societies. Many scholars, however, admit that governance in Africa has over time been affected by colonialism, the Cold War ideological rivalries of the superpowers, the machinations of international financial institutions in the immediate post-Cold War era and the vagaries of contemporary globalisation.¹⁷ One of the effects of the arbitrary character of colonial demarcation of Africa in the post-Cold War era, especially the distribution of particular ethno-linguistic groups across several national borders, has been the externalisation of intra-state conflicts into several countries. Thus, inter-ethnic conflicts in a single country often threaten the stability of an entire subregion, as played out in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region.

African leaders, who for several years have maintained the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), have come to terms with the reality of the contemporary challenge of improving governance and the need to collectively organise security and defence under the African Union (AU). This move occurred at a time when subregional organs, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), had intervened with some success in the civil wars that ravaged their regions. It was also at a time when the UN, overburdened by intractable problems, was embracing the 'Brahimi principle' named after the Algerian diplomat, who in 2000 authored a report proposing that regional organisations take primary responsibility for the problems in their own backyard.¹⁸ After decades of turbulence, there is now a regional consensus to develop both military and non-military mechanisms to deal with governance, economic growth and development and with 'common security threats, which undermine the maintenance and promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent'. The New Partnership for Africa (Nepad) and the Framework for Common African Defence and Security policy represent these efforts to come to terms with developmental slide and to ensure mutual support for progress across the continent under the umbrella of the AU. The protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was adopted in July 2002 with a provision for an African Standby Force (ASF). The force is to be deployed by the

PSC to peacekeeping missions and intervene pursuant to the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act.

Conflicts and conflict resolution

The conflict situation in Africa has not changed significantly over the past few decades. Although some successes have been recorded in conflict resolution in some states, in others, conflicts have deepened and there are fresh outbreaks. Some states, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, which had descended into complete anarchy, are currently under reconstruction with the help of outside intervention.

Liberia held a successful election, recording Africa's first female president. Somalia has proved very difficult and has become a site of operation for pirates. To deal with the situation, warships have been deployed by international coalitions and individual countries to ensure free passage for shipping. The coordination of such deployments, their rules of engagement and the legal environment governing the activities against piracy remain uncertain. The AU peacekeeping force (AMISON), further east of Somalia, has been strengthened. Although the UN-AU hybrid mission in the Darfur region of the Sudan continues to be under stress, an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant of arrest for President Omar al Bashir in early March 2009 provoked the government of the Sudan to revoke the licences of 12 humanitarian aid agencies, including the UK's Oxfam, the Dutch branch of *Sans Frontières Médecins*, and the American-based agency, the International Rescue Committee. Among the vital services that these aid agencies provide are medical care, water, sanitation and education programmes for approximately 650 000 people in Darfur and 1.1 million in northern and eastern Sudan. This action raises grave concerns about the welfare of millions of Sudanese people who rely on humanitarian aid for survival.

In the DRC, stability was established with the intervention of the UN mission known by the French acronym MONUC, and a successful election held in 2006. Violence has been further reduced with the arrest of General Laurent Nkunda of the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP) in late 2008 and the joint operation of Rwanda and DRC forces that severely weakened the *Forces Démocratiques de la Libération de Rwanda* (FDLR) rebels.

There is hope that the economic crisis and humanitarian disaster in Zimbabwe, which deepened with the flawed elections in 2008, will begin to be addressed as a result of the brokered power-sharing arrangement between President Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition party leader, as prime minister.

The outbreak of violence in Kenya following the 2007 elections was resolved in a similar power-sharing arrangement between President Mwai Kibaki and opposition figure, Raila Odinga.

Efforts are underway to return Guinea to constitutional rule following the death of President Lansana Conte and the attendant military coup in December 2008.

In Guinea Bissau, the killing of Chief of Defence Staff, General Tagme Na Wale, and subsequently President Joao Bernado Vieira is being resolved constitutionally with outside intervention.

Meanwhile, the AU has made remarkable progress in developing its military mechanism and structures for the ASF to deal with the ensuing violent and devastating conflicts on the continent. The West ASF of 6 500 soldiers that can deploy rapidly in response to crisis or threats to peace and security in the region was established in 2004.¹⁹ The newly established Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Brigade has expressed readiness to intervene in the DRC and Madagascar in order to restore peace and stability in the two countries currently facing armed conflicts.

One of the contributory factors to the protraction of low-intensity conflicts is the availability and proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the continent. Small arms and light weapons spark, fuel and prolong conflicts, obstruct relief programmes and undermine peace initiatives. They also spread human rights abuses and foster a 'culture of violence'. Although there has been some effort to address these issues, progress has been very slow as a result of the weak capacity of the many states in Africa to police their borders and the lack of cooperation by those in the business of producing and selling arms, both private corporations and wealthy countries, outside of the continent. Another important factor that accounts for the protracted conflicts in Africa is the predominance of economies that are based on export of primary commodities, since such economies conduce to conflict and war.²⁰

Terrorism, the scramble for African resources and superpower intervention

One of the defining elements of international intervention in Africa, after the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, is the global war on terror and the renewed scramble for Africa's oil and other mineral resources by the United States, China and other emerging markets. The 2002 US Strategic Policy observed that the United States is now threatened less by conquering states than by ailing ones that provide havens for terrorists.²¹ Africa's fragile states are viewed as potential havens for terrorist recruitment and activities. The United States therefore seeks to intervene in Africa's fragile states to help build indigenous capability to secure borders and strengthen law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny terrorists havens. Under George W Bush, Africa's growing oil reserves were declared to be of strategic national interest to the United States because they will become increasingly important in future.

The United States is also concerned about China's increasing involvement in Africa. The United States commenced its military agenda in Africa in 2002 when it set up a military base in Djibouti. Since then, it has contracted military organisations to provide services in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. It has numerous freestanding programmes that supply arms and secure cooperation in locations in Uganda, Kenya and Algeria. It has also signed agreements with Gabon, Ghana, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal and Zambia. It has carried out special programmes, including training in anti-terrorism in Botswana, a cooperation in agreement to enable US military enhancements and training in Botswana and South Africa, a counter-terrorism initiative in the Sahel region, training and weapons-provision in Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. It established the East Africa Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) to carry out military training for security and control of people along the coast of six East African countries, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.²² In 2007 the Bush Administration announced the establishment of an African Command (AFRICOM), signifying that the 'White House has opted for the hammer' in its dealings with Africa. These have raised fears that such military-based intervention may complicate the ongoing conflicts or generate new ones. If over-militarisation characterises US intervention in Africa, it may detract from the need of building democratic societies and promoting economic development. As foreign aid is increasingly linked to the introduction of new and draconian anti-terrorism measures, a reduced premium is placed on the eradication of poverty and other development goals.²³

China has in the last decade made major inroads into Africa, with huge investments in oil and other natural resources to feed its rapidly expanding demand for energy and raw materials. It continues to shore up its relations with African countries through the China–Africa Forum. China usually places economic interest above human rights and democratic development and has demonstrated a willingness to deal with dictators. It has provided cover to the government of the Sudan by frustrating the attempt by United States and the UN to intervene decisively in the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Its preference for an enclave working environment in its investment in oil and other mineral resources is poised to be a source of conflicts with local citizens, as shown in Zambia. China is also willing to use political intervention and force to secure its businesses in Africa, as we have seen in its crude intervention in the November 2006 election in Zambia in favour of President Mwanawasa and the use of Chinese police to protect oil pipelines in the Sudan.²⁴ Thus, just as the Cold War turned the continent into a battleground, there is a danger that Africa may once again be reduced to another front in the War on Terror and United States–China proxy wars.

Safety and security of refugees and internally displaced persons

Safety and security are essential public goods that provide the basis of human security. Indeed, the absence or quality of safety and security defines the status of a state as either weak or failing. Failing states often generate humanitarian needs. This is because dominant state elites are challenged by others through arms, and criminal gangs are able to operate in defiance of the state or the state faces active insurgencies.²⁵ Securing safety means that the state enjoys some legitimacy, has an effective police force and is able to reduce or prevent crime within its borders. In the age of globalisation the capacity to ensure safety also involves engagement with other states to fight trans-national crimes, such as smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children, money laundering and international terrorism. Crimes sometimes involve violence that threatens the existence and wellbeing of individuals and has led to forced movement of peoples. Safety and security may also be affected by natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes and accidental bomb explosions. In this case, appropriate agencies must be created for dealing with emergency management. Violent conflicts and other disasters have led to huge problems of refugees and IDPs in Africa. According to the 2008 World Refugee Survey, African hosts some 2 799 500 of the world's total refugee and asylum-seekers, which stood at 14 047 300 at that time.²⁶

This state of things owes largely to the series of conflicts that have affected the continent in the last few years in addition to the prolonged conflicts in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Uganda, the DRC and Eritrea, which continue to experience either low- or high-intensity conflicts. In recent times, the escalated civil war in the Sudan, the post-election conflicts in Kenya in 2007 and the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections, have served to worsen Africa's humanitarian situation. In places such as the Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee camps in Kenya and the 12 camps in the Sudan, refugees live in very dire situations. In Kenya the refugees are denied the right to work and live where they choose. The camp is rife with human rights abuses, such as rape, domestic violence and clashes with local populations over resources such as firewood. The same phenomena are rife elsewhere. In the Sudan, the camps lack adequate drinking water and food. Refugees are denied the right to work, leaving them unable to supplement their rations. Refugees and IDPs are often targets of attack to weaken opponents, or recruited to strengthen armed resistance. Madagascar has recently added to the number of refugees and IDPs as a result of the conflict between President Marc Ravalomanana and his rival, the Mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina of the opposition party, after the violence that trailed the public demonstrations that took place in January 2009.

Broad welfare and human development

One of the critical elements of ensuring human security is the empowerment of people and the protection of citizens against harsh economic conditions. Indeed, economic growth has been identified as the key to peace and long-term stability.²⁸ In the last decade Africa has enjoyed about a 5 per cent growth rate, which has raised hope about the future development prospects of the continent. The rise in the price of oil in the international market was particularly favourable to oil-exporting countries, such as Nigeria, Angola and the Sudan, which have experienced a heady boost in income and foreign investment. The increased incomes have enabled some governments to buy off dissident groups and finance internal security forces. But these have been adversely affected by the global economic meltdown that gripped the world in 2008. It is projected that the global economic crisis will slow the growth rate in Africa from an average of 5 % to 2 per cent. It is expected to slow gross domestic product (GDP) growth and increase the current account deficit for many countries that are net importers of fuel or food. The economic meltdown was also accompanied by a plunge in crude oil prices from US\$147 per barrel to less than US\$40, causing a major shock for oil-producing countries. The economic meltdown is likely to affect the investment-making capacity of banks and corporations in wealthy countries. Thus, their investments in developing countries might cease, further reducing the growth possibilities of those countries. According to the World Bank's *Global Economic Prospects 2009*:

Should credit markets fail to respond to the robust policy interventions taken so far, the consequences for developing countries could be very serious. Such a scenario would be characterised by ... substantial disruption and turmoil, including bank failures and currency crises, in a wide range of developing countries. Sharply negative growth in a number of developing countries and all of the attendant repercussions, including increased poverty and unemployment, would be inevitable.²⁹

Africa had not begun to address the wide gap between growth and development before the food and economic crisis set in in 2008. A review of the *UNDP Human Development Index 2007/2008* shows that the 22 countries that are characterised with low human development as at 2005 were in sub-Saharan Africa with a human development index (HDI) value of less than 0,5. Average life expectancy for these countries is 54,5, adult literacy 53,9 and GDP per capita (PPP of US\$) 14 999.³⁰ These mean that poverty continues to be a grave issue for these countries and life is generally precarious. While many of these countries already suffer from civil strife or natural disasters and face serious food security challenges, the current situation strengthens the threats from other more disastrous human security factors such as health

and devaluation of human life. Malaria and HIV/Aids remain major health challenges to human capital and account for the low life expectancy in many countries. According to UNAIDS, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest HIV rates in the world. It is estimated that more than 22 million people were killed by Aids in 2007. In countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland more than 20 per cent of adults are infected. In these and many countries, the disease has contributed to the increasing population of orphans, child-headed households and the worsening of poverty.³¹ The report highlights that ‘to maintain a robust prevention response, countries need to maintain a “prevention movement”, build the human and technical capacity that will be needed to sustain prevention efforts, and work to stimulate greater demand for prevention services’. The report also notes that ‘in every country where HIV-infection rates have sharply fallen, community mobilization for HIV prevention has been a critical element of success’.³²

According to the Department of International Development (DFID) on malaria and tuberculosis (TB), Africa accounted for 91 per cent of malaria deaths in 2006. None of the populations of 18 African countries surveyed in 2006 and 2007 had adequate access to anti-malaria drugs, and only 34 per cent of households owned insecticide-treated nets (ITNs). A few countries in Africa – Eritrea, Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe – have been able to cut malaria deaths in half. Of the 647 million people at risk in Africa, the portion covered by ITNs rose from 3 per cent in 2001 to 26 per cent in 2006. Government budgets represent only 18 per cent on average of total malaria funding.³³ Thus, much of the resources for malaria control are increasingly derived largely through the Global Fund to Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM). Of all the TB cases globally, 31 per cent were in Africa, with a declining rate of 46 per cent in 2006. The global average cure rate was 85 per cent in 2006, with the lowest level in Africa at 76 per cent. The incidence of TB has increased with the spread of the HIV/Aids pandemic. This is because people with HIV/Aids are easily infected with TB.

An assessment of Africa’s progress towards the achievement of the millennium development goals (MDGs) by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 2008 shows that progress has been slow in achieving a significant number of the targets. North Africa has met the first target to reduce hunger by half in 2015. But many countries along the west coast of the continent are also on course towards achieving this goal. Countries in or just emerging from conflict are worse off. Increased weather variability and climate change have had an adverse effect on rain-fed agriculture on which many African countries largely depend. The UNECA report also observed that global rising food prices have added to these difficulties. Africa has made some progress in aggregate school enrolment, but school completion rates remain on average at 60 per cent. Eleven countries in Africa achieved gender parity in primary school enrolment in 2005. There is still a significant under-representation of girls at the secondary school level. Child mortality rate is

still very high in Africa. Malaria accounts for the high rates of child mortality in West Africa while HIV/Aids explains the high levels of child mortality in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Although there has been some increase in the population of people with access to clean water and improved sanitation, the rural-urban gap in safe drinking water is still wide and tends to pull down aggregate figures in some countries. Changes in these two areas are too slow to reach the target of MDGs. The report observed that progress is slowest in health-related MDGs.³⁴

An International Labour Organisation Report observes that sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand out as regions with extremely harsh labour market conditions and with the highest shares of working poor of all regions. It is estimated that the unemployment rate in Africa stood at 7.9 per cent in 2008.³⁵ Poor living conditions remain a major threat to human security in the continent. However, it must be noted that the conditions of economies, governance and conflicts vary markedly across countries, hence the need for a collective approach to take advantage of the benefits of regional cooperation.

Conclusion

The capacity of the state to interact with society and extract resources for the benefit of collective interest and the common good is very weak in most of Africa. This is the result of both the colonial origin of the state and the failures of the post-colonial leadership to transform the state and manoeuvre to take advantage of an unfavourable and increasingly globalised world. This weakness of the state in many countries on the continent is reflected in widespread poverty, weak state bureaucracies, fragility of the security sectors, and in the series of challenges to the state's monopoly of the use of force by insurgents and other criminal gangs, and civil wars. These challenges transcend national borders and portend grave danger to the livelihoods of many.

African leaders under the AU have recognised the gravity of the human security challenge in the continent. Unresolved internal economic failures and political instability have, however, made it difficult for them to effectively commit material and human resources to give life to the notion of 'Africans solving African problems'. The achievements of Nepad have been very modest and the AU continues to face severe financial constraints in carrying out peace operations.

The persistence of poor diversity management, as shown in election conflicts, military coups and intra-state violent conflicts, show that there is a lot to be done in ensuring inclusive government and the rule of law. Inclusive government can be achieved when there is responsive and responsible leadership that promotes meaningful participation and empowerment. This means leadership that recognises that political stability cannot be guaranteed by means of force alone. Peacebuilding and conflict-resolution capability must,

therefore, be promoted across the continent and concrete efforts made to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Africa must expend more resources on peacebuilding, peacekeeping and enforcement to reduce conflicts in the short term in order to be able to reduce military expenditure in the long term and free resources for human development programmes.

There is no doubt the current global economic meltdown will adversely affect economic growth and renewed regional and national commitments to good governance and conflict reduction. But this should reinforce the commitment to collective human security. Challenges of human security that relate to nation-building should not be perceived as short-term, quick-fix situations. African leaders must draw on the lessons and pains of the independence struggle, the Cold War and economic reforms as it engages with the superpowers in an effort to promote global security in the 21st century.

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CHAPTER 5

Politics and Governance in Africa

John Akokpari

Introduction

A proper understanding of the context in which African states deal with the myriad of issues facing them requires an appreciation of the nature of politics and governance on the continent.¹ The issues, suffice to say, are numerous and complex. Many of Africa's problems can be directly or indirectly linked to questions of governance: some are causes of poor governance, whereas others are a result of it. Improved state capacity and governance standards offer the beginnings of solutions for many areas identified as problems for Africa in this chapter; corruption and the HIV/Aids pandemic are but two of them. Working African integration projects will not materialise under conditions of poor governance. Yet many of Africa's developmental challenges are regional by nature, and only solutions that involve all relevant actors will result in any real progress. It is, therefore, crucial that the link between governance and regional cooperation capacity is thoroughly understood. This chapter thus seeks to highlight some of the disconcerting features of governance in Africa. It attempts to show how the failure to order governance would potentially undermine any initiatives towards continental development and integration. We argue further that continental initiatives have faltered as a result of the inauspicious political culture both at national and regional levels. We begin the analysis by throwing some light on the notion of 'governance'.

Governance as a concept

'Governance' is a rather broad term that refers to the various ways through which social life is coordinated. Rhodes posits that the term is used so broadly that it can lose all sense of meaning. However, he argues that governance can be salvaged when it refers to self-organising, inter-organisational networks.² Such networks are likely to belong to both the state and society, and hence government represents one of the institutions engaged in governance. From this base, governance can measure the extent to which government networks deliver services.³

In order to influence government reform, the World Bank and other international financial institutions (IFIs) have increasingly encouraged 'good governance'. As set out by the bank, good governance includes some or all of the following characteristics:

[A]n efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.⁴

Good governance can also be defined as the presence of institutions that provide predictable, impartial and consistently enforced rules.⁵ Thus it relates to the capacity of a state insofar as it is able to enforce policies conducive to economic growth, and to provide good governance to society and markets.⁶ As such, good governance refers to the effectiveness of democratic institutions.

Under authoritarian regimes, Rhodes would describe the state's propensity to 'deliver services' as low. The state apparatus is unlikely to be particularly concerned about providing development or welfare to its citizens. Regional or international organisations – with the exception of military organisations – exist for the purpose of achieving some tangible economic or developmental objectives. Poorly governed states are by definition not disposed to participating in such projects, or if they do, their activism in them will be limited. Hence, any will to actively promote regional or international integration will be diluted at best in poorly governed states, characterised by authoritarianism and low or no citizen participation. The prevalence of this tendency may be attributed to the nature of Africa's political culture and reflects some of the broader features of governance.

Political culture and features of governance in Africa

Political culture can be understood in terms of the mores, norms, customs and habits related to the discipline of politics in a given population.⁷ How civic duty is understood, what constitutes legitimate government, what norms and practices have been adopted and how public participation in decision-making takes place are all questions that help define a political culture. Discussion about the political culture of Africa is inevitably prone to generalisations and broad assumptions, but such analysis has its uses: Africa's political landscape can be understood in terms of general trends, which while unavoidably do not apply in all cases, do indicate a direction or tendency that is common among states on the continent. It is, for example, popular among some Africanists to point to the notion of *ubuntu* as a social philosophy that transcends national boundaries and can be embraced by all Africans as a guiding principle for

social interactions, political included.⁸ This is not the place to debate the merits of *ubuntu*. However, it is worth highlighting that there is value in discussing 'African political culture' in the same way that there is value in talking about 'Western liberal democracy', which is not a coherent theory but an umbrella term which encompasses a plethora of different interpretations of democracy. If one is looking for African solutions to African problems, then a continent-wide understanding of good governance would certainly serve to facilitate any cooperation at the regional or continental levels.

What, then, are the salient features of the African political scene? There is certainly a preponderance of non-democratic systems of government. Where there is a semblance of democracy, one-party dominance is often the rule, with little role for the opposition. Corruption is rife: suffice to say here that in the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)⁹ only three African states were above midpoint in the scoring. Reporters Without Borders found in its 2008 report that in Africa: 'Outside certain countries ... the year was marked by a general setback.'¹⁰ HIV/Aids-infection rates in many countries have reached pandemic proportions, which has a deleterious effect on the economy and as a consequence on governance. Many countries still suffer from the politicisation of ethnicity or tribalism resulting in – often violent – conflict. Much of the continent is underdeveloped and has severe problems of poverty. This, in turn, feeds into understandings of the role of politics: questions of economic development often trump abstract notions of equality or civic rights and responsibilities in societies afflicted by extreme poverty. These realities inform and shape the political practices and systems in Africa.

In spite of the preponderance of governing institutions, democracy in much of Africa remains nascent and fragile. According to the 2009 Freedom House report,¹¹ only ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa can be termed 'free', with 23 'partly free' and the remaining 15 'not free'. Of the total population of 808 110 million people in the region, 706 162 million live in conditions that are either partly free or not free. Freedom House defines free countries as those 'where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media'.¹² Worryingly, such a climate exists in only a minority of countries in the region. Africa does not fare well in global comparison, with its significantly lower proportion of free countries (21 per cent compared to 46 per cent globally) and a significantly higher proportion of partly free and not free countries (partly free: 48 per cent compared to 32 per cent globally, not free: 31 per cent compared to 22 per cent globally).¹³ It seems fair to speak, therefore, of a political culture predominant in Africa that places little value on freedom.

While elusive in Africa, democracy is a disputed concept. But even taking a relatively minimalist understanding of democracy that entails regular free and fair elections, open political competition and the safeguarding of basic citizens'

rights by the state, not many African states fit the bill. Where democracies do exist, the political scene is often dominated by one party. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since 1966 despite regular free and fair elections. Despite the breakaway faction Congress of the People (COPE), the African National Congress (ANC) still dominates the political scene in South Africa and is unlikely to be beaten at the polls in the near future. 'Elections', in the words of Mozaffar, 'while commonplace, have a chequered history in sub-Saharan Africa.'¹⁴ Elections do not, of course, equate to democracy, but the irregular practice of holding them (bar a few exceptions) across the continent says something of the fragility of the system they are meant to legitimise.

A distinctive feature of African democracies is the general perception of a weak and fragmented civil society: in South Africa it is estimated that 70 per cent of the population does not participate in civics.¹⁵ Although there may be numerous active groups, they have limited (if any) influence on government policy. One explanation given for this is the prevalence of a dominant ruling party,¹⁶ which either swallows or mutes divergent interest groups. Molutsi and Holm point out, however, that in the case of Botswana the active groups can at least, over time, establish a 'tradition of popular control'.¹⁷ Bauer argues that in Namibia several civil society groups are active, despite the hostility of the ruling party: the groups' influence has been hindered by the reluctance of the government to engage with them. Bauer concedes, however, that Namibia's numerous civil society groups might be an exception in African terms.¹⁸ Still, civil society groups, despite their protestations were unable to prevent Sam Nujoma from challenging the constitution and seeking a third consecutive term as president of Namibia.¹⁹ There are a few exceptions: civil society agitation was able to prevent Frederick Chiluba and Olusegun Obasanjo in Zambia and Nigeria respectively from running for third terms. Similarly, in South Africa, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) successfully prevailed on the government to roll out antiretroviral drugs. These are, however, isolated cases of success of civil society agitation. Generally, the ability of civil society in Africa to reverse government policy is minimal.

Enslin and Horsthemke argue that the idea that there exist radically different forms of democracy is 'not only unhelpful but ultimately untenable'.²⁰ It is true, of course, that democracy varies from country to country. The question here is whether or not there is any value in differentiating between democracies whose core principles remain similar. Ake finds that the West's support for democracy in Africa is based on pushing a 'Western model of society'.²¹ The implication here is of course that any form of democracy that is modelled on (and the term is used here in the broadest sense) a 'Western liberal democracy' would be a synthetic construct in Africa. Ake admits that what constitutes democracy in Africa is still difficult to elucidate, but that one of the key components of it would be an emphasis on the economical.²² Hence, African democracy would be less a determination of abstract political rights and more an understanding of concrete economic ones. He also points

out that there are notable differences in terms of conceptualising political participation between Africa and the West due to differing socio-cultural circumstances.²³ Whereas Western democracy is built around the role of the individual, African society is understood in more communal terms. Thus decisions are based on an understanding of the communal rather than the individual good. The success of participation in politics is not measured by the decision that is reached, but by taking part in the process. The communality is reciprocated by those elected for public office: 'The notion, common in Africa, that the representative is elected for the sole purpose of furthering the interests of those who elected him or her is fundamentally inimical to the democratic order as we know it in the West.'²⁴ Ake concludes that African democracy will evolve and develop based on the unique circumstances of the continent, rather than be realised through any effort to manufacture it.²⁵

While it seems clear that details of the democratic processes in Africa might be at variance with those in some Western countries, the question remains: do these differences constitute a different type of democracy that warrants the epithet 'African', or are they merely differences that inevitably occur as a result of local circumstances? It would seem unlikely that there would be no variance even between democracies on the continent, and it therefore seems too simple to speak of a single African democracy.

A feature that can be said to characterise politics across almost the entire continent is the predominance of corruption in public life. Corruption is by no means unique to Africa, but its scale and pervasiveness are unique. Apart from Botswana, Mauritius and Cape Verde, all African states rank in the lower half of the CPI, based on surveys done by Transparency International. Indeed, out of 47 African countries reviewed by Transparency International, corruption is perceived as 'rampant' in 30 countries.²⁶ Szeftel, writing in 2000, argues that: 'Corruption [in Africa] ... is more widespread, more pernicious, more devastating than it has ever been.'²⁷ Few African leaders appear to have resisted the temptation of abusing their office for personal gain. Civil servants in many parts of Africa that are promoted to a high position are expected to abuse that position: 'To refuse to grab such an opportunity to make a fortune is to make oneself an object of reproach in some cases or of mockery in others.'²⁸ Thus it would not be far-fetched to suppose that those elevated to high positions within regional or continental bodies should also attempt to misuse that office. Corruption is not, therefore, an issue that affects governance only on the national level, it also undermines collective African efforts at addressing common developmental challenges. The key problem with the current situation is that corruption has the tendency not to abate, even when those factors that contribute to its spread (such as weak states or poor economic conditions) are removed: 'Though Africa provides numerous examples of countries showing a rapid development and spread of corruption, it provides none of the reverse.'²⁹

If widespread (and spreading) corruption has clear implications for the politics and governance of the continent, then the HIV/Aids pandemic has equally important ramifications. De Waal quotes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures (2002) for medium-term gross domestic product (GDP) per capita losses as a result of HIV/Aids as 5,8 per cent for South Africa, 7,3 per cent for Zimbabwe and 10,2 per cent for Botswana.³⁰ For a workforce to lose its most productive workers to HIV/Aids has both an immediate and a long-term consequence. In the short term, the economy loses actors whose contributions could have otherwise continued for 20 to 30 years. A reduced life expectancy for adults causes important professional networks and knowledge transfer mechanisms to break down; managers in the workplace are forced to either promote inexperienced juniors, or to do the work of their incapacitated subordinates themselves.³¹ Because this will happen in the private as well as public sectors, it is inevitable that the governments of afflicted countries will be affected too. Inexperienced or overwhelmed governments will be unable to deal with the increasingly challenging circumstances, resulting in diminished social infrastructure.

What makes the governance implications of the HIV/Aids pandemic even more profound is the inevitability that developmental and democratic agendas will have to be cut back to deal with the growing costs. In 2008 it is estimated that US\$13,7 billion was used worldwide in response to HIV/Aids.³² Importantly, states risk losing their monopoly on violence; HIV-infection rates are comparatively higher in army and police forces, and the organisational structures of these institutions rely heavily on long careers, whereby knowledge can be maintained and passed on effectively.³³ The new kind of political crisis arising from HIV/Aids has not been understood well enough yet. De Waal writes: 'To date, few African governments have recognised the political threat posed by the HIV/Aids pandemic.'³⁴ Any internal political crises will affect regional initiatives as well, especially as the virus affects large areas of Africa.

Also characterising Africa's governance is the ubiquity of conflicts and violence of various forms. Conflict reduces the capacity to govern, and inevitably drains the will for regional cooperation where cross-border conflicts are in question. Violence occurs in Africa with alarming frequency: the president of Guinea-Bissau, Joao Bernardo Vieira, was assassinated on 2 March 2009, apparently in retaliation for the killing of the chief of staff of the army, General Batista Tagme Na Waie, the day before.³⁵ Prolonged violence marked the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya following disputes about the result between the two main contenders and their supporters. The level of violent crime in South Africa is worrying: the South African Police Service crime statistics for 2007/2008 gives staggering numbers for reported murders (18 487), rapes (36 190) and car hijackings (14 201).³⁶ Conflict can serve only to frustrate any efforts at developing common African solutions or cooperative developmental solutions. In the patrimonial systems in place across much of the continent,

returns for incumbents are great. The competition for the resources of the state is high. When political options are not available to oust leaders, the opposition is 'forced' to take up arms as the remaining alternative route to be in government.

Experience has indicated that conflicts can damage regional organisations. For example, the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 severely undermined the organisation's legitimacy as a regional security regime, and created serious splits between member states. At the time of the military intervention by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, a pre-designed authorisation process for such action was not established.³⁷ Nonetheless, these member states proceeded to send troops into the DRC, at the displeasure of their partners. South Africa, supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, among others, preferred a more conciliatory approach.³⁸ Similarly, the initial decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene in the war in Liberia in 1991 received only lukewarm support of the Francophone members of the community. It is on record that Burkina Faso, one of the Francophone members, became a conduit for the supply of arms to Charles Taylor's rebels that the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was fighting.³⁹ This indicates a wider problem within regional organisations in Africa. Where membership is based upon geographical proximity rather than shared values, splits are likely to form within regional institutions. This in turn, reveals a tacit unwillingness of member states to cede sovereignty to supra-national bodies, especially where broader regional objectives are seen as conflicting with their national interests.⁴⁰

Africa's economic figures indicate the continent's growing global marginalisation. Africa's participation in the global market measured in its share of world exports has plummeted to just 1 per cent, although this was 4 per cent in the 1960s. Foreign direct investment (FDI), generally assumed to provide life support to Africa's fragile economies, is on the decline. Although this has recently been increasing in certain countries (Angola, South Africa and Mozambique), and regionally in southern Africa, the flow of FDI to Africa has on average declined from US\$8,1 billion in 1996 to US\$6,1 billion in 2000. Although this rose to a high of US\$13,8 billion in 2001, it fell again to US\$7 billion in 2003.⁴¹ Similarly, net overseas development assistance (ODA) has plummeted from a high level of US\$28 billion in 1990 to US\$16,4 billion in 2000.⁴² Also since the 1980s, Africa's share of North-South trade has declined, in marked contrast to the trade increases in other developing regions.⁴³ This can be accounted through the small size of the average African economy: 'Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP is similar in size to Australia's; when South Africa is excluded, Africa's GDP is about the same as Austria's.'⁴⁴ Neo-liberal logic follows that if these small economies integrate, larger markets will be created in which economies of scale can be exploited, domestic competition enhanced and FDI attracted.⁴⁵

Economic conditions prevalent in many African countries are not particularly conducive to economic integration. Levels of intra-African trade are remarkably low, accounting on average for only 10 per cent of total trade.⁴⁶ This low figure can be explained in part by the lack of diversification across Africa's predominantly agrarian economies. Consequently, there is a lack of trade complementarity among regional trade associations, (RTA) partners, which, along with small market size and weak infrastructural capacity, limits the ability of RTAs to exploit economies of scale.⁴⁷ Political conditions are also limiting. Governments are often averse to reducing trade barriers because it would concurrently mean a reduction in trade taxes, which often generate one-third of all government revenues.⁴⁸ States are disinclined to surrender sovereignty over macro-economic policy-making and are unwilling to accept the unequal distribution of gains and pains that result from integration agreements.⁴⁹ This has led to a weakening of regional secretariats. For example, neither SADC nor ECOWAS have the legal backing to force countries to fulfil their obligations.⁵⁰ Furthermore, overlapping membership means that tasks are duplicated and national policy coherence is seriously undermined.⁵¹ Consequently, implementation of regional trade policy has been weak, resulting in stagnant, if not declining, growth of intra-regional trade in Africa.⁵² No economic regional institutions with the exception of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), has yet reached the point of making all regional trade tariff-free.⁵³

And there are further disconcerting external pressures affecting politics and governance in Africa. Notable among these are aid and conditionalities. Since the 1980s, financial malpractice and economic conditions have meant that Africa has been a major net receiver of aid. In some countries, gross aid flows have accounted for 60 per cent or more of GDP in some years; and in many nations aid flows have often exceeded government tax revenues.⁵⁴ As can be expected, debt levels have simultaneously increased – from approximately US\$60 billion in 1980 to US\$230 billion in 2000.⁵⁵ Over the same period, aid has been increasingly given through official creditors and donors (as opposed to commercial creditors). It has been channelled more and more through multilateral bodies, such as the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the European Investment Bank.⁵⁶ Conscious of the need to foster African development, and with the neo-liberal logic that this will be achieved through the expansion and entrenchment of democracy, such development assistance has been conditional.

As Santiso remarks, 'the strengthening of good governance in developing countries has become both an objective of and a condition for development assistance'.⁵⁷ This conditionality satisfies donors that the revenue will be used for purposes they consider legitimate. Donor pressure has meant that IFIs have ever more demanded evidence of the impact of their aid. Research has shown a clear and positive correlation between aid effectiveness and good

governance. Aid is most effective, in terms of economic growth, where there is better social infrastructure, that is institutions and government policies that promote economic growth.⁵⁸ In other words, countries with good governance are better equipped and more likely to use development assistance effectively. On the other hand, in countries with weak social infrastructure, financial aid may have profoundly negative impacts; it represents a potential form of rents, which may further corrupt already neo-patrimonial institutions.⁵⁹ Countries with poor state capacity are less able to absorb aid to improve social infrastructure. This phenomenon has meant that since the 1990s countries with better governance records have received considerably more aid.⁶⁰ It is thus frequently argued that aid and conditionalities are contributing to the evolution of good governance practices in Africa by making governments more transparent, accountable and less authoritarian.⁶¹

China offers an alternative to the conditional aid given by international financial institutions. Over recent years, China has progressively invested in resource-rich African nations. In doing so, China holds firm to the principle of non-interference and political neutrality, which is of great appeal to African nations.⁶² The contrast between China and the IFIs can be illustrated in the case of Angola, a country emerging from civil war and whose governance credentials remain questionable. During negotiations with the IMF to secure reconstruction funds conditioned on transparency measures, the Angolan government halted the process. This was because it had received an unconditional counter-offer of a US\$2 billion loan from China's export-credit agency, Exim Bank.⁶³ This quite obviously and quite seriously undermines Western attempts to foster good governance and change political culture in Africa. Furthermore, it undercuts African efforts to develop transparency, by enabling badly governed regimes to remain in power unreformed.

Despite the deep suspicion and humiliation felt by African leaders when their regimes are judged by Western norms of human rights and liberal democracy, many African nations do not have the choice of turning solely to Chinese investment. This may be because they are not resource-rich, or for those that are, because debt burdens and the persistent need for capital means they still need to attract Western development assistance. This means that to varying degrees, reliance upon conditional aid IFIs holds. Africa has not been oblivious to the reality of bad governance, vanfarious initiatives have been undertaken during the last couple of decades to address it.

Regional initiatives towards good governance – the African Union and Nepal

Since the 1990s, there has been a renewed push to extend and deepen regional development initiatives and good governance in Africa. This has led to the creation and re-creation of regional organisations: the African Union (AU)

represents one such reincarnation. Adopted in 2002, the AU developed from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Formed in 1963, the OAU's primary objectives were to increase the pace of decolonisation and foster the unity of newly independent African nations.⁶⁴ The OAU had no clear approach to good governance, but its charter did set out its regard for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁶⁵ However, the OAU failed to stop the suppression of human rights inflicted by leaders such as Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi.⁶⁶ The AU was created as an attempt to address the failings of the OAU. Based on pan-African principles, the AU aims to 'end the international discrimination against Africans and to ensure their social, economic and political development'.⁶⁷ The AU focuses on broad and deep African issues, and aims to create a forum for collective action on matters of security, economics and politics. Although the transition of the OAU to the AU may reflect the reinvigoration of African leaders to seek regional solutions to their problems, the extent to which the substance of the AU differs from the OAU can be questioned. With the very same, or new and similarly despotic, leaders in place in Africa, the extent to which the AU can meaningfully address governance issues is unclear. This has led to the assertion that the AU is, more or less, 'old wine in new bottles'.⁶⁸

The New Partnership for African Development (Nepad) is the programme through which the AU attempts to tackle mal-governance on the continent.⁶⁹ At its centre is the notion that good governance is a requisite for peace and security, and economic and political development. Unlike the AU, Nepad has exclusive and discriminatory membership. In order to become a member, certain minimum standards of governance and economic management must have been met.⁷⁰ This is an important step, and sets Nepad apart from other regional bodies. As Kanbur terms it, Nepad's exclusivity, its continent-wide base and its commitment to democratic ideas give Nepad its comparative advantage. This makes Nepad a potentially effective platform from which Africa can be externally heard.⁷¹

Nepad represents a partnership with the G8 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations, with whom the notion of 'enhanced partnership' has been created. African nations that become members of Nepad are able to formulate development aims, for which donors guarantee funds for extended periods, and which are jointly monitored on the basis of outcomes.⁷² This represents a potentially important shift from externally conditioned aid, as traditionally received through official development assistance and IFIs, to a more cooperative approach whereby African nations have a clear stake in the direction and nature of reform. Clearly, such a benchmark is only likely to be met in nations that are well governed and that display a clear interest in improving their governance. The assessment of economic and democratic development is managed in Nepad through its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a voluntary process whereby member states' governance is monitored. This involves collaborative

processes through which governments and national stakeholders, along with an external Nepad review team, assess political, economic and corporate governance and identify shortcomings.⁷³ At the time of writing, 23 of Africa's 53 nations were signatories to the APRM Memorandum of Understanding.⁷⁴

There are, however, certain institutional and operational weaknesses in Nepad. A general criticism is that in attempting to analyse and evaluate political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and peace and security, it has been over-ambitious. This has led some commentators to recommend it reduce its review mandate.⁷⁵ More specifically, Nepad failed to fully engage civil society in its creation, which represents a missed opportunity for strengthening popular ownership of Nepad,⁷⁶ and for raising the importance of civil society involvement in regional processes. Instead, governments have become the prime actor in the Nepad process, in no way giving incentive for African nations to consult with their constituents. This not only undermines the regional institution itself, it also undercuts the potential democratising impacts the programme could have.

In practice, the APRM is subject to the willingness of the state under review. Jordaan's research on the process in Rwanda has shown that the government was unwilling in its self-assessment to acknowledge its most serious political problems. For example, the report failed to recognise Rwanda's role in conflict in the DRC, including human rights violations by Rwandan government troops, the exploitation of minerals and the supply of arms in contravention of UN embargoes.⁷⁷ Clearly, this instrumentally challenges the integrity and perception of the review mechanism. This problem also alludes to the weak implementation capacity of the APRM. This can be further illustrated in the case of the APRM process in South Africa. The final report, produced in October 2007 (some three years after South Africa's APRM process began), identified racism and xenophobia as issues of concern. It stated that: 'Xenophobia against other African countries is currently on the rise and should be nipped in the bud.'⁷⁸ However, not only did the government not respond to this advice, it also denied any previous knowledge of xenophobia during the attacks of 2008.⁷⁹ Therefore, Nepad clearly lacks the power of implementation. Members are able to obscure perception and choose what they respond to.

Nepad has been charged with being too focused around funding and not enough around substantive democratic improvement. Its very structure relies not on a partnership among African nations, but with its G8 funders. This means that its aims and objectives are couched in terms recognisable and appealing to the West. For example, one of Nepad's stated aims is to achieve an overall African annual growth rate of 7 per cent to enable the continent meet one of the millennium development goals (MDGs).⁸⁰ As a creation by member states for member states, Nepad reflects the desire of African nations to gain development assistance. Nations under review are keen to present a certain image, and will thus avoid a frank and truthful process. This means that the

motivation to pursue good governance, transparency and accountability may come from a disingenuous origin. It could be economic and political expediency that encourages African rulers to partake in such reviews, rather than an authentic aspiration to reduce mal-governance. As such, any change that does occur may be cosmetic, and is dictated by conditionality in much the same way as traditional IFI finance. This kind of top-down accountability reduces the need for governments to become answerable to their constituents and develop meaningful reform. Thus, international aid may actually undermine internal mechanisms of democratisation that may have developed otherwise.⁸¹

Regional political culture and authoritarianism

Both the OAU and the AU have had influential leaders with rather different approaches to the pan-Africanist agenda. At the creation of the OAU in 1963, Nkrumah of Ghana proposed immediate African unity, whereas Nyerere of Tanzania argued that nations should be consolidated first. Nyerere's view was most acceptable and so nation-building and economic development were propelled in the OAU.⁸² The drafting of the AU was crafted by three African leaders, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Mbeki took a neo-liberal internationalist stance, which aimed to improve African's global economic competitiveness. Obasanjo's approach can perhaps be described as gradualist pan-Africanism; he argued the AU should be an institution through which African leaders could develop a common African agenda. Gaddafi was the most radical of the three. He proposed that the AU have one president, one military and a single currency, and hence create 'the United States of Africa'.⁸³

It appears that regional political culture in Africa is a direct consequence of political culture at the domestic level. The issues of bad governance at the national level are reflected in supra-national bodies, which are consequently unable to make substantive changes to governance on the continent. Leadership transition data in Africa seem to indicate a shift towards democratic methods of government change. Goldsmith shows a marked rise in the number of democratic transitions from 1980 to 1999.⁸⁴ However, this does not directly imply a move towards a fundamentally more democratic Africa. Of the 39 autocratic leaders in Africa in 1990, half were still 'democratically' elected leaders of their countries in 1997.⁸⁵ Leaders in positions of power have been able to mould the transition to democracy in such a fashion that they would still be in a position of power after the said transition. For an autocratic leader becoming 'democratically elected', in many cases, did not imply that any meaningful democratic transition had in fact occurred; it was merely necessary to establish a veneer of legitimacy, which elections handily provided.

While the impact of authoritarianism on (good) governance is relatively clear, it also becomes apparent that any efforts at regionalisation are hindered

by the preponderance of authoritarian regimes in Africa. Zimbabwe is a good case in point. The SADC has undermined its own efforts at regional cooperation by its general nonchalance towards Robert Mugabe's repressive regime. Despite a few 'dissenting' voices, the SADC leadership has quietly allowed Mugabe to continue his brutal reign. In the case of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki's ludicrous allusions to African solidarity have justified the complete ignorance of a neighbouring country spiralling to complete ruin.⁸⁶ While Robert Mugabe was isolated from the world stage, he was able to attend the meeting of the AU in July 2008.⁸⁷ Following the controversial and irregular elections, criticisms for Zimbabwe from member nations were few, and during the summit at best muted.⁸⁸ Few leaders, notably presidents Ian Khama of Botswana and the recently deceased Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia, openly voiced their criticisms of Mugabe's regime. This behaviour may be partially explained through the 'old boys club' culture of African politics, wherein leaders are disinclined to criticise one another. Good writes:

Since the rise of the broad-based democratic movement in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, regional leaders have scorned the problems that Zimbabweans faced, and extended support to the despot [Mugabe]. All facts concerning land seizures for self-enrichment, lawlessness, destruction, and election-rigging have been almost studiously ignored. International appeals to re-think this ultimately self-destructive posture have been spurned.⁸⁹

Following irregular elections in 2002, President Mbeki described Commonwealth leaders who favoured tough action against Mugabe as motivated by notions of 'white supremacy'.⁹⁰ This defensive stance has resulted in the SADC being wholly inadequate at addressing political malpractice in Zimbabwe. Regional cooperation relies, to some extent, on a supra-national body that carries certain authority so that cooperative projects can be seen through. Authoritarian regimes are unlikely to accept any rulings from outside bodies, and even if they are members of such bodies, will in all probability ignore any rulings that are not in their interests.

Conclusion

The political culture of the African continent is difficult to put a finger on. As a consequence, the ability to draw conclusions about the present state, let alone the future, of governance in Africa is limited. What becomes clear from a whistle-stop tour of the challenges facing political systems and institutions is that they are numerous, and they are unlikely to be addressed quickly. The global economic crisis will hardly serve Africa's interest. Although the notion of an 'African democracy' has its shortcomings, the debate is a useful one. Established Western liberal democracies have had decades, if not

centuries, to mature and develop solutions that worked for the particular circumstances there. If there is to be found a democracy specific to the needs of the African continent, it will emerge through the political interactions of civil society groups, the public and the elected officials.

The manifestation of political culture at the continental level reflects the low priority of democratisation at the national level. African political elites have manipulated conditional international financial assistance for their own benefit. They have been able to 'tame' the process of democratisation, and have used the development assistance received to perpetuate client-elitist politics. Leaders were able, as Chabal puts it, to 'willy-nilly' implement structural adjustment and democratisation prescriptions.⁹¹ As such, sufficient veneer of complying with conditionality is created through institutions such as Nepad, but they lack substance. The financial assistance gained enables governments to bypass domestic sources of revenue, and thus it may actually suppress the development of internal mechanisms for accountability and development. As such, continental integration is likely to be limited in fostering good governance until genuine commitment for reform is forthcoming. Similarly, the nature of governance in Africa is certain to continually exert influence on any integrative initiatives on the continent.

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CHAPTER 6

Pan-African Governance Architecture: Prospects and Future

Ufo Uzodike

Introduction

Since the 1960s, African countries have undertaken significant initiatives with a view to achieving industrial prosperity by integrating their economies and promoting regional political cooperation or unity. Notable among these initiatives was the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The OAU's objective to promote unity and solidarity among African states underpinned the creation of pan-African structures and the promotion of regional governance. Since the formation of the OAU, African countries have taken progressive steps towards regional economic and political unification through the initiation and adoption of regimes and governance protocols. This notion of continental governance assumed greater significance in both academic and policy circles in Africa during the 1980s, underscored by the conscious attempts to integrate African countries. For example, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)¹ and the Final Act of Lagos (1980),² as well as the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), commonly known as the Abuja Treaty (1991),³ gave impetus to the governance of regional integration in the continent. In addition, the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2002 marked a watershed in the process of regional governance. And since the advent of the AU, African countries have taken significant steps towards continentalism through the rationalisation of regional economic communities (RECs), which are regarded as the building blocks of economic and, ultimately, political integration.

The commitment to regional economic and political unity has been reflected in the creation and/or modification of pan-African governance structures, as exemplified by the AU's activities since 2002. Remarkably, the idea of regional governance has remained firmly at the top of the continental body's priority agenda at every successive summit. Indeed, the issue of pan-African governance – or Afro-governance – has been pre-eminent, even at summits called or designated to address matters that do not fall strictly within the purview of the development of governance architecture for the continent. The AU's preoccupation with Afro-governance is reflected, as noted above, in the creation of pan-African institutions and the adoption of regional frameworks

of action not only to ensure coherence, but also to facilitate the convergence of national instruments and practices as a prelude to eventual continental unification. Therefore, it is apposite to examine these institutions, regimes, processes and mechanisms under the auspices of the AU in light of their crucial importance to continental governance. This is the thematic concern of this chapter: it examines the governance of regional integration in Africa.

As this chapter shows, Africa's experience with regional integration reflects ambivalence and contentions as to the process and form of, and path to, continental unity. Besides, the political contexts in several African states have shaped the course of integration by either reinforcing optimism regarding the prospects of Afro-governance or undermining the possibility thereof. In dealing with the thematic concern of our chapter as stated above, it is acknowledged that issues of politics and governance in African countries are germane to the process and eventual form of regional integration. In what follows, this chapter examines the philosophical underpinning of continental governance in order to offer illuminating insights into the historical trajectory of Afro-governance. The chapter posits that the ongoing drive towards Afro-governance can be located in the historical context of pan-Africanism. It is acknowledged that in practical terms, pan-Africanism underpins formalised and institutionalised arrangements in the form of structures and institutions of continental governance. The following section then examines some of these structures and institutions of pan-African governance, taking cognisance of their importance in the context of the transition from the OAU to the AU. Next, the chapter turns attention to selected regional frameworks or codes of conduct that have been developed to steer national political processes. Regional frameworks that receive focused attention include the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) and the Electoral Codes of Conduct. An examination of these frameworks is necessary to ascertain the extent and nature of national compliance with, or deviation from, these continental regimes. Moreover, this chapter explores the plausible role of subregional organisations in ensuring greater coherence and better rationalisation between pan-African governance institutions and national practices. The concluding section of this chapter examines the prospects of effective continental governance.

Pan-Africanism: Philosophical underpinning of continental governance

The idea of African unity, as well as the practices and initiatives associated with it, derives essentially from the notion of 'pan-Africanism'. In other words, the evolution of structures, institutions and mechanisms of regional integration can be traced to the fervour of pan-Africanism. This chapter posits that the historical provenance of the current trends in Afro-governance can be

located in the pan-Africanist movement of the 1930s. This section examines the ideology of pan-Africanism as a prelude to linking it with the evolution of continental governance architecture. It is fitting to note that despite its ubiquity in the discourse on integration in Africa, the concept of pan-Africanism is plagued by definitional complexities that characterise other social science concepts. This is because of the many forms of expressions associated with pan-Africanism. As a philosophical concept, pan-Africanism espouses the idea that African people share common bonds that define their humanity and shape their collective destiny. Politically and economically, pan-Africanism underpins the construction of a shared consciousness to wrestle African people from the various forms of political and economic domination, including those that emanate from the legacies of colonialism and the hydra-headed shackles of neo-colonialism. Generally speaking, pan-Africanism emerged in response to the historical, cultural, political and economic legacies that underscore(d) the need for African unity in the context of the struggle to overcome the internal and the external forces that subjugate the continent or seek to do so.

Therefore, the issues of liberation, self-determination and the emancipation of African people are cardinal to the conception and understanding of pan-Africanism. These issues find expression in the various definitions of the concept. Legum points out that pan-Africanism is associated with 'a belief in the uniqueness and spiritual unity of black people; and acknowledgment of their right to self-determination in Africa, and to be treated with dignity as equals in all parts of the world'.⁴ Sharp defines pan-Africanism as the belief that 'all people of African descent have common interests and should work together to conquer prejudice and oppression worldwide'.⁵ According to Kodjoe, pan-Africanism is the acceptance of the 'oneness of all African people and a commitment for the betterment of all people of African descent'.⁶ Mkandawire conceptualises pan-Africanism as a strategy for social solidarity among African people; a strategy for the cultural, political and economic emancipation of people of the continent.⁷

These definitions suggest that there are four strands in the ideology of pan-Africanism. The first, is that pan-Africanism is closely linked to the question of identity. It is essential for the creation of self-awareness as to what it means to be African and the burden of reconstructing that identity in light of the subjugation of the people of the continent via the instrumentality of slavery, colonialism and white supremacy (institutionalised, for example, in the form of defunct white minority rule in southern Africa). Secondly, pan-Africanism speaks to the quest for human dignity and the equality of all people. In fact, that the struggle for the equal treatment of people is an integral part of the pan-Africanist movement has never been in doubt. Historically, the emergence of the ideology is located in the struggles against the dehumanisation of Africans and people of African descent. In this context, definitions of pan-Africanism encompass the idea of human dignity and equality globally. Thirdly, pan-Africanism is conceived as a movement that engenders liberation,

independence and self-government for Africans. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ideology was a major rallying point for anti-colonial fervour and decolonisation struggles in Africa. Nationalists conducted the anti-colonial struggles within the broader pan-Africanist ideal of self-determination, a norm that found practical expression in the attainment of sovereign statehood by African social formations. And finally, pan-Africanism has always underscored the notion of African unity, although the form that such unity should take has always been in contention. Notwithstanding the rejection of Kwame Nkrumah's proposal (in the early 1960s) for the immediate political unification of Africa, political leaders on the continent realised and, were guided by, the imperative to address the problem of the fragmented and weak character of African states; hence, the adoption of the pan-Africanist strategy of gradual or functional integration towards eventual continental unity. This strategy of gradualism has under-girded the institutionalisation of pan-African unity. Remarkably, the formation of the OAU and the creation of the AU represent milestones in the institutionalisation of pan-African unity.

It is instructive to note that pan-Africanism had assumed the status of an intergovernmental movement prior to the formation of the OAU. For instance, the ideal of pan-African unity constituted the basis for the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana, in 1958. This conference was a follow-up to the five pan-African congresses held between 1900 and 1945.⁸ Sequel to these earliest attempts to institutionalise pan-Africanism was the establishment of the OAU and, with it, the creation of organs and the adoption of protocols for continental governance. Although the idea of a formal continental government in the form of a United States of Africa was rejected in the 1960s (even as there are reservations about its feasibility in the early 21st century), African countries perceived the OAU as an instrument for the pursuance and realisation of key pan-Africanist ideals such as the emancipation of the continent and the promotion of African unity. At its formation and during its existence, the OAU represented a compromise between a political union and a loose association of African states.

Although the OAU succeeded in the implementation of its pan-African strategy of liberating Africa from the shackles of colonialism and white minority rule (in southern Africa), the organisation's record in promoting unity via the instrumentality of continental governance was less than satisfactory. Effective pan-African governance required supra-national apparatuses and the ceding of powers to a new centre. In other words, nation states aspiring towards regional governance typically have to cede aspects of their sovereignty to regional structures. However, the refusal of African states to subordinate their sovereignty to a higher authority – as reflected in the fixation with the principle of non-interference as enshrined in the charter of the OAU – constituted an impediment to the formation of supra-national structures or mechanisms for continental governance. Yet, initiatives such as the LPA and the AEC Treaty presupposed that the OAU sustained the ideal of pan-African

integration and unity while the organisation lasted. Even though the OAU lacked the formal institutions of Afro-governance that now exist under the AU dispensation, the organisation's creation and *modus operandi* (for example, vis-à-vis dislodging colonialism and laying the groundwork for a new regional architecture) reflected pan-Africanism in practice.

The drive towards Afro-governance and continental unity gained momentum with the transformation of the OAU to the AU. In contradistinction to the OAU, the AU has created pan-African structures and adopted frameworks for the purpose of accelerating the process of continental governance. Therefore, it is pertinent to note that the formation of the AU and the subsequent development of structures and institutions of continental governance are parts of the dynamics of pan-Africanism. We now turn attention to the structures and institutions of Afro-governance.

Structures and institutions of pan-African governance: From the OAU to the AU

In practice, pan-Africanism has been reflected in the creation of formal structures and institutions of continental governance. Between 1963 and 2002, the OAU constituted the continent's overarching governance architecture. The OAU's achievements were, however, limited, given the encumbrances associated with the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. Despite this limitation, the OAU and its institutions provided the early framework for pan-African governance. These organs of the OAU presaged the evolution of some of the structures and institutions of Afro-governance under the auspices of the AU. Indeed, appurtenances of the OAU, such as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the various commissions – for example, the Economic and Social Commission, the Defence Commission and the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration – were created to promote the attainment of the pan-African objectives of the OAU. During the existence of the OAU, these institutions functioned as the apparatuses of regional governance, as briefly highlighted below.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government was the decision-making organ of the OAU while the Council of Ministers implemented the decisions of the Assembly. The General Secretariat, the administrative arm of the OAU, had the mandate to prepare the budgets of the OAU and coordinate the activities (primarily the meetings) of other institutions of the OAU. The various commissions met irregularly to deal with issues that bordered on their mandates. These institutions of the OAU functioned at the regional level in a manner that could be considered analogous to the structures of governance at the national level. However, the OAU operated without authoritative institutions such as a parliament and a court, which are not only indispensable institutions of national democratic governance, but also pivotal institutions of regional governance.

The importance of these key institutions to regional governance, especially where eventual political and/or economic unification was desired, cannot be overemphasised. (The European experience of regional governance process, anchored in and driven by institutions such as the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, is of illustrative utility here.) Typically, institutions such as a parliament and a court help crystallise regional governance and integration by virtue of their supra-national character. It is this realisation, among other imperatives, that underpins the creation of structures and institutions of governance at the regional level. Africa is not an exception in this regard. The advent of the AU has been accompanied by the evolution of pan-African governance architecture distinct from that associated with the OAU dispensation. The next section unpacks two key structures and institutions that make up this new governance architecture – the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

The Pan-African Parliament

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was established in March 2004 in consonance with the provisions of the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act of the AU.⁹ It is one of the major institutions of the AU. Its primary objective is to be a common regional deliberative platform through which all the peoples of Africa and their grassroots organisations could become ‘more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing the continent’.¹⁰ The specific objectives of PAP are to:

- facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the AU;
- promote the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa;
- encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in member states;
- familiarise the peoples of Africa with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African continent within the framework of the establishment of the AU;
- promote peace, security and stability;
- contribute to a more prosperous future for the people of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery;
- facilitate cooperation and development in Africa;
- strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa; and
- facilitate cooperation among RECs and their parliaments.¹¹

It can be deduced from these objectives that PAP has a very broad mandate. And, as Hugo notes, this creates ‘a degree of uncertainty on the exact role that

PAP is supposed to play as a continental institution'.¹² It may be added that such a mandate spawns uncertainty as to PAP's priority areas. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that these objectives impinge on governance and regional integration in Africa. Admittedly, the range of issues encapsulated in PAP's objectives is central to the context, process and form of pan-African governance. In addition to creating committees to facilitate the performance of its functions, PAP, as of 2008, has demonstrated, albeit modestly, that it is poised to engage with the governance challenges confronting the African continent. For example, PAP has made efforts aimed at promoting the peaceful settlement of the Darfur conflict via its peace mission.¹³ Moreover, it has deployed observer missions to monitor elections in African countries and conduct fact-finding missions in countries affected by political instability. Cases in point are PAP's electoral observer mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2006), Kenya (2007), Angola (2008), Zimbabwe (2008) and Ghana (2008). However, its character as an advisory institution has hampered PAP's performance with the net effect that its resolutions are often ineffectual. In fact, the AU executive has largely ignored resolutions passed by the legislative institution.¹⁴ For example, PAP's strongly worded recommendation in 2005 which demanded the release of Ugandan opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, was not only ignored, but also attracted virulent criticism from the government of Uganda.¹⁵ As such, it can be safely argued that the limited powers of PAP not only impair its oversight role, but also curtail its overall contribution to continental governance.

Against this backdrop, there is no gainsaying that in order to drive decisively the process of Afro-governance, PAP needs to transcend its current status as an institution with essentially 'consultative and advisory powers'. And if the protocol that established PAP is anything to go by, the institution should be able to play a more decisive role in continental governance after 2009, the final year of the five-year period in which its powers and roles are limited to being 'consultative and advisory'. But critical questions arise: What will be the nature of (power) relations between PAP and other institutions of pan-African governance? Will the AU executive – specifically, Heads of State and Government – cede greater powers to PAP? Will PAP's resolutions be implemented by the AU executive, given the current trends in which the legislative institution's recommendations have been largely ignored? How will PAP's resolutions be enforced at the national level? And what credible mechanisms can African countries muster to reward compliance and deter non-compliance with regional legislative decisions? Answers to these questions will become clearer in the post-2009 period.

The African Peer Review Mechanism

The APRM 'is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by member states of the AU as an African self-monitoring mechanism'.¹⁶ It has been described as

‘the most innovative aspect’¹⁷ and ‘a groundbreaking initiative’¹⁸ of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). As a fundamental component of Nepad, the APRM seeks to commit African countries to ‘good governance’¹⁹ in order to address the governance problems that have undermined the continent’s development prospects. The various definitions suggest that the APRM is an innovative pan-African initiative aimed at improving governance on the continent. The adoption, in 2003, of a memorandum of understanding on the APRM by Nepad Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, signalled the take-off of the mechanism. As of July 2008, 29 countries – representing more than half of AU’s 53 member states – had formally joined the APRM process by signing the memorandum of understanding and lodging the signed document with the Nepad Secretariat.²⁰

The APRM process draws from the notion of peer review in the academic context.²¹ The APRM entails the systematic examination and assessment of a country using a set of criteria/indicators under the Nepad framework. The APRM process is not intended to punish or ridicule countries, but aims at engaging African countries through voluntary self-assessment, constructive peer dialogue as well as problem and value sharing with a view to providing support and implementing corrective measures.²² A country voluntarily submits itself to the APRM process and is assessed periodically to ascertain its performance vis-à-vis four thematic areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development. An independent panel of eminent persons constituted entirely by Africans conducts a country’s assessment. A report is then submitted to the AU and its organs such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), PAP and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. (Therefore, institutions of regional governance are involved in the implementation of this continental mechanism.) In fact, this stage of the APRM process marks an important component of continental governance, as it affords structures such as PAP and the AU the opportunity to measure the performance of a country against the commonly defined regional benchmarks.

However, there are serious questions associated with the effectiveness of the APRM as an apparatus for Afro-governance. For example, there is uncertainty as to whether some African countries – especially those with a poor governance record – would welcome a process they may consider somewhat intrusive. The possibility (or fear) of a damaged reputation may well keep these countries out of the process. Also, the process could polarise African states into two blocs: those that choose to participate in the process versus those that do not. Moreover, the recommendations of the Independent Panel of Eminent Persons can be safely ignored by the government of a country under review, as there is presently no mechanism to ensure the implementation of policy recommendations. Clearly, dealing with these challenges is a critical

imperative, which must be addressed in the context of the larger quest to improve and strengthen Afro-governance.

Nevertheless, the APRM seeks to assist participating countries to improve their governance capacities, implement best practices and achieve coherence in terms of compliance with regionally defined codes and standards. This is the defining character of the APRM as a mechanism for pan-African governance. Inherent in the APRM's conception, strategy, process and ultimate goals is the capacity to develop and strengthen a new ethos of governance on the continent. For now, Africa's emerging governance paradigm or framework is best enunciated in the APRM.

In rounding off this section's thematic concern, a point is worth noting about both the OAU and the AU dispensations in relation to Afro-governance. It is possible to establish a measure of commonality in terms of the institutionalisation of pan-Africanism in both periods. The era of the OAU was marked by the existence of structures of Afro-governance, although their effectiveness was hampered by the doctrine of non-intervention. The 'new' dispensation is equally significant for the establishment of pan-African governance institutions to promote cooperation and to develop regional standards. While the OAU had 'non-representative' organs, such as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as the General Secretariat, the AU dispensation has witnessed the creation of 'representative' institutions – for example, PAP and the Economic and Social Council – to promote a democratic ethos, good economic and corporate governance and the pan-African ideal of continental unity. However, as the next section shows, the nature of politics in some African countries poses serious challenges for the 'new' pan-African governance framework.

Pan-African governance framework/regimes and contemporary politics of paradox

The new pan-African initiatives such as PAP and the APRM espouse ideals pertaining to democratic governance at national levels. Similarly, regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), the Draft African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, as well as Electoral Codes of Conduct, seek to commit African countries to certain standards of political behaviour. These regional frameworks or continental regimes are intended to promote standardisation across national political spaces with reference to their issue areas. It is envisaged that the adoption, domestication or compliance with these governance instruments by African countries will promote best practices and ensure cohesion between regional standards and national practices. Cohesion and standardisation will in turn pave the way for greater coordination and harmonisation at the regional level, thereby giving impetus to continental governance. This

scenario is still an ideal, which African countries hope to attain as the continent treads the tortuous path to the formation of a union government.

At this stage, it is necessary to point out that regional efforts towards achieving this pan-African ideal have been, and are being, undermined by the challenges associated with political processes in several African states. For instance, political developments in some African countries since 2000 have shown varying levels of non-compliance with continental regimes or regional standards pertaining to human rights, elections, and 'good governance'. This reality not only compromises the effectiveness of the pan-African governance mechanisms, but also undermines the prospects and efficacy of continental governance.

An important pan-African regime is the ACHPR. Although a brainchild of the OAU, the provisions of the ACHPR informed the human rights precepts in both the Constitutive Act of the AU and the APRM Base Document. The ACHPR, which came into force in 1986, is the principal instrument that purports to promote and protect human rights on the continent. It provides for civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights at the personal and collective levels. Examples are the rights to freedom from discrimination, to equality, to life, to dignity, to freedom of religion, to freedom of information and expression, to political participation and to property. In addition, the Charter gives attention to the duties of persons towards their families and communities, thereby establishing a nexus between rights and duties.

The ACHPR also provides for the creation of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and the African Court on Human and People's Rights; the latter is to be incorporated into the African Court of Justice, an institution of the AU.²³ The rights enshrined in the ACHPR are expected to underpin the human rights regime in African countries, thus giving expression to regional imperatives at the national level. However, the reality is that Africa is in a state of flux regarding human rights promotion and protection, as there have been varying levels of compliance or deviation from regional human rights norms. There has been considerable respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries with stable political systems and democratic credentials. Nevertheless, there have been minor or egregious human rights violations in several African states including in countries that have undergone (or are undergoing) democratic transitions.²⁴

Although it is impossible to examine the human rights situations across the continent in this chapter, it is trite to state that the violation of human rights not only contravenes the ACHPR, but also undermines regional governance of human rights. For example, as Makinda and Okumu note, the human rights situations in Darfur and Zimbabwe raise questions as to the AU's capacity to promote and protect human and people's rights as envisaged in the ACHPR.²⁵ With reference to human rights in Africa, it is possible to identify a substantive disconnect between regional standards and national practices. Although there is an innovative, progressive and coherent

mechanism at the regional level to govern human rights in the form of the ACHPR, the practices at national level, to a large extent are at variance with the regional standards. Therefore, the challenge associated with the human rights component of continental governance is to bridge the gap between regional 'theory' and national praxis.

The state of flux alluded to above also applies to electoral politics in Africa, which has been characterised in several African countries by deviations from subregional and regional electoral codes of conduct.²⁶ Nonetheless, the continent has recorded a few 'success stories' where electoral processes have been marked by better organisation, greater consultation, robust voter education, peaceful electioneering campaigns, and transparent voting, ballot counting and collation processes. It can be argued that these 'success stories' compare favourably with 'best practices' in consolidated democracies around the world. Examples of successful electoral exercises include the democratic elections in South Africa (1994, 1999 and 2004), Kenya (2002) and Ghana (2008). The provisions of the subregional and regional electoral codes of conduct found ample expression in those elections deemed generally to have been credible, free, fair and transparent. Tenets pertaining to the existence of independent and impartial electoral bodies, equal access to the state media by political parties, transparent voting and counting processes, and constitutional means for seeking redress have been instrumental to successful electoral exercises on the continent. It is also instructive to note that the Ghanaian experience illustrates the role of a virile civil society and technology (cellphones, for example) in preserving the sanctity of the electoral process.

On the other hand, the elections in Nigeria (1999, 2003 and 2007), Kenya (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008) are indicative of the continuing lack of probity in electoral politics in some African elections. Nigeria's elections since 1999 have been described as 'deeply/seriously flawed', 'a sham', 'an embarrassment' and 'a charade'. The Kenyan general election in 2007 was also flawed, precipitating civil unrest in the wake of the declaration of the presidential contest results. In the case of Zimbabwe, widespread intimidation, political violence and other irregularities characterised the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections.²⁷ As Badza notes, although the 'first round of [Zimbabwe's 2008] elections was in line with some of the SADC Principles and Guidelines, the subsequent presidential election run-off (in which President Robert Mugabe was the only candidate), deviated from not only these principles, but also from those set out in the AU declaration'.²⁸ In other words, the second round of presidential elections compromised the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the regional electoral code of conduct.

The juxtaposition of contrasting scenarios in Africa suggests that some countries have better organised electoral processes, whereas others have been largely mired in anti-democratic or pseudo-democratic politics. On the one hand, there are some national experiences that point to conformity with commonly defined electoral codes of conduct. On the other hand, deviations

from the democratic norms of electoral politics are still a major feature of Africa's political landscape. Although Electoral Codes of Conduct envision coherence and standardisation across countries in a region, national practices in Africa depict considerable divergence. This point is illustrated, for example, by the difference between the conduct and outcome of the Zimbabwean and Ghanaian 2008 elections. This divergence can be located in, first, the form of continental governance, secondly, the nature of regional instruments (including their substance and mechanisms for their application) and, thirdly, the level (if any) of commitment on the part of national leaders to the first two. The institutions of Afro-governance have yet to develop the capacity to ensure compliance with regional norms. Regional frameworks and codes of conduct are – to borrow Piccone's expression – 'political commitments rather than formally binding obligations under international law [thus] making enforcement problematic'.²⁹ At the national level, there has been an obvious lack of political commitment to regional standards. The narcissistic desire for political power on the part of some members of Africa's political elite – exemplified, for example, by tenure elongation or abolition of presidential term limits – has been a major impediment to the nurturing and consolidation of democratic norms as envisioned in regional frameworks. This is but one of the many challenges associated with regional governance in Africa. Although the formulation of regional precepts to guide national political processes represents a major advance in continental governance, the contemporary politics of paradox (highlighted above) presupposes that the question of how to promote and sustain democratic political culture will remain firmly on the pan-African agenda in the 21st century.

Prognosis: Subregional organisations and pan-African governance

The Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act of the AU recognise subregional organisations, or RECs, as the building blocks of Africa's integration. The institutions of pan-African governance (discussed above) and RECs are structures that are expected to facilitate the integration of African countries in a phased or incremental fashion. In this regard, subregional organisations may be perceived as 'bedrocks' of pan-African governance or the 'pillars' of the governance of regional integration in Africa. However, there have been concerns regarding the utility of Africa's subregional organisations for continental integration. These concerns have been informed partly by the multiplicity (or overlapping membership) of Africa's subregional organisations, resulting in the duplication of functions, competition and tensions. In addition, leaders have been unwilling to subordinate decision-making to RECs, illustrating a facet of the problem generally described as the lack of political commitment (on the part of leaders) to the integration process – whether at the subregional

or the continental level. These constraints have hindered progress towards the attainment of the objectives of integration and have therefore weakened the utility of RECs as ‘nerve centres of the continent’s integration process’.³⁰

Nonetheless, the realisation that Africa’s subregional organisations could play decisive roles in the governance of continental integration despite the multifarious constraints, has underpinned the adoption of measures aimed at bolstering the capacities and contributions of RECs to regionalism. The foremost measure undertaken under the auspices of the AU has been the rationalisation of RECs, illustrated by its recognition of eight RECs as the building blocks of integration in Africa.³¹ The process of rationalisation seeks to address the problems associated with overlapping membership and the duplication of functions. This attempt at streamlining RECs is expected to enhance the coordination and harmonisation of policies and action plans. Further, the process will engender convergence and coherence at subregional levels and, in turn, facilitate the domestication of regional instruments, standards, and codes of conduct. Thus, regional frameworks can find expression at both subregional and national levels. To achieve this objective, however, integration at the subregional level will have to be consolidated and characterised by the convergence of policies and practices across member states of each subregional organisation.

Certainly, commonalities between RECs will facilitate coordination and coherence across subregions. Additionally, convergence across Africa’s subregions will harmonise policies and practices intended to dictate the form and substance of governance at the national level. Although subregional organisations have the capacity to facilitate the governance of regional integration, their specific roles and how they feed into continental integration remain unclear. Therefore, the AU has to move beyond the professed relevance of subregional organisations to continental governance. The regional governance agenda has to delineate the specific roles and contributions of RECs to Afro-governance. Specifically, ongoing efforts at forming a union government must reflect this critical imperative. This is important given the incremental approach to integration and the pivotal character of RECs as ‘nerve centres’ of continental integration.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the governance of regional integration in Africa with reference to the structures, institutions and instruments devised by African leaders, not only to promote continental unity, but also to ensure coherence in policies and practices across countries. The creation of regional structures and institutions to further these objectives is underpinned by the philosophy of pan-Africanism. Structures and institutions that have been given attention in this chapter are the APRM and PAP. Continental regimes, such as the ACHPR

as well as Electoral Codes of Conduct, have also been reviewed and their effectiveness assessed in the light of national practices. As noted above, national practices – either in terms of the nature of electoral politics or adherence to the ACHPR – reflect ambivalence or the politics of paradox. At the regional level, there has been a concerted attempt to promote ‘good governance’ and ensure better organised electoral systems. However, there has been divergence between regional principles and national practices, thus raising a formidable question regarding the feasibility and the effectiveness of pan-African governance. Hence the question: is it possible to embrace effective pan-African governance?

Given the backdrop of the discussion in this chapter, it is stale to say that there are constraints and possibilities associated with the governance of regional integration in Africa. The example of the EU as the most successful case of regional integration presupposes that effective regional governance requires, among other things, supra-national institutions, the subordination of aspects of national sovereignty to regional mechanisms, and cohesion between regional policies and national practices. In the case of Africa, these prerequisites for effective continental governance are non-existent, nascent or deficient. Nevertheless, pan-African institutions (with emerging supra-national status) have been created, and continental regimes adopted, to drive the process of Afro-governance. Furthermore, the AU acknowledges the pivotal roles that subregional organisations could play in Africa’s governance process with the realisation that they could serve as ‘hubs’ for the coordination and harmonisation of policies to ensure coherence and convergence of both principles and practices across national spaces.

However, the AU has yet to delineate the sequencing of cooperation between its own institutions and subregional organisations. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask: how and at what stage will subregional organisations integrate into the AU’s mechanisms for continental governance? It is important to address this and other pertinent questions in the context of the ongoing efforts at creating a continental union government. Further the interface between the national and the regional levels is also critical to effective pan-African governance. Therefore, coherence between regional standards and national practices is the *sine qua non* for effective Afro-governance. At the national level, pro-people reforms (political and economic) are required in order to garner popular support for the unfolding pan-African project. Political commitment to regionalism on the part of national leadership is also crucial to the success of continental governance. At the regional level, the broadening and the deepening of the powers of pan-African institutions are germane to successful continental governance. These changes in both national and regional spheres entail a radical shift from the dispensation of patrimonial politics, characterising Africa since the 1960s, to pro-people, progressive, sustainable and Africa-centred politics. Therefore, the prospects of effective pan-African governance will be determined largely by the ability of the continent to surmount the challenges that have impeded regional integration.

Notes and references

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CHAPTER 7

African Renaissance, African Conflicts and the Regional Security Complex

Ben Okolo

Introduction

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) brought fresh perspectives to the continental body's approach to conflict resolution. Whereas the OAU had a policy of 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of states, even where civilians were dying as a result of conflicts or gross violations of human rights, the AU policy shift accepts intervention. The AU Constitutive Act (2000) in its article 4(h) recognises 'the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'. This shift in approach to continental conflicts has been hailed as a bold step. However, it is arguable whether the AU would be able to muster the much needed political will to translate the wordings of the Act into reality. The shift has equally been associated with the continental body's resolve to advance the frequently touted 'African solutions to African problems' in a bid to discourage external actors from meddling in African conflicts. The emergence of African initiatives can be traced to the call for an 'African Renaissance', championed by former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. This is a call to Africans to wake up and take their destiny in their hands.

This chapter argues that the emergence of the AU has changed the manner in which conflict resolution, mediation and peacekeeping are approached by the continental body. It posits that although Africa seems to have taken a leading role in matters of peace and security in the continent, there are challenges that the continental body needs to address in order to effectively merge rhetoric with actions. The chapter is divided into five sections. Section one introduces the issues to be discussed. Section two gives an understanding of the concept of African Renaissance, noting that while Thabo Mbeki is easily linked with the concept in its current phase, other African philosophers and scholars had articulated the concept earlier. The third section interrogates the AU's emerging security architecture. Using the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, as its focus, it argues that although it is desirable that Africa should manage its affairs, there seems to be a disconnect between theory and practice,

as the continental body has not been able to mop up the different conflicts in Africa without resorting to external partnership. It recognises, however, the importance of engaging with external partners, since the AU does not have the requisite capacity. Section four argues that the different defence pacts that individual African states maintain with their erstwhile colonial powers are not advancing the African Renaissance concept. In conclusion, the chapter posits that although African Renaissance and African solutions to African problems are ideologically right for the continent's development, Africa must also seek genuine partnerships with the West and other regions of the world.

Understanding the African Renaissance

The concept of the 'African Renaissance' is not new. The African philosophers Edward Blyden, Casely Hayford, Isaka Seme, Cheikh Anta Diop and Nnamdi Azikiwe have been associated with calls for an African Renaissance. For instance, Azikiwe, the first post-independence president of Nigeria, had in 1937, articulated the idea when he called on his generation of Africans and the youth to regenerate themselves and to seek spiritual balance.¹ This call for a rebirth is not surprising, especially when viewed against the backdrop of Africa being the cradle of civilisation.²

However, it was Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, who popularised the concept in its modern and current usage. Mbeki³ had given a seminal speech, 'I am an African', in which he challenged Africans to a rebirth in order to shake off what is often referred to as the 'African curse'. Mbeki's speech is traced to Isaka Seme's 1962 speech on the 'regeneration of Africa'.⁴ Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance covers everything that can lead to the improvement of African lives. This includes the rediscovery of self, liberation and democratic rule, poverty eradication, debt relief and independence.⁵ Notwithstanding the non-specific mention of an African Renaissance in his speech, Mbeki made the emotional, ideological and political nexus which speaks to a call for a renaissance.⁶ He, therefore, 'promoted the idea of an African Renaissance as a new social imperative, making it a critical component of change and a *sine qua non* of recovery in Africa'.⁷

The African Renaissance does not, however, claim to be the magical solution to Africa's varied problems. The philosophical underpinning of the concept can be found in the understanding that Africans, though not a homogeneous people, have a shared history of marginalisation arising not just through trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic slave trade, but also through colonialism and imperialism. This, although located in pre-colonial and colonial historiography of the continent, did not end with the independence of states. In the globalised world, Africa continues to be the underdog in global affairs, even where it concerns it most. Ottaway states that 'by any standard, African

countries remain marginal to all global trends. The basic facts are discouraging ... The continent is economically, socially, and culturally marginalized.⁸

While the continent is caught up in the renaissance wave, many still regard the concept as vague, since there are no clear strategies on how this rebirth can occur or what the key components are. This is against the backdrop of the much earlier European Renaissance that advanced Europe culturally in the Middle Ages. Maloka is of the view that discussions on an African Renaissance fit into three clusters: the globalist, pan-Africanist and culturalist perspectives.⁹ However, the African Renaissance must be understood in its own context. It should not be compared to the European Renaissance or any other renaissance, as it does not address the same complexities. The African Renaissance, when viewed in its right context, addresses African issues at not just a cultural, but also at socio-economic and political levels. It addresses not just governments and continentally established institutions, but also individual Africans. The call for an African Renaissance could not have come at a better time in the history of Africa, as the 1990s were a decade of great achievement and great strife in the continent. For instance, South Africa, the last bastion of colonial rule, had just gained its freedom. However, at the other end of the spectrum, there were conflicts sprouting in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and a host of other states. Mbeki's call for 'African solutions to African problems' must be seen within its broader context. It speaks to the African's initiative spirit and inventiveness: the fact that Africa should start playing a major role in its affairs. However, some have interpreted this as jettisoning all things from the West. Nothing can be further from the truth. Africa, especially in this globalised era, cannot afford not to partner with other regions of the world. Furthermore, the declaration or the call for an African Renaissance should not be seen as an end in itself, but a means to an end. It seeks to challenge, and at the same time, encourage Africa and Africans to succeed where past generations failed. The extent to which Africa has applied this concept, especially in its conflict-resolution mechanisms, will be questioned below.

AU security architecture

The African continent has been mired in conflict all through its recorded history. However, these conflicts had also been resolved through various traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms available to the different societies. With the independence of states, and the formation of the OAU in 1963, the nature of conflicts in Africa changed. Hitherto, conflicts in Africa had been more of an inter-tribal and inter-clan nature. The emergence of state borders bequeathed to Africa by colonialists, triggered the rise in border disputes and territorial claims, which often resulted in the use of force to settle them. Similarly, the Cold War saw Africa becoming a theatre of proxy wars, resulting from ideological

confrontations for control over the 'soul' of Africa. The end of the Cold War brought with it new types of threats within the continent. No longer were wars and conflicts between states, but mostly between the government and so-called 'rebels' or 'insurgents'. Furthermore, the conflicts witnessed the rise in the spate of violence deliberately targeted against the civilian population.

Various theories abound to explain the reasons for the change in the dynamics of conflicts. The failure of African leadership to legitimise and popularise their rule has exacerbated conflict in Africa.¹⁰ The failure of Africa's political elite to democratise their political systems and improve the efficiency of governance mechanisms is one of the causes of armed conflict that has increasingly undermined human and state security in the continent. Greed and economic considerations also feature as reasons for the proliferation of conflicts in Africa. Scholars and analysts who share this view contend that the main goal of conflicts in Africa is the desire to acquire control over the economic resources of the state, and not because of grievance against the political system.¹¹ They fail to address, however, the legitimacy of the grievances by those who take up arms to fight the government. The weak nature of governance in Africa, therefore, points to the existence of legitimate grievances on the part of the populace. Notwithstanding the greed and grievance factors, the consequences of the end of the Cold War should be considered. In the Cold War era, external patrons were quick to meet the demands of their protégés depending on which side of the ideological divide they found themselves. In the post-Cold War era, the erstwhile protégés were forced to finance their own wars. An attempt to explain the conflicts as ethnically motivated has been dismissed by Hutchful and Aning as lacking in substance. Instead, they think that the resort to ethnic politics is for the protection of a shrinking power base.¹²

In Africa's post-Cold War conflicts, approximately 70 per cent of the victims are civilians.¹³ While the OAU was involved in settling disputes in Africa which arose principally from border disputes and other inter-state differences, it was only in 1993 through its establishment of the Mechanism for Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation that it made the bold move to take a more active role in conflict resolution within states. The mechanism was mandated *inter alia* 'to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown war'.¹⁴ However, it was the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the crisis in Liberia which gave the OAU the added impetus to change its approach. Coupled with this was the support received from Salim Ahmed Salim and Yoweri Museveni, then Secretary-General, and Chairperson of the OAU respectively.¹⁵ These two African leaders interpreted the provisions of the OAU Charter expansively, arguing that the doctrine of non-interference as represented in the Charter does not translate to indifference, especially where civilians were deliberately targeted by states.¹⁶

Three factors are responsible for the drive by the continental body to seek African solutions to African problems. They are, first, the preference by African leaders to solve their problems without undue interference from

external actors. Secondly, the withdrawal of the West from African conflict management after the Somalia debacle, typified by the apathy shown during the Rwanda genocide, and finally, the initiative by subregional hegemons to advance the cause of African solutions, where the West was tarrying.¹⁷ The inaction of the UN during the Rwanda genocide of 1994 signalled to the continent that it was time it started playing a lead role in resolving conflicts within the continent. The AU brought a new dimension to conflict resolution in Africa. Subsequently, the launch of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in May 2004 brought a new zeal towards the understanding of finding 'African solutions to African problems'. At the launch, African leaders proclaimed the PSC as a 'historic watershed in Africa's progress towards resolving its conflicts and the building of a durable peace and security order'.¹⁸ The non-inclusion of the PSC as one of the original organs of the AU at its formation was premised on the existence of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Notwithstanding its existence, it did not cater to the conflict-resolution needs of the continent. The PSC, therefore, is a remedy to the ineffectual mechanism and the traditional manner of discussing issues of conflict by the continental body.¹⁹

The PSC was created pursuant to the provisions of article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, which provides for the establishment of other organs by the Assembly of the Union. The council is authorised *inter alia* to promote security and stability in Africa, and to develop a common defence policy for the Union.²⁰ The council is constituted of 15 member states with no permanent status. This was contrary to the initial proposal by Nigeria and South Africa that the council be structured like the UN Security Council, with five states having permanent members' status.²¹ In the exercise of its functions, the PSC will be supported by the following institutions, namely the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Fund. While the five institutions mentioned above are very critical for the full implementation and success of the new security regime, the chapter founded on the ASF, and the CEWS for two reasons. First, the ASF is the reactionary and enforcement arm of the PSC, while the CEWS is the preventive arm. In most conflicts in the continent, the delay in deploying a peacekeeping or intervention mission contributes to the suffering of civilians.

The ASF is a critical element for the success of the AU's new security mechanism. The PSC Protocol states *inter alia* that:

In order to enable the Peace and Security Council to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established.²²

The force, which is to consist of standby brigades in each of the five regions, will comprise military personnel, police and civilian components.²³ Understandably,

the rationale behind the ASF is an effective AU response to conflicts on the continent, as force generation is at the root of successful peacekeeping missions. It is expected that if the PSC fulfils its mandate as articulated by the Protocol, it should be able to rapidly deploy either a peacekeeping force or an intervention force within 14 days of mandate. The ASF is expected to be fully established by 2010, so as to have the capacity to intervene in situations of grave circumstances as envisaged by the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol, should the international community fail to act or delay acting. Notwithstanding, the establishment of the ASF and its promise of a more robust approach to issues of peace and security on the continent were initially viewed with suspicion. However, progress has been made towards its realisation. For instance, the training policy that provides for standardised training at continental, regional and national levels has been developed.²⁴ Although there are successes recorded by the ASF, it must be stated that for effective deployment and response to conflict hot spots in the continent, the requisite logistical equipment must be in place. The system of outsourcing logistical provisions to private companies by the UN may make it very difficult for the AU to acquire its logistical needs on time for such deployment, as the AU relies heavily on the UN for its logistical needs in peace support operations, despite its plan to have a logistics base at Addis Ababa. This is one of the major challenges that the ASF is faced with, as the lack of logistical support would hamper its efforts at peacekeeping in the continent.

Notwithstanding the existence of a new security regime, conflicts still proliferate in Africa. This has led scholars to question the effectiveness of the PSC and the avowed African Renaissance. The AU's attempt at providing leadership in conflict resolutions in Africa is in keeping with the philosophy of 'African solutions to African problems'. The above notwithstanding, the promotion of the philosophy does not preclude the AU from partnering with other international organisations in maintaining peace and security on the continent. The latest symbiosis created between the AU and the UN, which led to the replacement of the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS) peacekeepers by a hybrid force christened the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), is in furtherance of such partnership. While this is the first of its kind in the history of peacekeeping, it is definitely not the first time the UN and a regional organisation have worked together in peacekeeping issues in the continent. In the conflict in Sierra Leone, UN peacekeepers were deployed alongside the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The setting up of the Sierra Leone Special Court, which is equally of a hybrid nature, seems to signify the UN's acceptance of the reality on the ground. That is, that partnership must exist between the UN and regional economic communities (RECs), especially in the maintenance of peace and security, and in ending impunity.

The PSC provides for partnership between itself and the UN in achieving its goals. For instance, article 17(1) of the Protocol states that:

In the fulfilment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.²⁵

However, past experience, especially the Rwandan genocide, necessitates that the AU be prepared to act 'in situations where the UN is unwilling or unable to conduct or even [authorise] an intervention'.²⁶ The PSC, therefore recognises that it is the UN that has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; however, the AU has the primary responsibility for peace, security and stability in Africa.²⁷ While this seems a practical response to the apathy of the West to conflicts in Africa, it appears to counter the established norm, whereby the UN Security Council leads in matters of international peace and security. However, it is argued that the PSC Protocol gave an expansive interpretation to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which recognises the importance of regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security. It is also in keeping with the philosophy of the African Renaissance. This, however, does not mean that the UN should ignore conflicts in Africa, as it will not augur well for international peace and security. The understanding is that the AU should provide leadership when the UN is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, and fails or delays to act in time, as in the cases of Burundi, Darfur, Madagascar and Somalia. There seems to be an emerging pattern in peacekeeping, especially where it concerns African conflicts. The UN's reluctance to act has prompted either the AU or subregional RECs to step in, and invariably act as a stabilisation force before the UN takes over. This pattern seems a practical solution, since the conflicts are in the continent, and it would be of paramount importance to the continent that they be resolved quickly to avoid escalation. Notwithstanding the practicality of the arrangement, it has often been criticised. The basis of such criticism is rooted in the fact that the continental forces bear the risks, and the UN peacekeepers who arrive late end up taking the glory for success. This was the case in Sierra Leone, where the bulk of the 'dirty work' was done by ECOWAS peacekeepers, but the UN peacekeepers eventually took the glory.

Secondly, even where the AU peacekeepers are deployed alongside UN peacekeepers, the logistical and material support for the two different peacekeepers seems to vary. These discrepancies often lead to tension amongst the peacekeepers, and affect the morale of the peacekeeping troops, thereby affecting the level of performance of the mission. This was equally experienced in Sierra Leone, where the ECOWAS contingent complained of being paid less than their UN counterparts. The situation contributed to the withdrawal of the Nigeria-led ECOMOG troops, which led to the kidnapping of approximately 500 UN peacekeepers by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).²⁸

However, the concept of 'African solutions to African problems' is seen by some as giving carte blanche to African leaders, especially those who violate

human rights of their people, knowing that the AU will turn a blind eye to their atrocious acts. For instance, the apparent non-condemnation of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe by African leaders does not bode well for the concept. Furthermore, the request by the AU that the UN Security Council suspend the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution of Sudanese president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not in keeping with the philosophy of 'African solutions to African problems'.

Issuing a warrant of arrest by the ICC presented an opportunity for the AU to revamp its image by advising Bashir to surrender to the court. Instead, the continental body is bent on pressuring the Security Council to suspend, or at least delay, the execution of the warrant. Bashir's defiance of the court and the support he is getting from fellow African and Arab leaders is typified by his visits to Eritrea, Egypt, Libya and Qatar within three weeks after the issue of the warrant. It could be argued that Bashir's initial visit of African and Arab countries was to test the waters. Notwithstanding such apparent defiance, it must be mentioned that the AU and the Arab League had given him assurances that they would not effect his arrest. With the ICC prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo's determination to pursue the case against Bashir, and the larger international community calling for Bashir's trial, it will only be a matter of time before he is arrested. The message that the AU is sending by its support of Bashir, therefore, is that protection of civilians is not its priority, but the protection of fellow African leaders. This does not augur well for the continent's peace and security architecture.

Again, there have been criticisms of the AU's approach to issues of fraudulent elections in the continent. It appears that the AU is legitimising frauds that seek to entrench dictatorial governments in power. The Kenyan 2007 and Zimbabwean 2008 elections are two instances where the so-called 'African solutions for African problems' ended up jettisoning the will of the people. However, it must be said that the 'protection' of leaders by the AU is not what the African Renaissance or 'African solutions to African problems' envisage.

A review of the AU's attempts at resolution and management of conflicts in Africa indicates that the continental body does not have the capacity to implement the grandiose plan all by itself. For instance, at the start of the conflict in Darfur, the AU's attempt to broker peace between the protagonists did not yield fruits. The AU, in its proactive stance to the issues of continental peace and security, authorised the deployment of a Ceasefire Commission – later named African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – in April of 2004 following the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004 between the government of Sudan and the two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The initial observer mission was made up of 80 military observers and a protection force of 600 troops. This number was later increased to approximately 7 730 personnel. The AU's involvement in Somalia in 2007 also failed to cease the conflict. Instead, it led to its escalation, as the troop-contributing

states, particularly Ethiopia, were perceived as biased. Part of the problem with the AU's role in conflict resolution is that most African leaders, especially those with conflicts in their own backyards, see other African leaders' attempts to broker peace as insincere, since most of them engage in human rights violations in their own respective countries. Furthermore, there is the fear that African states electing to mediate in conflicts, particularly in their region, may be pushing a hegemonic agenda. This fear was present when the Nigerian-led ECOWAS wanted to intervene in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.²⁹

The AMIS's launch was in keeping with the spirit of African Renaissance, and in furtherance of 'African solutions to African problems'. However, the AMIS was destined to fail from the beginning. One of the key challenges that the AU faced in implementing its peace and security strategy in Darfur was force generation. For instance, the bulk of the protection force was provided by Nigeria and Rwanda, while Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and South Africa also contributed troops.³⁰ The small number of the AMIS personnel deployed in Darfur was not enough to repel the attacks on the civilian population by the militia, nor was it enough to protect themselves against attacks by the militia, rebels, or the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who occasionally engage in violent demonstrations. Aboagye is of the view that the AMIS did not have enough qualified personnel to carry out its mandate, even if the mission was fully deployed.³¹ This, therefore, represents a major challenge to the achievement of the goal of the PSC.

The attack on the AU forces stationed at Haskanita in northern Darfur in September 2007 confirmed the long-held belief that the AMIS was not capable of protecting the civilians in Darfur. Such attacks also affect the morale and capability of troop-contributing states to respond to conflicts in Africa. The vacillating attitude of some African countries, and their motives and roles in the conflict are also a major impediment to the AU's realisation of its avowed 'African solutions to African problems'. For instance, Libya's role in the conflict is not clear yet and seems to be fanning the embers of the conflict. Tripoli's alleged role in exacerbating the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone explains why it is not seen as a sincere mediator in Darfur. This played itself out at the Sirte, Libya, peace talks held in October 2007 between the Sudanese government and the rebels, convened by the UN and the AU. Ghaddafi was accused of trivialising the issues involved in the conflict when he referred to the Darfur conflict as a 'quarrel over a camel'.³²

The PSC's effectiveness depends in large part on how serious the member states view it. According to William, the PSC is not treated seriously by the AU member states, and this negatively affects its functions.³³ This trivial view of the PSC is attitudinal, and has nothing to do with the make-up of the members of the council. It is a rejection of African initiatives, an attachment to what is often described as 'colonial mentality'. It is such colonial baggage that the African Renaissance seeks to address. As pointed out earlier, the African Renaissance philosophy does not have a well-thought-out strategy on how to achieve its goal. One, therefore, posits that in achieving an African rebirth,

a regeneration of the African mindset is of utmost importance. On the other hand, the fact that the PSC does not tackle issues that lead to conflict casts it in the mould of a reactive mechanism, and not preventive, as envisaged by article 2(1) of the Protocol. This, therefore, would also affect how ordinary Africans view the PSC and its effort to maintain peace and security in the continent. In fact, this leaning towards a reactive system of security regime is counter to the establishment of the continental early warning system (CEWS), which is one of the mechanisms in place for the PSC to achieve its set goals.

The CEWS is premised on the need to create a mechanism for monitoring developments across the continent in order to determine situations that could lead to conflict, and nip them in the bud. It must be stated, however, that the CEWS is different from the traditional concept of intelligence gathering within states.³⁴ That the CEWS, therefore, recognises the shift in thinking about security means it is no longer viewed only in strict military terms.³⁵ While the traditional concept of security has state security at its core, human security encompasses non-traditional threats, such as hunger, disease and lack of access to the basics of life,³⁶ making a distinction between traditional intelligence gathering and that undertaken by the CEWS. While the former relies on secrecy of sources in its analysis of data, the latter relies on 'open-source material' to draw its analysis. These open-source materials draw on political and socio-economic issues that can easily be gleaned from places such as newspaper reports, etc. It is this strength that appeals to both international organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs).³⁷ The success of the CEWS depends largely on the cooperation between the AU, and the subregional RECs, some of which have well-functioning early-warning systems in place. For the PSC to fulfil its mandate of preventing conflicts in the continent, the CEWS must not only be able to gather the necessary data and analyse it, it must be able to put it to use. The maintenance of a situation room at the AU headquarters will amount to nought if the information generated cannot be acted upon, and in a timely manner, by the AU.

Since it is clear that the AU cannot by itself engage fully in the issues of peace and security on the continent, it must explore its partnership options with the RECs, especially those that exhibit experience in areas of peace-keeping, for example, ECOWAS. Furthermore, the partnership options that already exist among the AU, the UN and the European Union (EU) must be explored extensively. The AU would benefit not just from the provision of funding and logistics, but also from training.

African solutions: A reality?

Despite the independence of African states, there is a noticeable link between some states and their erstwhile colonial powers. This is more noticeable in Francophone, than Anglophone and Lusophone countries. This link was

maintained at the socio-cultural, economic, political, and military level with the newly independent states serving as mere appendages or neo-colonial outposts for their erstwhile colonial powers. Ostensibly, the reason for the link was to assist the newly independent states develop economically, politically and militarily. However, the relationship created neo-colonial dependence. This, therefore, raises the question whether such African countries are really independent or 'in dependent'. Realist theory assumes that states will always act to further their national interests. The question, therefore, is whose interests are being served in situations of continued dependence on foreign actors? For instance, most of the interventions mandated by the West, including those by the UN, and unilateral interventions, were launched when their interests were at stake, and not just because Africans were at risk of death, rape, etc. This is particularly the case with French interventions in francophone African states.³⁸

However, the trend of intervention for the purpose of protecting national interests in Africa is not limited to France. The United Kingdom's intervention in Sierra Leone during the conflict in 2000 was arguably premised on its interest in its erstwhile colony. Contrast that act of intervention in Sierra Leone with its reluctance to intervene in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994, or its intervention on the part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria during the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970, in which 3,1 million Igbo lost their lives.³⁹ This bias in intervention was further fleshed out in the 1999 UN Independent Inquiry report, which set out to determine the actions of the UN, or lack thereof, during the Rwandan genocide. The report revealed that as a consequence of Rwanda not being of strategic importance to the West, its actions during the genocide were minimal compared to actions in other more strategic countries.⁴⁰ The British decision to intervene on the part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria against the secessionist Biafra could be seen as the United Kingdom's desire to secure its interests in Nigeria's crude oil and other businesses. At the same time, the French assistance to Biafra during the same period reflects France's desire to expand its sphere of influence into Nigeria in order to secure access to the south east (Biafra), which is rich in oil and other resources. It has often been argued that Africa is not of very strategic importance to the West and other dominant world powers, so conflicts in Africa are often neglected. However, the conflict in Darfur presents another side to the coin. Ironically, the Darfur atrocities were ignored for the simple reason that Sudan is of strategic importance to the West, China and Russia.⁴¹

France maintained a stranglehold on its former colonies up to and until the late 1990s. Through a series of mutual defence pacts, entered into between it and the newly independent states, Paris made sure it controlled the politico-military institutions of the states.⁴² Furthermore, the Franco-Ivoirian Technical Military Assistance Accord of 1961 secured for France the major rights to supply military aid, training and equipment to Côte d'Ivoire. Currently, seven African countries still maintain such legal frameworks for defence as defined between

1959 and 1961.⁴³ This neo-colonial relationship prompted Kwame Nkrumah to describe Côte d'Ivoire as 'in theory, independent [with] all the outwards trappings of international sovereignty'.⁴⁴ This arrangement for the provision of military assistance was maintained over three decades by the late president of Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. So much was his reliance on French military protection that he did not maintain a strong national military force. This was later to haunt the country after his death in 1993. Following the power struggle between Henri Konan Bedie and Allasane Dramane Ouattara, the military led by Robert Guei took over power in a *coup d'état* in 1999.

Although there might be some advantages in the short term with this kind of arrangement, in the long term, it tends to mortgage the state's future, and its defence from external aggressors depends on the whim of the foreign partner, in this case, France. Furthermore, it goes counter to the concept of the African Renaissance, especially in seeking 'African solutions to African problems'. It has also often led to rivalry within the continent. For instance, in the West African subregion, the rivalry for the dominant hegemon between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire was principally stoked by French influence in Côte d'Ivoire's politico-military affairs. Often, this rivalry impacts on the ECOWAS involvement in development, peace and security in the subregion. During the launch of the first subregional peacekeeping effort by ECOWAS in Liberia, Nigeria, an anglophone state, almost had its initiative thwarted by the francophone states, led by Côte d'Ivoire. Such states, therefore, seem to promote the interests of their colonial powers to the detriment of Africa. Also, in situations where a particular state wants to go against the colonial power's bidding, there have been allegations of targeted removals from office through *coups d'état*. It must be stated, though, that some of the francophone states have jettisoned the defence arrangement that exists between them and France. For instance, Benin and Niger no longer adhere to that agreement. In fact, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated in 2008 that 'the drafting of these [defence] agreements is obsolete and it is no longer conceivable ... that the French army should be dragged into internal conflicts'.⁴⁵ There is, therefore, an indication that France would no longer honour the pact, even with the states that still maintain such a relationship. Whether this statement by Sarkozy will be implemented as France's foreign policy position towards its former colonies in Africa remains to be seen. On the other hand, if France was to withdraw its military support for countries such as Gabon, Chad, Cameroon, etc, the dictatorships that it has propped up over the years would crumble, and with them, French business interests.

While France is divesting itself of its military pacts with its erstwhile colonial states, a new scramble for Africa seems to have ensued. China is emerging as the new power in the scramble. China's strategy in inserting itself in Africa is premised on its similarities and background with Africa. China's developing state status appeals to most African states. It pretends that it shares the same peculiarities with Africa, and, therefore, is best positioned to

understand the African developmental problems. Again, China in its guile is occupying the gaps left by the United States and other Western states. For instance, when the United States and Canada divested their business interests from Sudan as a result of sanctions against the Bashir government, China quickly stepped in. Its strategy is to offer assistance in the form of loans and expertise to African states, without the conditionality normally attached by the West and Western institutions. For instance, China is in partnership with Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe, three African states that have been accused of human rights violations.

Since Africa is part of the globalised world, it should be able to participate in discussing and taking decisions on issues that concern it. In order to do that, therefore, Africa needs to present a common strategy. The concept of African Renaissance seeks to achieve this. What this invariably means is that Africa must develop and strengthen its institutions, especially in the areas of governance, peace and security. Through the strengthening of these institutions, and its respect, Africa can begin to represent its interests in the world. Since the AU has developed a new security regime for the continent, it is in the interest of the continent that all states in Africa work towards the achievement of the goals articulated in the PSC Protocol. This cannot be achieved if states within the continent continue to maintain different defence pacts with Western powers, as there would be a clash of interest.

Conclusion

The re-emergence of the concept of the African Renaissance in the post-Cold War period is aimed at positioning the continent to face the new and current challenges resulting from the apathy of the West in dealing with conflicts in Africa. The concept advocates that African solutions must be sought for African problems. While this concept presumes that Africa should provide leadership in issues concerning Africa, it equally assumes that partnerships with the West and other regions of the world be sought where it is apparent that it cannot act alone. However, the phrase, 'African solutions to African problems' is a misnomer, since African leaders do not make use of traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve conflicts in the continent despite the existence of the Panel of the Wise. The AU's current security architecture is aimed at addressing some of the gaps that existed within its predecessor organisation, the OAU. With the Constitutive Act provision of military intervention in situations described as grave circumstances, it is apparent, even if only in theory, that the AU would no longer tolerate such humanitarian disasters, such as the Rwandan genocide, from continuing on the continent. However, the situation in Darfur seems to belie this argument. Notwithstanding that the AMIS intervention in the Darfur situation was not successful, it was an indication that the AU will act in situations where it

has the necessary material and logistical support from the international community. Africa needs to demonstrate that it can take its destiny in its own hands, and not depend on the whims of its erstwhile colonial powers. It is only through this that the dream of African philosophers for an African Renaissance and 'African solutions to African problems' can be achieved.

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CHAPTER 8

Intra-African Trade and Economic Development

Oluyele Akinkugbe

Introduction

The growth of regional trading blocs has been one of the major developments in international relations across the world in recent years. Virtually all countries are now members of at least one bloc or trade arrangement; and more recently, more than one-third of world trade has been found to take place within such agreements – nearly two-thirds when the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group is included. Realising the inherent benefits (both static and dynamic) derivable from membership in trading blocs, African countries have been pushing for regional integration (RI), mostly understood as the integration of goods and factors markets through discriminatory trade arrangements over the past four decades. The eventual creation of an African common market, as envisaged by the Abuja treaty of 1994, represents the ultimate objective of the various existing integration schemes on the continent. As a vehicle for individual countries to overcome the barriers of small size and poor human and physical capital endowment, RI has often been promoted as a prerequisite for breaking away from the colonial pattern of trade and fostering economic growth. For most African countries, the inherited trade structure is characterised by heavy reliance on an undiversified and vulnerable structure of exports. The desirability of enhanced participation in world trade and of increased trade among African countries continues to strengthen the arguments in favour of deepening regional economic integration or South–South cooperation in Africa.

At the global level, it has become increasingly clear since the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, and particularly in recent years (from Seattle to Doha to Cancun and the collapse and restart of the negotiations in Hong Kong) that further rounds of global trade negotiations are likely to continue to be contentious. Developing countries, and African countries in particular, have voiced their concerns about the credibility problem of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) regime. Developing countries find that access to developed countries, markets for such basic commodities as textiles and agriculture continues to be elusive, perpetuating their apparent marginalisation in the global value chain. Consequently, African countries continue to suffer from slow growth and declining trade. Table 8.1 reveals that Africa's

participation in the global trading system has been quite marginal, and has not recorded any marked improvement since 1980, without an appreciable increase being projected for the foreseeable future. In actual fact, Africa's percentage share in world exports declined from 5,8 per cent in 1980 to an all-time low of 2,08 per cent in 1995. It has since increased, albeit marginally, to 2,8 per cent in 2007. The case of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) follows exactly the same pattern: declined from 2,46 per cent in 1980 to 1,1 per cent in 2000. The reported figure for 2007 was 1,34 per cent.²

Table 8.1 Exports of trade groups in Africa compared with exports of selected regional groups as percentage share of world exports, 1995–2007³

	1995	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Africa	2,08	2,37	2,24	2,36	2,52	2,89	2,97	2,87
Northern Africa (excl Sudan)	0,69	0,81	0,74	0,81	0,83	1,01	1,07	1,03
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)	1,4	1,56	1,50	1,56	1,69	1,88	1,90	1,84
SSA (excl South Africa)	0,86	1,09	1,04	1,07	1,19	1,39	1,42	1,34
CEPGL	0,03	0,01	0,02	0,02	0,02	0,02	0,02	0,02
CEMAC (formerly UDEAC)	0,12	0,13	0,14	0,15	0,18	0,22	0,23	0,23
COMESA	0,44	0,46	0,44	0,47	0,48	0,59	0,65	0,66
ECCAS	0,22	0,27	0,29	0,3	0,35	0,48	0,52	0,54
ECOWAS	0,43	0,55	0,46	0,49	0,55	0,62	0,59	0,48
MRU	0,03	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
SADC	0,77	0,79	0,81	0,82	0,86	0,93	0,96	1,01
UEMOA	0,13	0,10	0,13	0,13	0,13	0,12	0,11	0,11
UMA	0,63	0,75	0,67	0,73	0,76	0,91	0,97	0,93
MERCOSUR	1,36	1,31	1,37	1,41	1,48	1,57	1,57	1,62
NAFTA	16,56	18,97	17,06	15,41	14,29	14,13	13,88	13,38
ASEAN	6,25	6,69	6,29	6,01	6,2	6,23	6,33	6,26
EU	42,33	38,02	40,65	41,72	40,95	38,86	37,97	38,20

Source UNCTAD (2008), *Handbook of Statistics 2008*, UNCTAD, Geneva

Furthermore, African countries, and countries in SSA in particular, often export a narrow range of products.⁴ A study by Morrissey and Filatotchev noted that in the late 1990s, 39 of 47 African countries depended on two primary commodities for more than half of their export earnings.⁵ The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also shows that in 2006 the export diversification index for Africa was 0,589, while the export concentration index stood at 0,424. These are markedly different from other regions of the world: 0,142, 0,063 and 0,131 for economies in transition, developed economies and developing countries in Asia respectively.⁶ What these figures underscore about African economies is their high vulnerability to commodity terms-of-trade and foreign demand shocks. Diversifying exports away from primary commodities into labour-intensive

manufacturing, which currently accounts for only a relatively modest share of gross domestic product (GDP) and an even more modest share of exports, could reduce this vulnerability. In addition to reducing vulnerability to shocks, increasingly diversified exports might boost income by increasing economic growth.⁷

This trend is also reflected in the manufacturing sector. As a whole, SSA and North Africa as represented by the Middle East and North African countries (MENA), lag significantly behind the rest of the regions of the world in terms of manufacturing value added as percentage of GDP. In 2006, manufacturing value added was equal to only about 14,3 per cent of GDP, as opposed to about 32 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific and 18,3 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean. The difference between the successful Asian economies and SSA economies is even more pronounced when manufactured exports are closely scrutinised. Manufactured exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports were more than 80 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific in 2006 and about 53 per cent in Europe and Central Asia for the same period, compared to just 33 per cent in SSA. According to Clarke, manufactured exports from SSA as a percentage of GDP were just about 3 per cent,⁸ as summarised in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2 Regional manufacturing value-added and manufactured exports, 1995–2006

	Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)			Manufactured exports (% of merchandise exports)			Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)		
	1995	2000	2006	1995	2000	2006	1995	2000	2006
East Asia & Pacific	29,84	36,10	47,30	59,93	80,19	80,37	29,84	30,02	32,03
Europe & Central Asia	-	40,88	40,10	-	56,44	45,99	18,87	20,07	22,31
Latin America & Caribbean	-	20,63	25,70	36,25	57,73	52,71	-	18,17	18,34
Middle East & North Africa	14,37	28,40	57,80	-	19,26	14,70	14,37	12,56	13,34
South Africa	23,64	27,87	29,85	-	54,31	52,99	23,64	18,95	16,23
Sub-Saharan Africa	16,57	32,35	35,48	-	31,15	33,30	16,57	13,51	14,29

Source World Bank (2008) *World Development Indicators*, Washington, DC: World Bank

Against this backdrop, it is tempting to posit that the growth prospects of Africa are dependent on the growth of intra-African trade, and on harnessing the hidden opportunities from the expansion of such trade. In recent years, there have been growing attempts to tackle the factors that constrain Africa's capacity to fully engage in international trade and to examine policy and strategic options towards increasing such capacity. It is widely recognised that tariffs still remain quite high in Africa (except for those countries that belong to the same regional trading bloc), as are varying non-tariff restrictions, all of which tend to reduce intra-trade among African countries below potential levels. Equally important, perhaps, are self-imposed restrictions,

including the reluctance to be part of, or constrained participation in organised regional trading arrangements that can have similar adverse effects. Hence there is a dire need on the African continent for increased mutual trade and cross-border investment flows.

South Africa is the most industrialised country in Africa, accounting for almost 22,2 per cent of Africa's nominal GDP in 2007.⁹ Its GDP is approximately one-third the size of that of Nigeria and of the other Southern African Customs Union (SACU) member countries put together. South Africa would therefore appear to be an obvious *agent-facilitator* in the process of Africa's integration and trade expansion, both globally and from within Africa. Against this background, and deriving from Nepad's objective of promoting export expansion in Africa, South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has clearly articulated in its trade strategy formulations that Africa is a foreign policy priority for South Africa. In the last few years the DTI has attempted to develop its trade strategy for the continent, focused primarily on deepening intra-African trade.¹⁰ The DTI envisages that the South African government can assist other African countries in export diversification by promoting investment in infrastructure as well as industrial projects. Furthermore, it aims to strengthen trade relations with other southern Africa countries through offering improved and asymmetrical access to its market.

The objectives of this chapter derive in part from the above. We seek to examine the current trade relations between African countries, with emphasis on both formal and informal trade and their contribution to economic development at subregional and regional levels. Hopefully, this examination will help tease out some possibilities for the further strengthening of intra-African trade and correct the over-dependence on North-South trade for growth and poverty reduction. The chapter is divided into four sections. Following this introduction, section two examines intra-regional trade in Africa; this is also compared with trade developments in other regions of the world. Africa's growth prospect, whose momentum is expected to be dependent on trade performance and trade expansion is discussed in section three. This is followed by the conclusion in section four.

Intra-African trade versus trade with rest of the world

As previously mentioned, Africa remains a marginal player in global commerce, and in sharp contrast to conventional wisdom and expectations, regional integration arrangements (RIAs) have not succeeded to any reasonable extent in increasing intra-trade within the continent. Foroutan shows that none of the RIAs in Africa has succeeded in raising trade among its members beyond a negligible proportion of each group's total trade.¹¹ Most African trade flows are with industrialised countries, particularly the European Union (EU), which in 2000 accounted for more than 40 per cent of African exports, as indicated in Table 8.3.¹²

Table 8.3 Developing African countries' exports by destination (% share), 1980–2000

Year	World	Countries in Eastern Europe	Europe	US	Canada	Japan	Australia/New Zealand	South Africa	Developing America	Africa	West Asia	Other Asia	Oceania
1980	100	2,6	48,7	31,3	0,2	2,1	0,1	0,3	6,2	3,1	1,9	1,5	0,0
1990	100	2,7	56,8	19,0	1,2	1,4	0,1	0,6	2,2	5,9	4,1	4,6	0,0
1995	100	2,9	50,7	18,2	1,4	1,8	0,1	0,9	2,7	7,6	4,0	7,0	0,1
2000	100	1,3	43,2	23,4	1,5	1,4	0,2	1,1	4,0	7,3	3,1	10,2	0,1

Source UNCTAD (2004) *World Investment Report 2003*. Geneva: UNCTAD

Notwithstanding geographical proximity, all African countries trade more with the EU than with the six largest African economies (South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia), as indicated in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 Africa's trade with the six largest African countries and rest of the world (US\$millions), 1980–2007

	1980	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007
Morocco	28,51	331,65	317,94	707,21	823,05	1 046,20
Egypt	46,61	88,69	260,15	714,69	861,08	1 246,88
Africa	3 402,36	6 038,52	11 344,50	21 715,00	25 391,60	32 259,90
South Africa	22,59	198,20	955,35	2 535,10	3 720,72	5 553,46
Nigeria	167,71	149,71	398,61	1 392,09	1 535,15	1 904,91
Tunisia	37,84	299,27	174,61	221,68	298,68	365,97
Algeria	155,38	172,12	121,50	370,04	519,95	576,46
Rest of world	64 820,60	82 276,20	134 249,00	241 891,00	287 451,00	333 671,00
	70 661,59	91 544,36	149 821,66	271 551,80	322 607,23	378 631,78
As percentages						
Morocco	0,04	0,36	0,21	0,26	0,26	0,28
Egypt	0,07	0,10	0,17	0,26	0,27	0,33
Africa	4,82	6,60	7,57	8,00	7,87	8,52
South Africa	0,03	0,22	0,64	0,93	1,15	1,47
Nigeria	0,24	0,16	0,27	0,51	0,48	0,50
Tunisia	0,05	0,33	0,12	0,08	0,09	0,10
Algeria	0,22	0,19	0,08	0,14	0,16	0,15
Rest of world	91,73	89,88	89,61	89,08	89,10	88,13

Source UNCTAD (2010) *International Trade Statistics*, 2009. Geneva: UNCTAD

In 1980, intra-African trade accounted for only a modest share of 4,82% of Africa's total trade. This share rose to 7,5% in 2000, and stood at 8,5% as at 2007.¹³ Although intra-African trade improved between 1980 and 2007, the record of African regionalism is still very poor when compared to other RIAs, as indicated in Table 8.5.¹⁴

Table 8.5 Intra-regional trade of regional groups in Africa and other parts of the world (US\$ millions), 1980–2006

	1980	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006
CEPGL	2	7	8	10	20	24
CEMAC (UDEAC)	75	139	120	96	198	245
COMESA	569	1 146	1 367	1 443	2 864	3 489
ECCAS	89	163	163	191	271	334
ECOWAS	661	1 532	1 875	2 715	5 497	5 957
MRU	7	0	1	5	6	8
SADC	106	1 070	4 190	4 383	7 668	8 571
UEMOA	460	621	560	741	1 390	1 545
UMA	109	958	1 109	1 094	1 926	2 400
MERCOSUR	3 424	4 127	14 199	17 829	21 128	25 775
NAFTA	102 218	226 273	394 472	676 142	824 550	902 086
ASEAN	12 413	27 365	79 544	98 060	165 163	194 321
EU	501 402	1 037 044	1 409 714	1 641 252	2 729 376	3 087 605
As percentage of total exports of each group						
CEPGL	0,1	0,5	0,5	0,8	1,2	1,3
CEMAC (UDEAC)	1,6	2,3	2,1	1,0	0,9	0,9
COMESA	1,8	4,7	6,1	4,6	4,5	4,2
ECCAS	1,4	1,4	1,5	1,1	0,6	0,6
ECOWAS	9,6	8,0	9,0	7,6	9,3	8,3
MRU	0,8	0,0	0,1	0,4	0,3	0,3
SADC	0,4	3,1	10,7	9,4	9,2	9,1
UEMOA	9,6	13,0	10,3	13,1	13,4	13,1
UMA	0,3	2,9	3,8	2,3	2,0	2,0
MERCOSUR	11,6	8,9	20,3	2,0	12,9	13,5
NAFTA	33,6	41,4	46,2	55,7	55,8	53,8
ASEAN	17,4	18,9	24,5	23,0	25,3	24,9
EU	62,3	67,6	66,8	67,7	67,3	67,6

Source UNCTAD (2008) *Handbook of Statistics*, Geneva: UNCTAD

Trade among African countries as a whole as well as among various regional groupings in Africa is a small fraction of each country's total; and that share has not recorded significant improvements over the years. Many observers of African affairs believe this level of intra-African trade is too small, and should be expanded further. The different regional schemes in Africa are working towards achieving this objective. Moreover, the fact still remains that far greater levels of success may be attainable if regional integration arrangements could enhance their effectiveness over time, thereby driving Africa's recovery by engaging in more import and export trade and investment flows within the continent than they currently do. In contrast with the situation in Africa, intra-regional trade in the EU as a share of total trade was 67,6 per cent, 53,8 per cent in the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 13,5 per cent in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCUSOR), and 24,9 per cent in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2006. On the other hand, most of the regional groupings in Africa's share of intra-regional trade in total trade remained at a level that is less than 10 per cent on average for the period 1980 to 2006. The southern African region as represented by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Union Economique et Monetaire del Oest Africaine (UEMOA) led the rest of the regional groupings in Africa in terms of intra-regional trade over the period 1980–2006.¹⁴

Perhaps the most important concern raised by the trade statistics briefly highlighted above is the glaring and historically weak trade links within Africa, and the continued strong dependence of African countries on developed country markets.¹⁵ This, unfortunately, has continued to be reinforced over the years by the more or less uni-directional and dependence-enhancing preferential trade arrangements, such as the former trade arrangements between the EU and African and Pacific countries under the Lomé (Cotonou) Convention (which ended in December 2007), different commodity protocols, and the yet to be finalised negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and the different regions of Africa. In addition to the primary commodity dilemma enshrined in some of these arrangements, another general perception expressed by many countries participating in the ongoing EPA negotiations is that there is little coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration processes in Africa.¹⁶ One particular concern has been that countries in the same economic region might liberalise different baskets of products and so create new barriers to intra-regional trade in order to avoid trade deflection. This concern has been vindicated by the interim EPAs that have been agreed. For instance, in the case of Central and West Africa, the principal challenge for regional integration is that most countries have not initialled an EPA, but Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have done so. The countries in the region that do not currently belong to an EPA will reduce none of their tariffs towards the EU, maximising the incompatibility between their trade regimes and those of Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Furthermore, for the Eastern and

Southern Africa (ESA) countries, the five SADC sub-group (SADC-minus) states that have initialled the agreements, have done so to single agreements thereby creating serious dissimilarities in terms of country liberalisation schedules and exclusion baskets. Of the goods being excluded by ESA, not a single item is in the basket of all five countries and more than three-quarters are being excluded by just one. Comparing Mozambique's schedules with those jointly agreed by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS), just one-fifth of the items are being excluded by both parties.

These arrangements, among others, will in all likelihood, lock African countries into primary commodity export trade with partners in the developed world, generally with low value added, as well as creating additional burdens on RIAs in Africa in terms of conforming to the different rules of different agreements. They may also have played a role in the difficulty encountered by many African countries in linking up with the global value chain, and hence their continuing lack of competitiveness in global commerce. Therefore, the attainment of higher levels of intra-Africa trade flows cannot be hinged on the success or otherwise of these North-South trading arrangements. Instead, it is an item that should constitute a serious challenge for the implementation of the different aspects of Nepad and other regional initiatives on the continent. Unfortunately, beyond high-level meetings, workshops and written pronouncements, the direct impact of Nepad in these regards is yet to be felt in Africa.

In addition, taking a more self-assessing stance, Soko identified the issue of trade facilitation as one major constraint to the expansion of intra-trade among African countries. Africa's trade facilitation problems include a whole range of poor capacities, such as deficient transportation networks, moribund communications and energy infrastructure, poor port facilities, a lack of customs and payment automation systems, a lack of transparent regulatory frameworks and inadequate human resources.¹⁷ It is estimated that border delays in southern Africa cost the region about US\$48 million annually. It requires one day for customs clearance in Estonia and Lithuania as opposed to 30 days on average in Ethiopia. Shipping a car from Japan to Abidjan costs US\$1 500, but shipping the same car from Abidjan to Addis Ababa costs US\$5 000.¹⁸ Moreover, it has been noted that the reason why many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Africa do not actively participate in global trade has more to do with red tape rather than tariff barriers. Given that SMEs do not frequently ship large quantities, the numerous administrative barriers they have to contend with make foreign markets appear unattractive. Therefore, in the context of globalisation, where the provision of efficient and competitive services is critical, this has undercut the competitiveness of African traders in international markets.¹⁹

It is worth mentioning that the informal cross-border trade that remains a vital part of rural African economic activity and invisible integration has been neglected by African countries. This type of trade benefits from the activities and social ties among same ethnic groups that spread across Africa's borders since it minimises language and cultural barriers. For instance, evidence from the Horn

of Africa, West Africa, East Africa and southern Africa shows that cross-border trade in Africa is actually on the increase.²⁰ Even though it is not reported in official statistics, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) in June 2004 initiated a system of monitoring 24 borders between Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to measure the volume of goods in informal cross-border trade.²¹ Initial reports showed that 94 per cent of the 34 000 metric tons (MT) of maize trade went into Malawi from neighbouring countries. The trade benefited Malawi because the southern zone of Malawi was an area of maize deficit, whereas the northern sector of Mozambique had a good harvest in July 2004. The report also revealed that Zambian traders took over maize needs in the DRC from September 2004, exporting 220 MT; Tanzania and Zambia supplied 79 per cent of the 36 000 MT of rice to the DRC in the same year. There is also evidence of small and medium entrepreneurs from West and Central Africa who are resident in South Africa selling handicrafts, curios and clothes from West and Central Africa, and textiles and shoes from East Asia.²²

Other important explanations for the failure of regional groupings in Africa to increase intra-regional trade share could be found in the constraints imposed by the existence of a multiplicity of non-convertible currencies for countries outside the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc zone and the Common Monetary Area (CMA) (Rand Monetary Area); ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity; and volatile political environments in some cases. In addition to these, it is also the inability and/or unwillingness of many African countries to undertake the preferential trade liberalisation measures that represent the prerequisite for trade creation among integrating markets. This failure is being attributed to a number of factors such as the reluctance to surrender the fiscal revenue derived from trade taxes, which still constitutes a significant proportion of annual fiscal budget of many countries; the uneven distribution of costs and benefits of integration among participating countries in existing schemes; the associated difficulty in devising proper compensation schemes from the gainers to the losers and the inward-looking, import-substituting economic philosophies that have guided the policy action of the majority of African governments since the mid-1960s.

The conjecture can be made that a lot rests on the shoulders of Nepad and other regional initiatives on the continent, as well as on African governments, to provide appropriate solutions to many of these seemingly self-imposed constraints on intra-African trade.

Africa's recent economic performance: A fallacy of the trade and development story

Africa comprises 53 internationally recognised sovereign states, 31 of which are officially listed as least developed countries (LDCs), out of a total of 49 in

the world.²³ In the 1980s and early 1990s, Africa's economic situation was characterised by slow GDP growth, little progress in manufacturing; relatively static trade structures with limited diversification; a declining share in world trade, limited participation in the growing globalisation of investment and production and a weak private sector.²⁴

Although there have been positive signs of progress since late 1990s, available statistics, as shown in Tables 8.6 and 8.7, paint a discouraging picture on economic performance in Africa.

Table 8.6 Real GDP growth trends across regions of the world, 1980–2007

	Real GDP growth (%)					Growth of GDP per capita (%)				
	2000	1980s–1990s	2005	2006	2007	2000	1980s–1990s	2005	2006	2007
Africa	2,3	2,2	4,8	5,7	5,8	0,5	0,2	2,4	3,3	3,5
SSA	2,7	2,1	4,8	5,9	6,2	0,8	0,0	2,3	3,4	3,7
Sub-Sahara (excl South Africa)	2,6	2,3	5,2	6,1	6,7	0,4	0,2	1,6	3,5	4,0
Asia	5,0	6,3	6,5	7,9	8,1	3,7	4,6	5,2	6,6	6,8
North Africa (excl Sudan)	2,7	2,8	4,7	5,1	5,3	0,1	1,0	3,0	3,5	3,7
Developed economies	3,2	2,5	1,9	2,8	2,5	2,6	1,9	1,3	2,3	2,0
World	3,4	3,1	2,8	4,0	3,8	1,4	1,3	1,5	2,7	2,7

Source Norbert Funke & Saleh M Nsouli (2008) UNCTAD, *Handbook of Statistics 2008*

Between the early 1980s and 1990s, real GDP growth averaged only 2,3 per cent a year, and real per capita GDP growth that was negative in the 1980s reached 2,3 per cent in 2005.²⁵ Moreover, due to favourable terms of trade for primary commodity exports (crude oil and solid minerals in particular) from the early 2000s, real GDP growth and the growth of real per capita GDP witnessed improved performance between 2005 and 2007. Projections for 2008 and 2009 indicated weakening trends given the negative impact of the global financial crisis, which started in the second half of 2008, on Africa's commodity exports.²⁶

Furthermore, Table 8.7 shows that despite impressive growth rates recorded across the developing world since early in this millennium, selected indicators of development reveal that SSA continues to lag far behind other regions of the world. Even in the light of being the highest aid recipient (consistently high aid per capita), the level of productivity as measured by GDP per person employed still remains quite low in SSA, as does the savings rate. Similarly, SSA remains the lowest in terms of electric power consumption, a measure of the level of industrial production and infrastructure development.²⁷

Table 8.7 Other selected indicators of development across world regions, 1980–2007

	1980	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Aid per capita (current US\$)											
East Asia & Pacific	2.45	4.81	5.73	4.76	4.06	3.98	3.86	3.75	5.10	4.15	–
Europe & Central Asia	2.36	7.93	26.06	22.42	19.91	24.07	22.01	24.52	11.69	13.99	–
Euro area	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Latin America & Caribbean	5.93	11.61	13.09	9.40	11.25	9.52	11.25	12.45	11.95	12.44	–
Middle East & North Africa	41.05	46.16	21.70	16.24	17.42	20.83	26.04	35.10	91.14	54.34	–
South Asia	5.83	5.32	4.16	3.09	4.24	4.68	4.32	4.65	6.25	6.19	–
Sub-Saharan Africa	19.88	34.64	31.75	19.58	20.21	26.71	33.75	35.27	42.53	51.82	–
World	7.54	11.26	11.87	9.51	9.45	10.72	12.32	13.74	16.60	16.10	–
United States	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Trade (% of GDP)											
East Asia & Pacific	33.76	47.34	58.68	67.89	65.80	67.86	74.33	82.55	86.37	87.33	–
Europe & Central Asia	–	48.62	61.37	67.62	66.32	65.86	67.75	70.24	68.36	69.83	67.05
Euro area	52.76	54.65	56.88	72.50	71.99	69.44	67.99	70.83	74.05	78.27	–
Latin America & Caribbean	27.68	31.52	37.24	41.91	41.00	43.93	45.20	48.30	48.09	48.96	47.96
Middle East & North Africa	63.17	57.26	55.00	52.36	52.21	58.22	58.07	64.24	71.38	73.45	72.96
South Asia	20.95	20.28	27.09	30.07	29.66	32.34	33.22	38.58	42.70	46.69	45.80
Sub-Saharan Africa	62.55	52.08	58.23	63.37	63.42	64.21	63.26	64.58	66.98	68.84	68.89
World	38.70	38.32	42.00	49.21	48.83	48.18	48.77	51.91	54.18	–	–
United States	20.75	20.54	23.37	26.34	24.14	23.39	23.66	25.47	26.80	–	–
Real GDP/person employed (1990 PPP US\$)											
East Asia & Pacific	–	–	2 950.90	3 423.25	3 694.76	4 059.11	4 556.43	4 946.60	5 372.09	6 351.98	–
Europe & Central Asia	–	–	4 340.23	4 929.60	5 087.03	5 357.42	5 721.25	6 194.52	6 613.36	–	–
Euro area	–	–	16 623.74	18 730.75	19 007.78	19 090.20	19 145.21	19 446.35	19 647.72	20 102.14	–
Latin America & Caribbean	–	–	5 626.21	6 067.43	6 029.50	5 934.14	5 966.34	6 247.07	6 452.23	–	–

Continued on p 130

Continued from p 129

	1980	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Middle East & North Africa	-	-	3 204,89	3 612,51	3 696,63	3 833,20	3 958,25	4 121,59	4 220,86	-	-
South Asia	-	-	1 465,71	1 766,60	1 816,90	1 862,07	1 977,18	2 104,01	2 257,77	2 610,61	-
Sub-Saharan Africa	-	-	1 008,78	1 055,10	1 068,86	1 071,21	1 095,65	1 145,84	1 191,82	-	-
World	-	-	5 776,71	6 494,90	6 609,75	6 754,31	7 003,79	7 333,59	7 629,19	-	-
United States	18 577,37	23 200,56	24 603,17	28 403,40	28 347,04	28 534,69	28 982,15	29 838,65	30 518,82	31 245,40	-
Gross savings (% of GDP)											
East Asia & Pacific	31,65	35,78	38,26	35,17	35,30	37,06	39,91	41,41	44,36	47,01	-
Europe & Central Asia	-	-	22,50	23,81	22,92	21,44	20,97	22,06	22,64	22,48	22,05
Euro area	22,00	22,43	21,30	21,61	21,18	20,82	20,48	21,12	20,81	21,69	-
Latin America & Caribbean	20,28	19,85	17,79	17,35	15,91	17,70	18,49	20,64	20,63	21,95	22,44
Middle East & North Africa	-	-	25,06	27,61	26,93	28,06	28,46	29,08	30,44	27,31	27,42
South Asia	16,74	21,24	25,33	24,53	25,00	26,60	28,32	31,04	32,44	33,52	35,23
Sub-Saharan Africa	23,37	14,98	14,10	14,69	14,12	15,23	15,33	14,90	14,87	16,44	16,12
World	23,09	22,38	21,58	22,12	21,13	20,34	20,16	20,74	20,83	-	-
United States	19,17	15,29	15,53	17,73	16,06	13,88	12,93	12,77	12,52	-	-
Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)											
East Asia & Pacific	258,42	461,29	687,94	885,79	949,31	1 037,66	1 184,86	1 344,58	1 491,94	-	-
Europe & Central Asia	-	4 323,68	3 316,00	3 255,26	3 282,87	3 306,13	3 432,84	3 539,90	3 614,59	-	-
Euro area	4 222,57	5 360,93	5 688,94	6 409,94	6 561,48	6 595,98	6 741,20	6 868,47	6 925,78	-	-
Latin America & Caribbean	884,84	1 188,29	1 351,22	1 579,58	1 544,41	1 567,94	1 614,13	1 667,60	1 714,69	-	-
Middle East & North Africa	434,59	738,98	864,54	1 059,03	1 105,16	1 159,09	1 203,34	1 268,22	1 337,72	-	-
South Asia	125,62	246,31	325,76	359,21	361,57	373,29	3 90,50	410,65	432,36	-	-
Sub-Saharan Africa	464,43	515,50	498,90	490,03	492,73	509,06	5 24,45	541,04	542,21	-	-
World	1 584,74	2 119,60	2 204,22	2 389,48	2 382,90	2 439,60	2 509,37	2 594,18	2 677,76	-	-
United States	9 862,37	11 713,33	12 659,61	13 667,77	13 034,10	13 272,18	13 274,98	13 349,36	13 647,58	-	-

Source: World Bank (2009) World Development Indicators. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/publications/wdi>

To further buttress the dilemma of the trade expansion and development fallacy in SSA, recent statistics from the World Bank show that the incidence of poverty, as measured by the percentage of the population living on less than US\$1,25 per day, still remains above desired levels. Over the period 1990 to 2005 the percentage of the population living on less than US\$1,25 per day declined from 57,62 to 50,9 per cent, and is being projected to be at about 37,1 per cent in 2015. This means that the share of people living in extreme poverty will remain well above the region's target of 29 per cent in 2015. In absolute figures, the statistics also reveal that in actual fact, the number of people living in extreme poverty in SSA increased from 297,5 million in 1995 to 388,4 million in 2005, though this is projected to decline slightly to 356,4 million in 2015.²⁸ Hence, despite improved growth rates of real GDP and real GDP per capita, and even improved participation in global commerce due to increased exports of minerals in recent times, SSA is not on the way to meeting one of the key targets of the millennium development goals (MDGs), which is halve absolute poverty by 2015.

Many African countries have implemented macro-economic as well as micro-economic reforms that have resulted in a generally improved business environment and investment climate since the mid-1980s. In addition to increased aid and debt relief, this has helped to attract high net private capital inflows of US\$26,5 million in 2005, US\$17,3 million in 2006 and US\$42,1 million in 2007.²⁹ These improvements need to be widened, deepened and sustained if Africa is to accelerate and sustain growth beyond the ongoing commodity boom. The continent also needs to promote the high-quality growth that is broadly shared in terms of generating decent employment, poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs. The recorded real per capita income growth rate (0,2 per cent during 1990–2000; 2,4 per cent in 2000–2005 3,3 per cent and 3,5 per cent in 2006 and 2007 respectively) is not sufficient for Africa to make any significant progress towards achieving the MDGs. Its ability to accelerate and sustain high-quality growth hinges crucially on successful regional integration efforts, enhanced South–South cooperation for trade and investment expansion, diversification of the other sources of growth and mobilisation of domestic and external financial resources.³⁰

Confronted by poor performance over time, the question then remains as to how Africa, particularly SSA, hopes to make a breakthrough in the increasingly globalising world, where competitiveness, high-tech industrial production, the capacity to invest or the ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and a vibrant private sector are the weapons of winning nations. The simple answer is that Africa will need to adopt a new vision for the development of the continent and translate this vision into concrete programmes. However, such programmes may not be feasible on an individual country basis because in most African countries, the markets are too narrow; and the level of domestic savings and other financial resources available for investment is also too low to sustain the establishment of the large industries required in

today's globalising world. This implies a dire need for African countries to join forces in regional and subregional economic integration arrangements, within Africa and with other developing regions of the world.

Conclusion and way forward

Regional cooperation and integration, as a vehicle for achieving African unity and sustainable economic recovery and growth, has always been a cherished goal. A number of efforts have gone into making this a reality in the last couple of decades, but the record of achievement has fallen short of expectations, as intra-African trade has really not gone very far beyond the levels experienced in the 1980s. Similarly, exports from the continent have not only been confined to traditional commodities (minerals and unprocessed agricultural goods) destined for Europe and America, and these goods continue to be subject to the vagaries of the rather volatile international commodity market. Hence, in spite of continuing trade with the rest of the world, Africa remains marginalised and uncompetitive in the global trading arena, and still largely in discord with the global value chain. Poverty remains quite high, labour productivity quite low, and high levels of unemployment are pervasive in the different regions on the continent.

It is also worth mentioning that the informal cross-border trade, which remains a vital part of rural African economic activity and invisible integration, has over the years enjoyed only near (if not total) neglect by African countries. It benefits from the activities and social ties among similar ethnic groups that spread across Africa's borders since it minimises language and cultural barriers. Whatever their failings as ascribed to by contemporary economic theories and received literature, there is evidence to suggest that cross-border trading systems have something to offer in Africa. In particular, the commercial skills, experience and organisational infrastructure of trans-border traders represent invaluable institutional resources for the development of effective regional trading blocs in Africa, which in itself is an important component of any effective strategy for integrating Africa into the global economy. With public resources so scarce and incomes so low in SSA in particular, governments should avoid wasting valuable resources trying to police trans-border trade. What is needed is a more effective developmental framework within which these networks can operate.

African countries will, therefore, have to continue to deepen their policy and structural reforms so as to diversify their export basket. They will also need to rationalise and strengthen the various institutions that they have created to enhance such efforts. Evidently, the launching of Nepad has been acclaimed as an important initiative that has a high potential to give a new boost and direction to the development efforts of African countries as well as establishing new forms of partnership with the developed world. It is hoped

that the smooth and efficient functioning of Nepad will move Africa in the desired direction of South–South cooperation on the African continent. Against this backdrop, it is also envisaged that South Africa, the biggest economy on the continent, through the collaboration between its DTI and Nepad will work to develop a coordinated trade strategy for the continent, focused primarily on deepening intra-African trade. Evidence abounds already in this regard, as many South African-based companies (industrial and services) already have fully established branch networks in a number of African countries. Moreover, particularly for the southern African region, efforts of by South African government will be pronounced and even become more effective in terms of strengthened trade relations if the DTI will in the near future offer improved and asymmetrical access to the South African market for goods produced by other countries.

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CHAPTER 9

Market Reforms and Socio-economic Development in Africa

Said Adejumobi and Gonzaque Rosalie

Introduction

The late 20th and early 21st centuries were characterised by the triumphalism of the liberal capitalist ideology encapsulated in market reforms and liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama, celebrating the ascendance of the neo-liberal orthodoxy, suggested that perhaps humankind was at the very end of its civilisation; and human history in terms of socio-political evolution, was coming to a close. According to him, 'liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics – the "free market" – have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close of World War II, part of the impoverished third world.'¹

Before the close of the first decade of the 21st century, the neo-liberal ideology was being challenged. The global economy has reclined into crisis- the consequence of a spiral effect from the financial crisis which hit the United States and Europe, leading to the collapse of banks and manufacturing industries, high unemployment rates and general economic slowdown. The US number of unemployed was estimated at 4,4 million, representing an unemployment rate of 8,1 per cent in March 2009, the highest in 25 years. Giant financial groups such as the Citibank and American International Group (AIG) are in deep crisis, while in England, the Bank of Scotland (BOS) had recorded a whopping financial loss of US\$34,5 billion by December 2008.

The burgeoning crisis has sounded the death knell of economic neo-liberalism. As David Milliband described it, the crisis constitutes 'financial 9/11' in which 'old orthodoxies have crumbled, leaving space that either progressives or reactionaries can fill'.² Western governments have resorted to state interventionism, control and protectionism in order to facilitate economic recovery. Stimulus packages, economic bailouts and subsidies for private firms are the new clichés in global economic management. The neo-liberal ideology has undoubtedly run its full course.

This chapter reflects on how market reforms have facilitated or undermined socio-economic development in Africa within the last two decades. Market

reforms couched in the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were the standard policy formulas for most, if not all, African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. It was a 'one-size-fits-all' policy, which the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed on developing countries, particularly in Africa. Even in a post-adjustment era, market reforms continued to be the guiding principle in economic policy agenda in Africa. The recent collapse of neo-liberalism is offering a possible rethink in that direction.

This chapter contextualises market reforms in terms of their organising economic philosophy and ideology, analyses their policy components and their implementation in Africa, explicates their effects on economic growth and social welfare, and concludes on their netbenefits to the continent. Our basic argument is that while Africa has recorded modest economic growth due partly to the reform measures, the social costs of such have been phenomenal: increasing poverty, unemployment, continued poor access to education and healthcare facilities and generally declining living standards. If human beings constitute the means and end of development, then market reforms have not served as a link to meaningful development in Africa.

The philosophy, ideology and critique of market reforms

The philosophical and ideological foundation of market reforms is the neo-classical economic theory. Neo-classical economic theory asserts that markets do work, and the centrality of market forces and private agents in economic organisation and transactions promote efficiency and economic growth and facilitate social welfare in society.³ In a laissez-faire economy, economic competition among private agents often guarantees efficiency, enhances quality and productivity and lowers prices. The less competitive firms either wither away, or are compelled to reform in order to brace up to the challenges of competition. As private actors play out their selfish interests, they, on the aggregate, contribute to the welfare of society. Thus the sum total of private interests leads to the common good. In the words of Adam Smith: 'By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.'⁴

The market is viewed as a self-regulating system, which responds to price signals with a capacity to gravitate itself back to equilibrium whenever there is a distortion or crisis. The role of the state in the economy therefore is to invest in public works and create the regulatory regime for the smooth functioning of the market. However, the practice of economic neo-liberalism in the late 20th century seems to have transcended what Adam Smith envisaged in his treatise. Smith had argued that while the state should be less obtrusive and less visible in economic transactions, it nonetheless should provide for

public goods such as defence, administration, justice, education and social welfare, which the market may either not necessarily be interested in, or may not be able to facilitate in the public interest. Adam Smith thus argues:

The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a greater society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expense to any individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires too very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.⁵

An ultra-right neo-liberal market ideology was what emerged in the global arena in the late 20th century, which informed the formulation of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) for the developing world. Not only did it emphasise the centrality of the market, but also sought to empty the state of the responsibility for public services. The state was to be retrenched from the economy and social sphere, and its services turned over to the private sector and the market. Thus, the commercialisation and privatisation of public services became major elements in SAP, as well as the shrinking state budgetary profile, and general macro-economic reforms based on market doctrines.

Three factors engendered the new thinking and the rise of market doctrine in the late 20th century. First was the emergence of the neo-conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively. These two regimes preached the inviolability of the market. Second was the accompanying change of leadership at the World Bank – McNamara was replaced by W Clausen as the president of the bank. Clausen was a neo-liberal economic conservative. Third was the incipient economic crisis, especially in the developing countries in the 1970s, which challenged the Keynesian economic policies adopted around the world. Under a market doctrine, the reform cliché became one of ‘getting the prices right’. The switch in global economic thinking was not only sudden, but also very dramatic. As Ravi Kanbur noted, matters changed ‘from a situation where the state could do no wrong to one where the state could do no right ... The pendulum swung too far the other way. That it began to swing the other way was due to experience. That it swung too far the other way was due to ideology.’⁶

From the 1980s, market reforms became the cornerstone of economic policies in Africa as reflected in SAPs. SAPs had two major components of stabilisation measures designed to reduce domestic and external imbalances, curb inflation, promote market driven exchange rate in order to ensure optimal use of scarce foreign exchange and demand reducing fiscal policies. What is the first component? The other component entails macro-economic re-engineering through decontrol of prices, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, dismantling or pruning of public bureaucracies through public-sector reforms, and

general withdrawal of the state from the economy and downsizing in the social sector. As the implementation of SAPs progressed and their pitfalls became imminent, the emphasis changed from 'getting prices right' to 'getting institutions right'. The argument was that SAPs were not working in Africa because of institutional perversion and resistance, which required that institutions needed to be fixed for adjustment to thrive. That was the context in which SAPs were constructed in the late 1980s and 1990s in Africa.

There is a wealth of literature on development economics and the political economy of development critiquing SAPs in Africa and the developing world. Suffice to note that the basic premise and assumptions on which market reforms are rooted are belied in many developing countries. Market economy theory assumes that the elements of perfect competition, perfect information flow and factor mobility are present for the effective functioning of the market. Unfortunately, these variables are in short supply or deficit in many developing countries. A selective reading of history to support market reforms also suggests that Western countries and the South East Asian countries did not premise their development solely on the market. This is highlighted by Joseph Stiglitz's description of the role of the state in the development of the United States. He writes:

Historically, the US government played an even larger role in the economy in promoting development, including the development of technology and infrastructure. In the nineteenth century when agriculture was at the centre of the economy, government created the whole system of agricultural universities and "extension" services. Huge land grants spurred the development of the Western railroads. In the nineteenth century, the US government funded the first telegraphic line; in the twentieth, it funded the research that led to the internet. The United States was successful partly because of the role that the government played in promoting development, in regulating markets and in providing basic social services.⁷

Market reforms as couched in SAPs therefore assumed more of a fundamentalist ideology and doctrine rather than a coherent, logical and historically tested and proven policy package. John Mihevc equates it with the fundamentalist theology of the religious realm. In his words, 'the manner in which the World Bank has presented, promoted and defended structural adjustment against its critics, closely parallels fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible. The strategies employed by the World Bank to guarantee the hegemony of its ideology and to deal with dissenters also correspond to those of fundamentalism'.⁸

Background to and nature of market reforms in Africa

Since the end of the Second World War, economic policy experts have debated on the best policies that developing countries should follow to achieve

sustained and inclusive economic growth and development. The opinion concerning the appropriate economic policy for developing countries has cycled over the last 60 years, with the relative roles of markets and governments in fostering economic development changing depending on the prescription.⁹

In the wake of the Great Depression, the dominant economic development paradigm was predicated by an acceptance of pervasive market failures that required widespread state direction of economic activities through marketing boards and state-owned and managed enterprises. Anticipating a deterioration in the terms of trade of primary products relative to manufactured goods, developing countries focused on their static comparative advantage, implying that the export of primary produce and minerals was not a viable option for developing countries.¹⁰ This export pessimism gave rise to the consensus that industrialisation should be the path out of poverty for developing countries. As developing countries have a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing, the 'infant industry argument' provided the justification for the protection of the nascent industrial sector by tariffs, import quotas and other trade barriers until the manufacturing firms could fend for themselves in export markets. The poor state of social services and infrastructure at independence, coupled with the absence of a significant middle class, a weak indigenous private sector that was deemed unable to take advantage of market opportunities and the prominence of economic nationalism in the immediate post-colonial period provided additional reasons to increase the role of the state in the economic sphere in African countries.¹¹

Many post-colonial African states invested heavily in health, education, housing, roads, water supply, irrigation and electrification to fill the social services and infrastructure deficits that existed at independence.¹² To reduce the dominance of their economies by foreign-based multinational companies and non-indigenous minorities, especially Asians and Lebanese in economic life, governments either nationalised private enterprises, or forced their transfer to indigenous Africans through indigenisation and nationalisation policies.¹³ The state agricultural marketing boards were expanded to smallholder areas that did not benefit under the colonial system.¹⁴ Civil services were increased rapidly to satisfy rising expectations for better public services, provide patronage to groups of political supporters and cope with the increased government activism after independence.¹⁵ This explosion in civil service employment was accompanied by the 'Africanisation' of the professional and managerial levels of the civil service.¹⁶ State-controlled enterprises were protected from competition from exports behind import tariffs and other non-quantitative import barriers, and were also supported by production and credit subsidies and overvalued currencies. The protection of domestic industries was usually accompanied by financial repression to encourage capital-intensive investment.¹⁷

The statist, inward-oriented approach was soon to come under increased criticism and pressure on a number of fronts. First, the focus on heavy industry was not making a dent in poverty levels. Secondly, the development experience

of the East Asian 'Tiger' economies, which combined export-oriented economic growth with lower income and land poverty, was calling into question economic development strategies characterised by inward orientation. The balance of payments problems and external debt crisis experienced by developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s provided the political impetus for African countries to abandon state-led import-substituting industrialisation under pressure from international financial institutions (IFIs) and other donors.¹⁸

The severe balance-of-payments and debt crisis in African countries in the 1970s and 1980s were caused by a confluence of both internal and external factors.¹⁹ The international economic recession caused by the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 reduced the demand for exports by industrialised countries, leading to reduced export earnings and difficulties in servicing external debts by African countries. Furthermore, economic stagnation in the West induced falls in aid flows and foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries. Developing countries were also disadvantaged by having to borrow funds at high interest rates on international financial markets, further exacerbating the debt-servicing problem.

The foreign exchange strangulation resulting from these external shocks led to negative economic growth rates, stagnating or falls in per capita incomes, balance of payments problems and soaring external debt levels in African countries. In the period from 1981 to 1985, average real GDP growth per capita fell by 0,7 per cent for African countries overall and by specifically 1,0 per cent for sub-Saharan African countries. Revenues from the export of goods and services in Africa as a whole fell by 2,6 per cent in 1975, by 10,2 per cent in 1981 and by 3,3 per cent in 1982. Export volumes in Africa fell by 7,9 per cent in 1981 and by 5,6 per cent in 1982.²⁰ Total external debt stock of African countries increased from US\$11,2 billion at the end of 1970 through US\$112,4 billion at the end of 1980 to US\$269,3 billion at the end of 1990. Total external debt service rose from just under US\$14 billion in 1980 to just under US\$26 billion in 1990.²¹

Internal factors exacerbated the economic crisis. The subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises, the rapid growth of the civil service, weak public financial management, pervasive corruption, inappropriate economic policies, lax implementation and misuse of resources and wastage of public funds also put pressure on government finances.²² Due to financial repression and the resulting decline in domestic savings, countries had to rely on external savings for financing development. In addition, state-owned enterprises were unable to generate sufficient export earnings to service foreign debts and finance rising expenditure on imports, causing debt burdens to soar.

As a result of the debt-servicing crisis and import strangulation, African countries had no alternative other than to rely on the IMF and the World Bank for adjustment resources and had to subordinate themselves to the conditions in SAPs imposed by these IFIs for accessing such funds.²³ The set of policies that underpinned the SAPs were labelled the 'Washington Consensus' in 1989.²⁴ The 'original list of the Washington Consensus' contained ten specific policy priorities

for countries in Latin America. These included fiscal discipline that involved keeping budget deficits small to maintain price stability; redirecting public expenditure from political sensitive areas to pro-poor and pro-growth areas; tax reforms that were aimed at broadening the tax base and marginal tax rates; interest rate liberalisation; unified and competitive exchange rates; trade liberalisation aimed at replacing quantitative trade restrictions by tariffs and the reduction of tariff rates; openness to FDIs; privatisation of state-owned enterprises; deregulation in terms of abolishing barriers of entry of new firms or of competition; and the securing of property rights at acceptable cost to the informal sector.²⁵ This original list was later supplemented by a further set of ten policies. These included corporate governance, anti-corruption, flexible labour markets, adherence to WTO principles, adherence to international financial codes and standards, prudent capital account opening, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central banks and inflation targeting with the aim of promoting sound money policy, and targeted poverty reduction that aimed at ensuring that the intended beneficiaries benefited from poverty-related policies.²⁶

In Africa, although the adoption and implementation of market reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus was slow and lacked conviction, a significant component of the new policy agenda was adopted, mostly due to pressure exerted by donors, as explained above. Internally, loss-making state-owned enterprises delivering low-quality services were putting pressure on government finances and were thus encouraged to be either liquidated or privatised, or faced competition from private enterprises. According to Nellis, from 1991 to 2001, 2 270 privatisation transactions were conducted in Africa at a sales value of US\$9.1 billion. However, 71 per cent of the privatisation proceeds in that period were accounted for by five countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa and Zambia.²⁷ Production and consumption subsidies were reduced, prices were decontrolled to reflect supply and demand conditions and state marketing boards either abolished or faced competition.²⁸ International trade transactions were liberalised by reductions in tariff rates, the tariffication of quantitative import restrictions and the abolishment of foreign exchange controls, and official exchange rates were brought more in line with parallel rates to remove the anti-export bias of overvalued currencies.²⁹ In order to reduce budgetary and inflationary pressures, government expenditures were reined in and civil services retrenched. Tax systems were reformed to replace lost revenues as a result of trade liberalisation, and excessive growths in money supply checked.

Progress or setbacks?


In this section, attention is paid to the continent's economic performance over time, inflation, income poverty and inequality and human development. Starting with economic performance, it should be noted that within the last

decade and a half, there have been notable improvements in the general economic condition in Africa with GDP on the increase for many countries and per capita income on the rise compared with the period of economic crisis in the 1980s. For the region as a whole, real GDP growth rate was estimated at an average of 5 per cent between 1995 and 2007, and real per capita growth averaged approximately 2 per cent over the same period.³⁰ For the continent, real GDP per capita rose from US\$1 492 in 1960 to US\$2 300 in 2003, while for sub-Saharan Africa, real per capita income increased from US\$1 366 in 1960 to US\$1 708 in 1976, before experiencing a prolonged period of stagnation and decline until 1995, and rising again to reach US\$1 702 in 2003 (see Figure 9.1).

Growth in real per capita income in Africa rose by 1,9 per cent in the late 1970s before falling by an average of 0,5 per cent in the period from 1981 to 1995, as a result of balance of payments problems and an external debt servicing crisis. From 1996 to 2000 Africa's per capita income grew by 2,6 per cent in real terms and by 1,3 per cent from 2001 to 2005.³¹

The healthy economic growth in African countries starting from 1995 was due to a number of factors beyond market reform policies. These included higher international prices for commodities in world markets, increased FDI flows to the extractive sector, favourable supply conditions; debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and the multilateral debt relief debt initiative (MDRI) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the end of violent conflicts and subsequent relative political stability in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone in the last decade; and improved macro-economic management.³² Although there is relative improvement in economic growth, Africa still lags significantly behind all other regions of the world in terms of economic

Figure 9.1 Real GDP per capita for Africa, 1960–2003³³



Source A Heston, R Summers & B Atan (2006) Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.³⁴ Available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php


performance. In the period 1990–2001, the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in Africa was 0,2 per cent compared to 1,5 per cent for the world, 1,3 per cent for Latin America and 3,1 per cent for Asia.³⁵

Over the last decade, the macro-economic environment has improved somewhat in Africa, especially in terms of inflation. After deteriorating from 13,8 per cent in 1990 to 41,7 per cent in 1994, inflation fell to 9,0 per cent in 1998 and to 6,3% in 2006, as seen in Figure 9.2. However, in the first six months of 2008, average consumer price inflation in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 9 to 15 per cent due mainly to the increase in food and fuel prices worldwide. By 2009, Africa's inflation rate was projected to be around 10 per cent.³⁶ As Africa grapples with the global economic crisis with a possible slowdown in economic activities, export flows and earnings, and rising balance-of-payment problems, inflationary pressures may be mounting, as currently being witnessed in some African countries.

Income poverty and inequality are major areas where market economic policies have worsened the lives of the people in Africa. As private agents gain control of the economy and the role of the state in regulating incomes, providing social services and welfare for the people is curtailed, people are left helpless and often, hopeless, with the weak and vulnerable in society being the worst victims. For instance, the number of people living in extreme poverty in SSA rose by 182 million to 384 million between 1981 and 2005. As a percentage of the population, the incidence of poverty increased from 50,8 per cent in 1981 to 57,5 per cent in 1996, before trending downward to reach 50,4 per cent in 2005.³⁷

The level of poverty in Africa is intolerably high, reflecting the class character of market reforms which de-prioritise the people as the agency of development, but

Figure 9.2 Average consumer price inflation in Africa, 1980–2006 (% per year)



Source: International Monetary Fund (2008) *Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa*, October 2008. Washington, DC: IMF

perceive the market as the fulcrum of economic progress. Under market reforms, social services of education, health, water supply, etc, have been largely privatised or commercialised with user fees and charges being imposed on the people. This has restricted access to services, thus accentuating the level of poverty in many African countries.³⁸ According to the IMF in 2004, SSA had the worst incidence of extreme poverty in the world, while the growth in China and India dramatically reduced poverty in Asia. SSA had lower levels of poverty compared to East and South Asia in 1980; it has now fallen behind.³⁹

Poverty in Africa is accompanied by high levels of inequality, as measured by the Gini Coefficient. The Gini index for income inequality ranges from a low of 30 in Ethiopia to a high of 62,9 in Sierra Leone.⁴⁰ The southern African region has the least egalitarian income distribution in Africa. Six countries from the region; Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia rank in the top ten of the most unequal countries in the sample with a Gini Coefficient of above 50.⁴¹

In terms of human development, there has been mixed progress if one looks at the various indicators of education, child mortality and life expectancy, and access to drinking water and sanitation. With regard to education, there has been substantial improvement in school enrolment at the primary and secondary school levels, especially the former. The net enrolment ratio (NER) in primary education for SSA rose from 54 per cent in 1991 to 71 per cent in 2006. North Africa has the highest NER with 95 per cent, exceeding the average for all developing countries, which was 88 per cent in 2006. There were 89 girls enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys enrolled in SSA in 2006 compared to 93 for North Africa and an average of 94 for all developing regions.⁴²

In spite of this progress, more than 33 million children were not enrolled in primary school and more than 60 per cent of African countries has primary NERs below 80 per cent, and more than one-third below 70 per cent in 2005.⁴³ Africa's primary enrolment rate remains the lowest in the world. In 2005, 53 million students were enrolled in secondary schools in SSA, an increase of 55 per cent since 1999. Generally, participation in secondary education remains very low in Africa, with the general enrolment rate below 20 per cent in 2005 in many African countries.⁴⁴ For tertiary education, the enrolment rate is very dismal. Only 3,5 million students were enrolled in tertiary education in Africa in 2005, representing a 66 per cent increase on the 1999 rate. However, this figure constitutes about 5 per cent of the relevant age group for tertiary education in Africa.⁴⁵

Of particular importance in all levels of education in Africa, but especially at primary and secondary level, are the issues of quality and student retention. In most cases, due to domestic pressures and the inability to pay school fees, many children drop out of school before the completion period. As UNESCO estimated in 2004, the median survival rate to the last grade of primary education was 63 per cent, far lower than that of other regions of the world. Similarly the student:teacher ratio in many of the countries is disproportionately skewed,

making for poor teaching and learning in the schools. Africa has the highest teacher-per-student ratio in the world (1 teacher to 45 students).⁴⁶ In addition, instructional materials and facilities are poorly provided in many African public schools. Overall, most African countries are not likely to meet the goal of basic education for all by the year 2015 set in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the UN for developing countries.

The poor performance of Africa in the education sector is related to state policy influenced by market reforms. Under market reforms, the state gradually divested itself from the social sector, and its budgetary commitment to the sector dwindled remarkably. Indeed, African countries were encouraged to focus mainly on primary education, as it was dubiously argued that the rate of social return on primary education was far higher than that of secondary and tertiary education. Tertiary education was considered to be a private good for which the net benefit was to the consumers, rather than society, hence students in tertiary institutions were to pay for their education. This was the basis for the commercialisation and privatisation of university education in Africa.⁴⁷ This restricted access and affected quality and regulation of the higher education sector.

In 2000–2006, 12 countries in SSA had very low adult literacy rates (less than 50 per cent): Benin; Burkina Faso; Central African Republic; Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; Ethiopia; Guinea; Mali; Mozambique; Niger; Senegal and Sierra Leone. Nine countries in SSA had adult literacy rates at or greater than the world average (84 per cent). These are: the Republic of Congo; Equatorial Guinea; Gabon; Mauritius; Namibia; São Tomé and Príncipe; Seychelles; South Africa; and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, this subset of countries are oil-exporters, small countries or are in southern Africa. Botswana (82 per cent), Cape Verde (83 per cent), Lesotho (82 per cent) and Swaziland (80 per cent) join the countries mentioned above if the threshold adult literacy rate is reduced to 80 per cent.

With respect to child mortality and life expectancy in 2006, 157 children out of every thousand in SSA did not live to see their fifth birthday, down from 184 in 1990. The corresponding figures for developing regions were 103 (1990) and 80 (2006). In North Africa, the figure more than halved from 82 in 1990 to 35 in 2006. In SSA 9 000 mothers died in childbirth for every one million live births in 2005, exactly twice the average for all developing regions and more than five times the figure for North Africa. Life expectancy at birth in Africa increased from 46 years in 1970 to 51 years in 2005. The corresponding figures are 52 and 71 years for North Africa and 45 and 47 years for SSA respectively. For the latter, life expectancy increased to 49 years in 1985 before first stabilising and then reversed after 1990 due to the HIV/Aids pandemic, the spread of malaria and tuberculosis and regional conflicts. Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana have life expectancy at birth below 40 years.⁴⁸

Therefore, life in most African countries except North Africa remains nasty, short and brutish, with a life expectancy that has marginally improved from the 1970 position. As Africa's healthcare facilities deteriorate with poor funding,

dwindling household incomes and poor nutrition, the risk to longer livelihood increases.

Regarding drinking water and sanitation in Africa, 277 million people lacked access to clean water, and 393 million had no access to sanitation by the end of 1990. But by the end of 2004, 191 million more Africans had access to an improved drinking water source than in 1990.⁴⁹ The 550 million people in Africa with access to safe drinking water in 2004 represented 62 per cent of the population; 337 million people still had no access. This analysis hides huge disparities in access to safe drinking water between regions and between urban and rural areas. In 2004, only 42 per cent of the rural population in SSA had access to an improved source of drinking water, compared with 80 per cent in urban areas. But 42 per cent was an improvement over the 36 per cent in 1990. In contrast, the coverage in urban areas fell from 82 per cent in 1990 as a result of rapid population growth. The urban-rural gap is even more startling when one looks at country data. Fourteen countries have an urban-rural gap in coverage of 40 per cent and above.⁵⁰

From 1990 to 2004 an additional 146 million people in Africa enjoyed access to improved sanitation, increasing the coverage from 38 per cent to 44 per cent. But at the end of 2004, 498 million people in Africa still did not have access.⁵¹ At the end of 2004, 53 per cent of the urban population had access to improved sanitation, a small increase from 52 per cent in 1990. In contrast, the equivalent figures for North Africa were 84 per cent and 91 per cent in 1990 and 2004 respectively. The rural population with access to improved sanitation in 2004 was lower than that of the urban population for both SSA and North Africa in both magnitude and as a proportion of the population. The rural population without access to improved sanitation in SSA in 2004 was 339 million (72 per cent) compared to 124 million (47 per cent) of the urban population. Although the effort to improve access to sanitation in SSA was concentrated in urban areas, with an average yearly increase of 4.6 million people served (compared with 3 million in rural areas), rapid population growth caused coverage in urban areas to increase by only 1 per cent in 2004.⁵²

Overall, Africa still performs very poorly with regard to access to basic social services of water and sanitation. The rural-urban skew exacerbates the problem, as a majority of Africa's population resides in the rural areas, and has less access to potable water and sanitation. The poor social facilities in the rural areas have encouraged urbanisation, intensifying urban pressures, thus posing a major challenge to urban social infrastructure. This explains why urban infrastructure continues to deteriorate in relative terms.

Business and investment environment in Africa

Many African countries have taken initiatives to reduce the burden of doing business by setting up one-stop institutions for investors, streamlining

licensing procedures, reducing the cost, duration and number of procedures for starting a new or expanding an existing business and reducing the tax burden on businesses. This is a major component of the structural reform process. From January 2005 to June 2008, 46 African countries introduced 186 positive reforms in the ten areas covered by the World Bank's 'Doing Business' study.⁵³ Reforms to simplify the procedures and reduce the cost associated with starting a business were the most popular with 40 countries, followed by reforms to reduce the number of procedures, time and cost to register property with 35. The largest number of reforms registered during the study period were undertaken by Egypt with 13, followed by Mauritius with 11 negative reforms. As for those that increased the burden on businesses, were introduced during the same period by Zimbabwe.⁵⁴

Despite reforms to reduce the burden of doing business, African countries are lagging behind other regions in terms of the ease of doing business. In SSA it takes longer and is costlier to start a business and obtain licences; the labour market tends to be more rigid than elsewhere; taxes on businesses tend to be higher as a proportion of profits; and it is relatively costly to export and import goods. This is highlighted in Table 9.1.


In the overall ranking on the ease of doing business as at 1 June 2008, only three African countries – Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana – are in the top 50 out of 181 countries, while 27 African countries are in the bottom 50, including 9 out of the bottom 10.⁵⁵

Despite the widespread use of tax incentives and legal and regulatory framework reforms to attract private investments, it would seem that these have had a limited effect in stimulating the flow of FDI to African countries. The flow of FDI into Africa reached a record US\$53 billion in 2007 up from US\$45,8 billion a year earlier⁵⁶ and from an average of under US\$2 billion in 1980–1989, as shown in Figure 9.3. However, Africa's share of world FDI flows of 2,9 per cent in 2007 was smaller than those for other regions, and FDI flows

Table 9.1 Selected indicators of doing business in Africa compared with other regions, 2008⁵⁹

Region	Starting a business		Dealing with licences		RoEI ⁶⁰ (0–100)	Total tax rate (% of profit)	Export cost per container (US\$)	Import cost per container (US\$)
	Time (days)	Cost (% of GNI per capita)	Time (days)	Cost (% of GNI per capita)				
EAP	44	32	174	171	20	38,7	902	949
EECA	23	9	257	620	39	48,1	1 649	1 822
LAC	65	39	229	249	31	48,6	1 230	1 384
MENA	24	41	187	433	32	33,3	1 024	1 205
South Asia	33	21	245	2 341	26	40,4	1 339	1 487
SSA	48	111	271	2 574	41	66,7	1 879	2 279

Source World Bank (2009) *Doing Business* database, Washington, DC: World Bank

Figure 9.3 Foreign direct investment inflows to Africa, 1981–2007Source UNCTAD (various years) *World Investment Reports*

to Africa remain highly concentrated. Of the US\$1 411 million FDI that flowed to Africa from 1980 to 1985, oil-exporting countries were the recipients of 74 per cent of it.⁵⁷ The top ten recipients of FDI in Africa in 2004, 2005 and 2006 accounted for 68,5 per cent, 69,9 per cent and 91 per cent, respectively, of the FDI flows to Africa.⁵⁸

Conclusion

During the last two decades, African countries have embarked on market reform programmes, yet the progress of the continent has been mixed. Indeed, some African countries can be said to be in the post-adjustment phase, although still pursuing market-driven policies tempered with social and human development considerations. On average, economic growth has been remarkable in Africa with GDP growth rate averaging about 5 per cent in the last decade. This economic progress has led some to suggest that Africa is in the process of economic take-off consistent with the Rostowian model of stages of economic growth.

However, economic growth may mask serious development challenges, and may indeed not translate into overall development for a country or region. This is exactly the case for Africa. HDIs – education, health, access to potable water and sanitation – though on the increase, and far better than where they were a decade ago, still lag considerably behind those of other regions of the world and what is required to meet the MDGs by 2015. It is only the North African countries that are fairly on target in meeting the MDGs.

Market reforms have significantly affected the ways, means, processes and outcomes of economic organisation and social service provision and delivery in Africa. As the state shrinks from the economy, the public sector which hitherto was and still remains the highest employer of labour in African countries, sheds its weight by disengaging some of its personnel, thereby exacerbating the problem of unemployment in the formal sector, with consequences for household income, poverty and social inequality.

Although, the UN objective of the MDGs seems to have refocused and re-channelled resources back to the social sectors, especially at the basic level of primary education, primary healthcare services etc – mostly with support from international development partners – the progress made in these sectors has been very limited. Africa is ranked poorly, and is perhaps the poorest, in terms of social service access, quality and scope.

An inward-looking economic development strategy which constructs an industrial base, encourages economic diversification, promotes agricultural self-sufficiency and embraces human development and protection as a fundamental development priority is the development path feasible for Africa. A revisit and review of the Lagos Plan of Action⁶¹ and the Final Act of Lagos⁶² may be a first step in re-engaging the development question in Africa. No country has developed on the basis of unfettered market ideology. Selective liberalisation, a well-guided and state-supported industrialisation process, human capital investments and provision of essential social services and infrastructure constitute development in tAfrica, as is the case in other regions of the world. The market is useful, but certainly cannot displace the state in the development agenda. An appropriate market-state mix depending on the stage of development, and priorities and strategies of individual countries is essential for facilitating development.

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- Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Sub-Saharan Africa comprises the African countries less Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
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61 The Lagos Plan of Action.

62 The Final Act of Lagos.

CHAPTER 10

Africa in Emerging International Forums

Gilbert Khadiagala

If what [is] happening in Africa today was happening in any other part of the world there would be such a scandal and clamour that governments would be falling over themselves to do something about it.¹

- Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Davos, January 2005

The so-called donors cannot continue to show us how we should manage our country. If we get a GDP [tax] collection ratio of 24 per cent, we shall not need this ignominious practice of dealing with these so-called donors.²

- Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Kampala, May 2005

Introduction

Tony Blair's unease about development in Africa reflects the debates about Africa's ambiguous relations with multilateral institutions. Against the backdrop of prosperity and cosmopolitanism elsewhere, there have always been misgivings about whether Africa can improve its economic fortunes by seizing the opportunities of globalisation – notably trade, investments and new technologies. The ambiguity stems from two stark pictures. On the one hand, figures and statistics are mobilised perennially to underscore Africa's plight: almost 50 per cent of Africans live on less than US\$1 a day; 34 per cent are malnourished; 6 000 die of Aids each day; Africa's share of global trade is only 2 per cent; growth rates have averaged 2,6 per cent over the past decade; Africa as a whole receives only slightly less than 5 per cent of overall foreign direct investment (FDI); and Africa is the only continent to have grown poorer in the past 25 years.³ The other dominant picture is one in which donors and other international actors have maintained a steady presence in Africa as providers of development assistance and humanitarian relief. According to UN estimates, Africa received US\$23,1 billion in official development assistance (ODA) in 2003, a striking 46 per cent more than three years earlier.⁴ As a recipient of foreign assistance, Africa is also a target of diverse conditionality regimes that donors have crafted to guarantee Africa's prudent management of development assistance. The

conditionality regimes are, however, under siege, as Museveni's concern above aptly illustrates.

Blair and Museveni allude to contrasting images that colour Africa's role in multilateral institutions. Although Africa has been a key player in diverse international forums dealing with economic development and security, African countries have consistently sought a meaningful voice in multilateral debates. For the most part, participation has not necessarily afforded Africa sufficient vistas for translating demands into concrete results. Part of the explanation for this puzzle revolves around how Africa has articulated its demands on the international arena. Historically, working with the rest of the Third World on fundamental questions, African countries made significant efforts in forcing change in the rules and norms that undergird international institutions. Over the years, as the Third World became increasingly differentiated, African voices began to gradually decline. More importantly, as African countries have become fragmented in the articulation of continental agenda, there has been a marked impact on their ability to prevail in international forums.

In probing the impediments to African voices in multilateral institutions, this chapter contends that while there has been significant progress on agenda-setting, witnessed in the opportunities that have opened up to Africa via the participation of key African leaders in the G8 summits and Africa's input in UN reform initiatives, overall there has been a precipitous decline in African ability to wring concessions from an increasingly recalcitrant international community. In addition, although there has been widespread invocation of partnerships as the organisational mantra for engagement between Africa and multilateral institutions, these partnerships have not diminished the persistence of power asymmetries. The outcome of this inability to influence traditional multilateral institutions has been the gradual diversification of African international economic ties toward the new giants in Asia, particularly China and India. This chapter examines three main elements: continental leadership (under the heading 'the continental cockpit'), Africa's engagement with multilateral institutions and attempts to forge new partnerships with emerging powers.

The continental cockpit

At the turn of the new century, Africa's engagement with multilateral institutions and other external actors found fresh impetus in the reform movement that germinated in the early 1990s seeking Africa's political and economic regeneration. Organised by the African Leadership Forum, the crusade for renewal was captured in the Conference for Stability, Security, and Development Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) under the leadership of Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo. With its four landmark calabashes – security, governance, development and regional integration – the CSSDCA epitomised Africa's determination to manage mass demands for change

through democratisation and development and reinvigorate the structures of regionalism for security and prosperity.⁵ Thus the CSSDCA's normative framework formed the groundwork for attempts to design new continental mechanisms to deal with problems of state collapse, civil conflict and economic deterioration. Of the core principles of the CSSDCA, governance stood out prominently. Coinciding with widespread pressures for accountability and responsiveness, governance was propounded as a means to foster development and security.⁶

The principles guiding the CSSDCA were influential in subsequent continental efforts to create new institutions for problemsolving and African engagement with the international community. The general perception in the reform movement was that only prosperity and self-confidence would place Africa's involvement with the outside world on more favourable and reciprocal grounds. Starting with the reforms in the mid-1990s, geared to inject more authority in the capacity of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), these efforts culminated in the formation of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, which sought to lend weight and meaning to the notion of African capacity to manage its own affairs.⁷ The AU Constitutive Act created a wide range of institutions that contemplated strengthening African security. Through new institutions, such as the 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU Commission, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the African Standby Force (ASF), the AU is working toward a new architecture for peace, security and stability in Africa. Equally important, the AU recommitted Africa to the objective of building an African Economic Community (AEC) using the existing structures of regional economic communities (RECs).

In addition to the AU, the momentum for renewal in Africa coalesced around the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), a plan that has attempted to develop an integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa. The objective of Nepad is to articulate a core set of principles and guidelines that national actors can voluntarily buy into in exchange for development assistance from donors.⁸ In its internal dimensions Nepad represents the domestication of the donor conditionality regimes that have marked Africa's contentious relationships with external actors since the late 1980s. Key to this undertaking is the proposal for African countries to adopt and implement principles of democracy and good political economic, and corporate governance, and the protection of human rights. Countries have also pledged to develop and implement effective poverty-eradication programmes and accelerate the pace of investment in human development goals. To guarantee adherence to these principles and practices, Nepad has created the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a mutually agreed instrument for self-policing by the participating member governments. Of Africa's 53 countries, 27 had signed up to APRM by 2007, opening their countries to evaluators assessing their performance in democracy, human rights, peace and security, economic policy and business environment.⁹

Overall, the economic and security architecture of the AU/Nepad dovetailed significantly with what former South African president Thabo Mbeki popularised as the 'African Renaissance'. As institution-building for continental security and prosperity has proceeded, the AU and Nepad have become central fulcrums for Africa's engagement with multilateral institutions. What is in doubt, however, is whether these institutions have broadened African voices in the international arena and whether global institutions see them as solid structures upon which to build new reciprocal relationships of partnership.

Africa's engagement with multilateral institutions

Africa's relations with multilateral institutions have been conceived in the lofty terms of partnership, a concept that Africans and non-Africans have invoked since the beginning of the new millennium.¹⁰ The partnership has, however, faced two challenges. First, there has been an increasing fragmentation of African voices in the international arena – an outcome of efforts by a few African leaders to appropriate Africa's agenda and play leadership roles in multilateral organisations. Rather than enhancing partnership, the selective engagement of Africa with multilateral institutions has essentially deepened the asymmetries in power relationships while sustaining the illusion of movement on fundamental grievances that Africa has articulated internationally. Secondly, unlike in the past, when African countries worked in tandem with other Third World countries in obtaining resources from global actors, Africa now stands alone in most multilateral forums. The resultant weakening of the African multilateral position has been compensated somewhat by the search for new allies that Africa has engaged multilaterally.

The template and parameters for Africa's interaction with the outside world on economic issues established through the Copenhagen process that articulated the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the invitation of the UN, world leaders meeting in Copenhagen in March 1995 dedicated themselves to addressing the structural causes and consequences of human insecurity and misery. At the centre of the movement was the conviction that 'democracy and transparent and accountable governance and administration in all sectors of society are indispensable foundations for the realisation of social and people-centred sustainable development'.¹¹ They further noted that:

Economic development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development, which is the framework for our efforts to achieve a higher quality of life for all people. Equitable social development that recognizes empowering the poor to utilize environmental resources sustainably is a necessary foundation for sustainable development. We also recognize that broad-based and sustained

economic growth in the context of sustainable development is necessary to sustain social development and social justice.¹²

Subsequently, the MDGs adopted by the UN in September 2000 provide one of the benchmarks for the mobilisation of international action about Africa's economic challenges. Summarised under the overarching aim of eradicating extreme poverty worldwide by 2015, the MDGs include a 50 per cent reduction in poverty and hunger, universal primary education, reduction of child mortality by two-thirds, cutbacks in maternal mortality by three-quarters, promotion of gender equality, and reversal of the spread of HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases.¹³

The MDGs set the framework and targets for the mobilisation of international efforts to the multi-faceted problems of development in Africa. However, the realisation of these goals has been a difficult task. Most critics have drawn attention to the unrealistic timeframes for meeting these objectives, contending, for instance, that at the current development rates, the right to education will not be attained until 2130, 115 years beyond the UN's MDG deadline, whereas the eradication of hunger and extreme poverty will not occur until 2150.¹⁴ Although the targets and timeframes need to be seen more accurately as benchmarks that the global community should strive to approximate, rather than absolute ends that are achievable any time soon, the most worrisome trend in the fulfilment of these goals has been donor reticence to galvanise and garner sufficient resources toward them.

Although one of the pillars of the MDGs is to develop a global partnership and dialogue on governance, trade, aid and investment issues by national and international state and non-state actors, the inauguration of the MDGs coincided with the progressive diminution of African voices in the international arena, a consequence of selective leadership on economic concerns. The widespread identification of Nepad with the leadership of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa started the era in which former presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, Obasanjo and Mbeki, and current presidents of Algeria and Senegal, Mohammed Bouteflika and Abdoulaye Wade, assumed disproportionate roles in defining Africa's agenda.¹⁵ Multilateral institutions, in turn, latched onto these leaders as dependable spokespersons of African aspirations. Therefore, from the July 2000 G8 meetings, in which these leaders were invited to give African perspectives, the pattern of selective invitation of African leaders to the annual G8 meetings became a dominant feature of African engagement with the globe. Similarly, the Davos committee began to routinely invite South Africa, Nigeria and a host of select African leaders to the annual conclaves in Switzerland. Proponents of these selective invitations contended that they demonstrated a growing respect and recognition of African voices in shaping the global economic agenda, but critics raised questions as to whether such limited and sporadic participation trivialised African perspectives. As the regular presence of these leaders at these meetings

hardly translated into significant aid concessions to meet the MDGs, critics claimed that much of this participation smacked of tokenism that sustained the illusion of movement on fundamental African concerns.¹⁶

The much-publicised Blair Commission of Africa of 2005 symbolised the growing trend of fragmentation of African voices and the inability of the international community to meet the resource goals purported to advance Africa's development. To lend legitimacy to the exercise, the commission incorporated leading African personalities, including Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.¹⁷ The commission recommended that aid flows to Africa be tripled to US\$50 billion a year by 2015, wealthy countries devote an additional US\$10 billion annually to fight the HIV pandemic, complete debt forgiveness be applied, an extra US\$10 billion in aid a year for vital infrastructure be added, and banks in the developed world repatriate money stolen by corrupt African leaders. The report emphasised the need for investment in infrastructure as critical for growth in Africa, and that Africa's capacity for economic development depended on sound education in science and technology. When Blair unveiled the report at the G8 summit in July 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland, he expected to convince his colleagues to embrace the recommendations and fund most of the policy objectives. Instead, however, the report met with disappointment. As Penny Jackson showed:

Once published, the question became whether the report would have a real impact on policymaking. The most obvious policymakers at whom the conclusions of the report were aimed were the eight men who lead the richest nations of the world – the G8. At its launch, Tony Blair (Chairperson of the Commission) surprised many by stating that the British government endorsed its every recommendation. But elsewhere the report was not endorsed unreservedly, leading to the fear that its recommendation would do little more than gather dust. Some G8 members thought that the diplomatic drive was an attempt by Britain to steal the moral high ground and that it gave insufficient recognition to their own increased aid to the continent. The Canadians and French had already used their G8 chairmanships to talk about African issues, and the Bush administration has taken an increased interest in Africa.¹⁸

Three years after the G8 aid commitments set at Gleneagles, UN and AU figures showed that barely 14 per cent of the promised aid had been delivered. Whereas the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany had raised their development budgets to redeem their pledges, France, Canada and Italy had not. The French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, actually reduced French spending on aid.¹⁹ At the G8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, in July 2008 the latter three countries led a behind-the-scenes effort to dilute the original Gleneagles pledge. However, the G8 reconfirmed their pledges to increase annual aid to Africa by US\$25 billion from the 2005 level by 2010. African countries attending the Hokkaido summit – Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria,

Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania – continued to plead for more aid to address the continent's escalating food and fuel prices, but the G8 took them to task for their inability to deal with the political crisis in Zimbabwe. African leaders were warned by the G8 that trade and investment on the continent could be hit unless they dealt with the 'illegitimate' Zimbabwean president.²⁰ At the end of the summit, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon accused the developed countries of backtracking on their MDG commitments:

As we stand before you today, the world faces three simultaneous crises: a food crisis, a climate crisis and a development crisis. The three crises are deeply interconnected and need to be addressed as such. The Millennium Development Goals or the MDGs are the internationally endorsed agendas to address the development emergency. But at the midpoint in our efforts to achieve the goals by 2015, progress in many countries is off track-particularly in Africa.²¹

Reflecting the general disappointment with the aid pledges of various G8 summits, Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane of Cape Town, a critic of Western aid policies, wrote:

Having put Africa as a key item on the agenda, the G8 has made a number of proclamations about how they would contribute to Africa's growth and development. If G8 leaders can continue to make public pronouncements committing themselves to targets that they are failing to reach, I strongly question the type of leadership that is content to make empty promises. G8 leaders need to start subjecting themselves to peer-review, where they account for why they are lagging behind in meeting the commitments they have made. Members of the G8 must begin to show forthright leadership by ensuring that commitments are made with a clear road map with targets and clear time frames. Just as Europe needed a strong injection of resources from the international community to recover from World War 1, so does Africa now. The international community, especially the G8, have this responsibility.²²

The new global multilateral institutions, such as the G8 and Davos, have not offered African participants any leeway in fulfilling the primary objectives of achieving the MDGs. But neither have the traditional institutions such as the Cotonou Agreements, the successor to the Lomé Convention. The accession of the Cotonou Agreements (2000 and 2005) marked a critical phase in the articulation of the parameters of the new relationships. For Europe, phasing out of the Lomé process marked the end of special relationships with Africa and the transition to more differentiated relationships. Europe ended preferential trade concessions to its African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) allies to comply with the trade strictures established by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Subsequently, as part of shedding its post-colonial responsibilities in Africa, the European Union (EU) has forced the ACP group to sign economic partnership

agreements (EPAs), as the new vehicles for engagement with Europe. At conception, the EPAs had three objectives: removal of the previous non-reciprocal clause whereby African states would furnish free access to their markets to European products; the establishment of new trading blocs among African states that would negotiate free trade areas (FTAs) with Europe; and better coordination of EU aid programmes with individual EPAs.²³

One of the outcomes of negotiations for the EPAs has been the radical realignment of African regional organisations as countries have scrambled to decide which organisation they belong to. Although Europe has claimed that EPAs will rationalise African RECs that have been characterised by overlapping memberships, incompatible goals and unwieldy mandates, the EPAs have created new layers of relationships between African countries and Europe, but without eliminating the RECs. Moreover, as Christopher Stevens has noted, although EPAs are supposed to expand intra-regional trade and trade links with Europe, they may erect new trade barriers among African countries, defeating the objective of integration: 'By increasing the stakes, EPAs may make regional liberalisation less likely. Some countries willing to remove barriers to imports from their neighbours with similar economies may be unwilling to offer the same terms to highly competitive (and possibly dumped) EU imports. Regional groups may splinter between those willing to liberalise towards the EU and the others.'²⁴

There have been creative African participations at global forums that go beyond tokenism, best illustrated by the solid African positions at the Hong Kong convention of the WTO. African expertise, organisation, and preparedness made a difference in pushing for a fair trading system. But more critically one of the lessons of the WTO discussions was that African leverage on global issues comes alongside the mobilisation of broader international constituencies around issues that are not specifically African. Although Africa sought to coordinate its agitation for free-and-fair trade with most of the Third World countries, as it had done in previous decades, the organised strength of Western countries coalescing about protectionism – particularly price supports for farmers in industrialised countries – guaranteed the failure of the WTO Doha Development Round of talks in December 2005. Despite attempts to revive the Doha talks, there has been sustained Western pressure against meeting the objectives of poor countries, a problem that has been worsened by the onset of the global recession since mid-2008.²⁵

Similarly, although Africa has been at the centre of discussions about the reforms in the UN system, there have been fewer results from these efforts. The efforts to find new rules and procedures for global governance have been part of the global agenda since the days of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN. Echoing the imperatives embraced in the MDGs, the momentum for reform of the UN reflects the search for new governance and institutional mechanisms that can furnish appropriate structures to deal with the 21st-century security challenges. To reflect the urgency of reforms, Secretary-

General Annan constituted a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that became an essential part of forging consensus on the global norms and institutions for human security.²⁶

The High-level Panel identified seven clusters of threats of concern: war between states violence; within states that occasion human rights violations and genocide; poverty; infectious diseases and environmental degradation; nuclear and biological warfare; terrorism and transnational organised crime. To meet these threats, the panel recommended strengthening and revamping existing collective institutions and the creation of new ones, such as the Peacebuilding Commission. More importantly, it endorsed the emerging norm of 'responsibility to protect' civilians. African countries were widely consulted for their input in the deliberation of the panel and subsequent initiatives to implement some of its core provisions.²⁷ Nonetheless, apart from the formation of the Peacebuilding Commission, which has benefited post-conflict reconstruction in Burundi and Sierra Leone, there have been meagre tangible results from the wide array of concerns that African countries have articulated with regard to UN reforms.

In February 2009, the World Bank Board of Governors approved the first phase of reforms to increase the influence of developing countries within the World Bank Group by granting Africa an additional seat on the board. Although the World Bank president, Robert Zoellick, described this gesture as 'central to delivering effective aid and promoting shared prosperity and development within a 21st century economic reality',²⁸ it will take a long time before this step translates into effective input for Africa at the World Bank. Similarly, while the British prime minister then Gordon Brown, invited heads of African regional institutions to attend the April 2009 G20 summit in London that would deliberate on measures to tackle the current international financial crisis, it was not clear whether such invitation would transcend the tokenism that has marked African participation at these forums.²⁹

Forging new partnerships beyond the West

Africa's quest for new relationships with countries in the Far East has been described as the yearning for 'true partnerships'.³⁰ More accurately, reaching out to China, India, Japan and Turkey is a consequence of the widespread inability of traditional multilateral and bilateral donor institutions to deliver on their annual pledges and the reluctance of Western countries to open their markets for commodities from Africa. But the eastward shift has also coincided with the new scramble for African natural resources from the emerging giants, China and India.³¹ Moreover, as Western countries have made muted criticisms of the foray of China and India into Africa, African countries have defended their freedom to broaden their ties beyond the West in an era of declining privileges from Western-dominated multilateral

institutions. Africa has also been disenchanted with Western moralisation on the Eastern expansion.

In its attempt to develop policies that would differ from its G8 partners, Japan has since 1993 initiated the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process to promote high-level policy dialogue between Tokyo and African leaders every five years. Since its formation, TICAD has evolved into a major global framework to facilitate the implementation of initiatives for promoting African development under the dual principle of African 'ownership' and international partnership. Billed as the harnessing of Asian experience to the benefit of African development, TICAD has embraced the core principles of Nepad and the MDGs while also deepening Japanese investment in Africa.³² The third TICAD summit in 2003 in Tokyo was heralded as one of the largest international conferences on African development, with 23 heads of state and 10 heads of international organisations present. At the last summit in 2008, the participants focused on three major areas: boosting economic growth, ensuring human security, including the achievement of MDGs and the consolidation of democracy, and addressing environmental challenges. The then South African president, Thabo Mbeki, stated that the G8 countries as a whole have a lot to learn from the TICAD process.³³

Japanese engagement with Africa pales in significance compared to the evolution of Sino-African relations since the late 1990s. During the 2009 visit to Senegal by Chinese President Hu Jintao, a Senegalese official urged Africa to consider China as its 'first partner given its relentless technical and financial supports and for its willingness to help Africa alleviate poverty'.³⁴ The scale of Chinese engagement with Africa has been witnessed not just in the mushrooming trade and investment, but also by high-level official exchanges. In the most publicised event, almost 43 African heads of state converged in Beijing in November 2006 for the Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) on trade and investment, during which China announced a package of aid and assistance, including US\$3 billion of preferential loans over three years and the cancellation of debt owed by African countries. China signed debt cancellation agreements with 11 African countries worth US\$1.4 billion.³⁵

Alongside the FOCAC summit, the 2nd Conference of Chinese and African entrepreneurs concluded with 14 agreements signed between 11 Chinese enterprises and African governments and firms, worth US\$1.9 billion. The agreements covered cooperation in infrastructure facilities, communications, technology and equipment, energy and resources development, finance and insurance. In a declaration at the end of the summit, China and Africa pledged to use the FOCAC as a 'new type of strategic partnership' for collective dialogue and cooperation to cope with new challenges and facilitate common development, particularly in agriculture, infrastructure, industry, fishing, information technology, public health and personnel training.³⁶ Following the FOCAC summit, President Hu visited eight African countries in

January 2007 in a trip depicted as intended to ‘deliver in person the fruits of the Beijing summit to African friends’. In yet another milestone in the rapidly expanding economic ties, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) held its annual board of governors meeting in Shanghai in March 2007. At this meeting, China unveiled the China–Africa Development Fund with a total of US\$5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. The Import and Export Bank of China also promised to inject US\$20 billion into development projects in Africa.³⁷

Sino-African relations epitomise the broadening of South–South relations in an era of significant global shifts in economic power. But the imbalances in trade, China’s voracious need to secure Africa’s supply of oil and raw materials as well as markets for Chinese goods and investment, and the association with regimes that do not respect human rights have raised concerns about the impact of these relations on the sustainability of norms and standards pursued within the rubric of Nepad.³⁸ The immense benefits that Africa has accrued from Beijing have in effect replaced the false promises from annual G8 meetings; from this perspective, China has contributed more to the realisation of the Nepad agenda than Western donors. Yet governance and human rights concerns are critical in the aid and investment calculus, especially since there has been a consensus over the years that international actors have responsibilities in ensuring that they deal with regimes that are not abusing their people. This is the dilemma that China faces in the single-minded pursuit of its economic policy toward Africa.

Less contentious but equally generous are the flourishing Indian relations with Africa. At the first India–Africa summit in New Delhi in April 2008, participants aimed to forge a strategic economic partnership between the two regions by focusing on trade, investment, energy security and peacekeeping.³⁹ Touted as an example of ‘fruitful partnership’, the summit was marked by India’s commitment to African development through the provision of preferential market access to 34 African countries and doubling of financial credits to Africa to US\$5.4 billion in the next five years. As part of the proposal to turn the 21st century into a ‘century of Asia and Africa’, the two sides adopted two documents, the Delhi Declaration and the Africa–India Framework for Cooperation to enhance the ‘true partnership to support its development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals’. While the Delhi Declaration is a political document covering issues of bilateral, regional and international interest to India and Africa, the Framework for Cooperation covers many sectors, including education, science and technology, agricultural productivity, food security, industrial growth, infrastructure and health.⁴⁰

In addition to their trade and investment discussions, African countries have embraced India, Brazil and Turkey in multilateral summits to give voice to reforms at the UN. At the New Delhi summit, for instance, India, an aspirant for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, sought the crucial support of African countries to bring about UN reforms. Thus

in the New Delhi Declaration, India and African countries agreed to 'further strengthen cooperation towards early realisation of a genuine reform of the UN and its working methods, particularly revitalising and enhancing the role of the General Assembly and reform and expansion of the Security Council'.⁴¹

Conclusion

Substantive African voices in international forums have declined precipitously because of changes in the agendas of international institutions, the persistence of global inequalities, the decay of the Third World as a unified political bloc, and more recently, the emergence of discordant African voices purporting to provide leadership on diverse international issues. What unites African and other poor countries in global debates is the perennial agitation for the attainment of the MDGs. However, while the MDGs have constituted a source of consensus-building for diverse actors and initiatives about the transformation of the global system, it is less certain whether the consensus around these objectives will remain solid, particularly because of the disagreements among countries about how to achieve them. The many studies and reports around the implementation of MDGs speak to the problems of translating these goals into diverse cultural arenas against the backdrop of competing donor priorities and approaches toward poverty alleviation.

In the past, African countries made a difference in international institutions when they could galvanise attention to issues that had broader ideological resonance across the globe. In partnership with the rest of the Third World, African countries made a remarkable contribution to international norms and practices when they embraced platforms that transcended the African horizon. When, however, the economic imperatives ushered partly by global forces began to divide Africa into economic performers and laggards, the stage was set for the fragmentation of African input into international debates. This was exacerbated by the deliberate efforts of Western actors through the new emerging institutions, such as the G8 and The World Economic Forum held at Davos, to selectively foist African leaders onto the international arena. This practice dovetailed with the previous one perfected by the Clinton Administration in the early 1990s to designate 'new African leaders' with the ostensible criteria and latitude to manage African challenges. As before, however, Western choices of African leaders often fail when those leaders either do not live up to international expectations or when pressure from the domestic arena nullifies their ability to continue to provide credible leadership on the issues that propelled them to the fore. Mbeki and Obasanjo, the beacons of the African Renaissance, have variously been discredited in their domestic domains for pushing for undemocratic norms, especially re-election platforms. For the most part, their democratic credentials were their

singular selling points to their G8 and Davos partners. Similarly, presidents Bouteflika and Wade are now presiding over the decimation of participatory institutions in Algeria and Senegal in ways that are shaming their G8 and Davos patrons.

The Nepad project, a visible symbol of Africa's novel engagement with the international community, has also recently come under siege within the continent. Long derided in radical Africanist circles as a reincarnation and emblem of imperialist designs on African resources and markets, Nepad has lost its previous autonomy and has been merged in the umbrella of the AU. The merger has not been without its critics, particularly those who perceive the AU as ill-prepared to manage economic issues at the heart of Nepad because of its inordinate focus on political and security issues. Critics, therefore, worry that Nepad's mission may be watered down in the merger.⁴² The significance of AU's appropriation of Nepad may be felt in multilateral circles that cherished its autonomy and who are wont to look with trepidation at the turn of events. This may become particularly worrisome since the ascendance of Libyan Muammar Gaddafi and Senegal's Wade at the head of the new crusade to fast-track African integration. As one of the most vociferous critics of Nepad, Gaddafi may now be in a vantage position to superintend its demise. In the place of Nepad, Gaddafi has advocated for a federal Africa that would lend greater and influential voice in global affairs.

Even though African influence has diminished over the years, Africa will remain an important player in discourses about global security and development. In the future, like the past, the major obstacle to an appreciation of Africa's contribution to global issues will be the absence of coherence, credibility, conviction and consistency in African voices. While these obstacles speak to the broader problem of organisation, they also underscore the reluctance of African actors to exude confidence in framing their contributions to pertinent international debates. However, confidence accrues from marshalling political will and technical competence and expertise in order to evolve common positions in international forums.

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CHAPTER 11

Africa and its Traditional Western Partners

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo

Introduction

It is neither superfluous nor an exaggeration to observe that post-Cold War politics can be characterised as a period of partnership. Global and regional institutions, states, major non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the specialised agencies of the UN have referred to partnership as a vital channel through which debates and policy discourse about development are expected to take place. The call for it has been massive.

Nevertheless, the partnership between Africa and Euro-Anglo-American states faces a serious crisis of legitimacy. It is an area of political contestation. The crisis is rooted in unequal power relations, development aid fatigue, political arrogance and the failures of programmes to contribute significantly to the improvement of the African condition. Alison Johnson and Matthew Martin, for instance, have formulated elements of the problematique of 'donor aid' from the 'traditional partners' as follows:

the funds are not flexible for the recipient countries to use in priority areas, and donor countries are unwilling to provide 'additional budget or balance of payments support to combat exogenous shocks';
there are too many conditions that come with the aid; and
the disbursement procedures are cumbersome and time-consuming.¹

Furthermore, there is a range of contending theoretical interpretations of the partnership itself between Africa and the industrial countries, as actors and agencies have perceived it differently. This has led to its various usages depending on who uses it, where it is being used, and what specific purposes it is serving.

This chapter is basically a general reflection on the problematic nature of Africa and its 'traditional partners'. It is a reflective essay that has both policy implications and critical intellectual propositions. This examination is based on the historicisation of how Africa as a political entity, a fabrication of artificial, but relatively sovereign nationstates with dependent economies, has become part of the world system. Whether Africa is perceived as being

integrated into the world system with some degree of political autonomy through the sovereignty principle or viewed as a fragmented entity of the world economy, in general, it is the most vulnerable region with the weakest link to the world political economy despite its potential and its people's struggles for social progress.

The main interrelated objectives in this chapter are, first, to critically examine why and how the 'traditional partnerships' were established. Secondly, to historically interrogate the quality of such partnerships in relationship to values of decolonisation, sovereignty, development, democracy and human rights, political stability, peace, self-sufficiency and self-reliance as advanced by the African institutions and people, and synthesised in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights in 1981. Thirdly, to explore how to transform existing partnership goals into positive policy and political outcomes for building a progressive Africa. It is not possible to fully discuss a historiography of partnership here. Only a few illustrations are examined to support and elucidate our points. However, the United States, partially because of its dominant role in the world and also because of its claimed controversial liberal premises in states' interactions.

The rest of the chapter is divided into four parts. The first part is the re-definition of traditional partnership. The second part focuses on the United States-Africa partnership given the global dominance of the United States. The third part looks at Nepad, which is seen as the new hope of partnership between Africa and the West. The last part forms the conclusion. A number of things, however, need to be noted from the onset. First is the fact that the emergence of new trade partnerships between Africa and Asia challenges the status of the 'traditional partners' in international cooperation. There has been an increase in trade between the two continents, rising from 14 per cent of Africa's external trade in 2000 to 27 per cent in 2008. Asian exports to Africa are growing significantly, estimated at 18 per cent per annum. Additionally, China's partnership, with its pragmatic socialism (known as 'socialism with the market economy'), is covering new schemes of investments in the construction, agricultural, health, education, mining and petroleum-related areas in Africa, which are being promoted through summits and frequent visits of the Chinese president to Africa. The UK, the US and Europe, the 'traditional African partners', and the dominant global institutions are putting tremendous pressure on African governments to clarify their relations with these new partners. They are questioning China's intention in Africa, as they are also warning that China is a neo-imperialist power.²

Secondly, it should be noted that Africa's partnership with the dominant political powers is characterised by unequal exchanges of resources, by the history of European discrimination against Africa and by the exploitation *sans merci* of African resources, both natural and human: 'African coun-

tries are vulnerable because of their dependence on primary production and resource-based sectors, and their narrow export bases.’³

Thirdly, whatever its real meanings and values are, partnership has become a central element of development competing only probably with such issues as security, sovereignty, development, human rights and democracy. This has resulted in the creation of numerous partnership arrangements with Africa. Among these are: the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), the Africa–Europe Summit’s Cairo Plan of Action, the World Bank-led Strategic Partnership with Africa, the International Monetary Fund-led Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Japan-led Tokyo Agenda for Action, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of the United States (AGOA), and the Economic Commission on Africa-led Global Compact with Africa.

Fourthly, it is important to note that there is no single Africa and there is no monolithic group of Africans. Africa speaks with many voices, with diverse histories and political claims. Furthermore, African countries are not affected uniformly by the world economic crisis, as they can be split into two major categories: first, the low-growth countries with substantial domestic and external financial disequilibria, and, secondly, the high-growth countries with ‘lower average inflation, lower budget deficits, lower external accounts deficits, and higher savings and investment rates’.⁴ However, within the African diversities, there are also commonalties and similarities that transcend the European imagination. Thus, this study requires a multidisciplinary approach to address how Africa, as a continent of 53 nation-states, has been interacting with the ‘traditional partners’ in a world that is not in its essence developmentally and environmentally friendly, but is organised on the state-centric interest of Morgenthau’s power politics.

Lastly, one has to take into account the current world economic and financial crisis, the crisis in which neo-liberal economic globalisation has failed its own inventors. World capitalism has lost its momentum, credibility and guiding dogmas, as noted by Michael Parenti who writes:

The present economic crisis, however, has convinced even some prominent free-marketers that something is gravely amiss. Truth be told, capitalism has yet to come to terms with several historical forces that cause it endless trouble: democracy, prosperity, and capitalism itself, the very entities that capitalist rulers claim to be fostering.⁵

All the above provide the broad context for the discussion below.

Towards a re-definition of ‘traditional partnership’

In the 2007/2008 Social Sciences Index⁶ partnership is defined as ‘joint ventures, stock companies, strategic alliances or public–private cooperation.’ It is

used as a process of cooperation between the public and private sectors to maximise their interests or their gains. Partnership suggests an alliance of parties bound together by a common goal. It assumes the existence of equality between the parties involved, as well as shared and equal participation. It also implies a formal or informal agreement, contract, or consensual arrangements.

It is difficult to predict with precision the policy impact of the activities or programmes of partnership between Africa and former colonial powers because the internal and external factors that guide such a relationship are most of time multifaceted, fluid, non-causal and non-linear, as they are conditioned by a combination of realist, idealist, globalist and nationalist interests and purposes of the ruling elites and their national and international associates, and their subsystems (such as political parties, ethnicities, families, clans, etc). Thus, this discussion is contextualised within the broader dynamics of a dominant system with ideologies that can provide explanations about the values or the objectives related to the behaviours of partners. In short, this author believes that partnership in Africa essentially plays political and ideological functions.

Therefore, the study of Africa and its 'traditional partners' should be essentially part of the studies of power relations and the dynamics of the international political economy, which is the interplay between international politics, actors and institutions, and economic conditions, their institutions and the availability of resources. It is within the field of international cooperation that various theories of international relations, such as realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism, environmentalism and Marxism, have located political debates concerning the place of foreign partnership in development debates. Thus, for instance, from a realist perspective, the location of the states provides the political context in which to re-conceptualise or rethink the notion of partnership. As stated elsewhere:

Assumptions in conventional international relations stipulate that all sovereign states can have, in principle, and legally, equal access to the same international resources regardless of their past political history, their location, national resources, and identities are utopian and ahistorical. However, the view that these states can exercise their rights equally in the international political economy and collective security systems if they respect existing agreements, conventions, laws, and norms of international forums and institutions is realistically and politically unfounded.⁷

The claims embodied in the above quotation can be further clarified within a brief reference to the realist theory, which can be summarised in the following three basic assumptions:

First, states are the major actors in world affairs. Second, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to project their interests

or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence they are 'sensitive to costs' and behave as unitary-rational agents. Third, international anarchy is the principal force conditioning the external preferences and actions of states. On the basis of these assumptions, realists have developed two major propositions concerning international cooperation. First, realists argue that states are preoccupied with their security and power; by consequence, states are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and they often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests. Second, realists claim that international institutions can mitigate the inhibitory effects of anarchy on the willingness of states to cooperate only marginally.⁸

Nationstates pursue their own interests in establishing partnerships as extending instruments of their powers. The concept of 'traditional partnership' implies the existence of certain types of formal structural linkages among the actors involved in a given political and social context. The concept of linkages was formalised in the work of Alfred Hirschman,⁹ which he used to refer simply to economic connections among economic industrial structures. Later Rostow¹⁰ also used it as a consolidation instrument of his fixed stages of economic growth. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) expanded the concept of partnership as the foundation for economic and development cooperation among the industrial countries that share common values.¹¹

However, at the international level, the concept of linkages as used by Hirschman has evolved from economic industrial structures to transnationalism in trade relations, foreign direct investments (FDIs), economic and development assistance and also from any other forms of the flow of capital and technology within industries to interdependency of the global economy.

Contemporary Africa entered into the world system, the world of the Westphalian states and global capitalism, from a history of transatlantic enslavement, colonial and neo-colonial designs and politics. Africa's partnerships have been influenced by the dialectical relationship of struggles for independence and aspirations for social progress by Africans, and the struggles for maintenance of status quo. However, the entry of a multitude of actors in the international political and economic arena since the 1950s, the decline of the powers of many industrial countries, including the end of the US hegemony, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the acceleration of the formulation and implementation of liberal economic reforms and their social consequences, the rise of the demands for democracy locally and internationally, the increasing influence of external institutions and their agencies and so forth challenge the validity of the well-known premise of 'the more things change, the more they remain the same'.

General presumptions behind any partnership activities imply a relationship that is based on some kind of consensus, commitment and mutual benefit scheme articulated on the win-win theory. However, these assumptions are

challenged in light of historical and empirical facts related to the dynamics of the states. For instance, from a realist perspective, the notion of partnership is founded on the dominance of national interests. Thus, partnership is an extension of the elite's sovereignty and not necessarily the people's sovereignty associated with democratic republicanism.

From a liberal perspective, partnership is the outcome of individual freedoms or realisation of self-seeking whose actions are 'rationally' calculated across a wide range of possible actions. As Thomas Lairson and David Skidmore indicated:

Perhaps liberals' most important contribution is the idea that all participants in a system of free markets and trade are beneficiaries. But the arguments of liberals sometimes extend beyond respecting, to worshipping markets; their views almost never understand the role of politics and power in creating and conditioning markets ... More recently a new version of liberalism, neo-liberalism, has built on older versions of political economy. Neo-liberals make broad claims about the impact of markets, international interdependence, and the possibilities for cooperation among nations.¹²

Liberals tend to perceive cooperation among states as being essentially ontological to liberty. Interdependence is the instrument of free trade and the force for advancing international cooperation. However, international cooperation is not possible without bargaining. Bargaining is part of human *logos* and reason of being. Actors recognise that they all depend on one another in order to advance their collective causes.

At the state level, partnership is a formal political network of social, economic, technical, educational, environmental and political relationships among the states, which reflects freedom, rationality and individualism. It is a legal and political contract in which members, in principle, ought to benefit mutually and collectively.

From a Marxist perspective, partnerships between Africa and industrial countries can be projected on the contradictions embodied in the international capitalist system and dialectical change that is related to those contradictions. In any kind of formal relationship or the state's relationship, each class acts to maximise the economic wellbeing of such a class as a whole.¹³ 'An important benefit of the radical perspective is that it presses us to see beyond national economies or even a world economy created by transactions among the states. Instead, they want us to see a global capitalist economy framed by the logic of capitalist exchange.'¹⁴ It is in the struggle for social justice that the working class organises the productive forces to change unequal relations imposed on them by those who own and control the means of production.

There are also various types of partnerships among nationstates, such as security, strategic, preferred, economic and cooperative. Other types include partnerships between the capital and labour, and between the private and

public sectors. These relationships are established in most sectors of the international political economy and international relations.

Finally, partnerships can be articulated on the basis of bilateralism and multilateralism. They can also be arranged around specific items, sectors, and regional, historical or ideological bases. Interdependency, technological communication, and liberal globalisation advocates claim to promote the practicum of partnership that would be less restrictive, more open and fluid and more flexible.

Thus, within a simple synthesis of the three schools of thought, partnership may be characterised by dependency and exploitation, interdependency, free market, mutuality, power and ideological struggle. It is within these ideological spectrums that one should examine the historical and political basis of African partnerships. It is within this context that Zartman states:

During the past three decades, a debate arose over whether Euro-African relations were a case of decolonization or dependency – whether European presence and influence were gradually declining, leaving Africa increasingly on its own as part of a multilateralized interdependent world, or were merely ebbing to a more subtle plateau of dominance, leaving Africa locked and co-opted in a class-world ... Both were plausible scenarios in the 1970s, although the first was dynamic and more optimistic and the second static and pessimistic.¹⁵

The assumptions behind the above implied scenarios are still relevant in post-Cold War African politics. The claim in this chapter is that the main values that Africa has been defining as vital for its social progress, despite various resistances, include: decolonisation, sovereignty, development, democracy and human rights, political stability, peace, self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Thus, partnership has to be examined in relationship to the degree to which these values have been promoted and sustained in Africa.

The contemporary history of partnerships between African states and Anglo-American-European nationstates and their multinational or transnational corporations has been not a history of equal relations or equal means for advancing these relations. Slavery, then colonisation, created traditions and practices through which economic and political relations are organised. For instance, until the end of 2007, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was trying to phase out preferential aid and trade pacts that Europe had maintained for some 30 years with its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP).¹⁶ The majority of the ACP countries are in Africa.

The history of the relationship between Africa and foreign powers is a history of the establishment of capitalism. As George Kieh stated:

Generally, there is an asymmetrical and unequal relationship between Africa and the industrially developed world, and the change process on the periphery of the world capitalist system is not an endogenous path through stages, but a

process subject to powerful exogenous factors. In other words, in terms of the power calculus in the global political economy, Africa is in a subordinate role. This status was assigned to Africa by the core states, from the latter's formal incorporation into the global capitalist system.¹⁷

Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, and Belgium, as the major former colonial powers in Africa, have instrumentalised their history of colonisation into the new demands for partnerships. What kind of partnership they have created or projected in Africa within the win-win theory of international cooperation?

France, for instance, prides itself on being the home of a particularly rich culture and having a vocation to spread it overseas. As Guy Martin stated:

Stimulated by the universalist ideals of the revolution of 1789 – notably, *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* – in the nineteenth century this vocation became a mission *civilisatrice*, intimately linked with French imperialist expansion and rule in Africa. Even after decolonization, France retained its claim to be centre of a transnational culture and pursued a policy of cultural *rayonnement*.¹⁸

French cooperation with Francophone African countries is complex and even intriguing. Although the project of creating Francophonie was initiated by Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, since its creation in March 1970, it has become an instrument of French cultural arrogance, military cooperation, and the weakest, but important, factor-economic domination. It is through this community, which supports French leadership and the French language as instruments of partnership, that many dimensions of the French-African partnership have been actualised.

From the referendum of September 1958 in which Charles de Gaulle persuaded the former French colonies to vote yes and stay under French protection to the death of Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993, the 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA Franc (the currency used in all the former French colonies) in 1994 and the death of Jacques Foccart (a special advisor on African affairs of two French administrations) in May 1997, the French cooperation with Africa was generally characterised with consistency, sameness and continuity (*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*). Only the people of Guinea Conakry under Ahmed Sékou Touré voted no to the referendum. Foccart was a 'shadowy figure from the intelligence services', who oversaw all the arrangements of the maintenance of the status quo in the essence of Africa's French relations during Charles de Gaulle and George Pompidou's administrations. He was removed from his special position by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974.¹⁹

For several decades, French traditional policy toward its former French colonies in military, diplomatic, cultural and economic areas was characterised as *domaine réservé*. These African countries were referred to as 'pre-

carré or *'chasse gardée'*. For many African leaders, even those who shifted briefly to the left under civilian or military regimes, France remained the most accessible and most willing external partner.²⁰ However, behind the *façade* of amicability, the relationship was reflected by excessive dependency, militaristic interventions, labour and economic exploitation—factors that have led some people to conclude that ‘there is no France without Africa’. As Chazan et al stated:

Despite speculation in the earlier 1990s about a declining French role in Africa and despite occasional disagreements among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Cooperation, and the presidential bureau over specific policies, France retained a broad political consensus that its role as a major power in world affairs is rooted in Africa.²¹

However, despite the apparent consistency of the French cooperation to support the African elites and their development programmes, aid fatigue is not an indicator of sustainability, as Gorm Rye Olsen stated:

The biggest European donor, France, reduced its total ODA/GNP aid commitment from 0,63% in 1992 to 0,39% in 1999. Within this shrinking budget, the share of French ODA going to Africa was reduced from 51,8% in 1988/89 to 34,2% in 1999 so that Africa received less and less aid from France during the 1990s. Measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates, aid fell from US\$2 825 million 1988/89 to \$1 467 million in 1999.²²

Britain, through the involvement of NGOs in development projects, a free trade approach, and the Commonwealth as an agency of consolidating its cultural and historical relationship with Africa, expanded to even the non-former British colonies. As Gorm Rye Olsen stated:

Non-governmental organizations were among the strongest proponents of British aid to Africa. It is estimated that more than 300 NGOs are involved in development-related activities. They make up an important part of what is often described as the ‘development lobby’, consisting of development consultants, academics, NGOs and a few newspapers. There is some disagreement among observers of British aid policy as to the degree of influence of this lobby and the NGOs.²³

This kind of partnership is described as the ‘best aid’ in policy and procedural terms,²⁴ as it appears to be less state-centric, but it is not easy to identify its ideological characteristics in comparison to the case of the French model.

The relationship between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, since the 1960s has been characterised by the struggles between nationalism, neo-colonialism and globalism. Belgium wanted to

maintain its permanency and 'immortality' in the Congo, but the nationalist forces have challenged that assumption. The United States, on the other hand with a globalist camouflage, was also trying to weaken the Belgian influences in the DRC.

The casualties of this international struggle led to the establishment of the most personalised, corrupt and brutal patron–client regime in the world, under Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. However, despite political zigzags and some episodes of rocky roads under the so-called 'politics of authenticity', Belgium firmly served as a leading investor in many sectors and a guarantor or spokesperson of the Congo in the Paris Club, the European Bureau of the World Bank and the European Economic Community until the rise of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in May 1997. For instance, Belgium was among the first donors among the industrial countries to ease the debt problems of Zaire by forgiving repayment of Bf1 billion in direct loans and rescheduling payment terms for further Bf15 billion in loans as of 1988.²⁵ The relationship has been characterised by a patron–client nexus and patrimonial arrogance.

Germany lost its colonies as a result of its defeat in World War I. Its former colonies were given, under the protectorate policy of the League of Nations, to Belgium, Britain, France and South Africa, which *de facto* transformed them into colonial powers. However, post-World War II Germany was still, until recently, the second donor in Africa after France. It developed and kept solid private businesses in some sectors such as beverage industries, timber, general retailing, construction, etc. Germany too has suffered from aid fatigue, which is a general trend within the industrial countries' development cooperation with Africa. As Gorm Rye Olsen indicated:

The second biggest European aid donor, Germany, reduced its ODA/GNP from 0,38% in 1992 to 0,26% in 1999, while at the same time the share of German aid going to Africa was reduced slightly from 31,3% in 1988/89 to 27,7% in 1999. This resulted in a reduction of net disbursements from Germany to Africa from US\$1 306 million in 1988/89 to US\$939 million in 1999, measured in 1998 prices and exchange.²⁶

Since the end of World War II, despite the creation of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – and then the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1993 – to regulate trade rules, the level of protectionism has made the practicability of the Adam Smith 'invisible hand' principle absurd and fallacious, as all industrial countries have been engaged in competition guided by neo-mercantilism. As Thomas Lairson and David Skidmore said:

As mercantilists, they can lay claim to the longest intellectual tradition because this perspective emphasizes the importance of nations and power in thinking about economic issues. The mercantilist perspective is an aspect of nationalism, and mercantilists often call on governments to manipulate

markets so as to capture special benefits for the nations. The criterion used to judging policies and actions is the need to preserve and enhance the power and prosperity of the nation.²⁷

All liberal (Western Europe), social (Nordic states), and ad hoc (United States) welfare states were built on some aspects of protectionism defined as another form of nationalism. Opoku Agyeman, for instance, has emphasised 'Africa's vulnerable link' in the global capitalist system as he stated:

By contrast, the concept of linkage vulnerability implies not only that the actors caught in it tend to be severely handicapped in their interactions with the world system, but that they tend to have little or no say in configuring underlying linkages ... By any yardstick, Black Africa's relationship to the global system provides the quintessential depiction of linkage vulnerability. This dubious distinction derives from the deadly combination of external (extra-Africa) and internal (intra-African) factors.²⁸

As emphasised in Nepal: 'African countries are vulnerable because of their dependence on primary production and resources sectors, and their narrow export bases.'²⁹

Post-colonial regimes in Africa, despite people's demands for social progress, accepted the 'paternalistic partnership or controlled partnership' between Africa and its former colonial powers. This type of partnership came under the discourse of the 'modernisation school' theory, with its claimed universal assumptions about human conditions and human capital. With technical assistance and other types of foreign aid, Africa was expected to take off in respect to the fixed prerequisites of the uni-linear Euro-Anglo-American model of development.

But, partnership did not provide assurance for stability and consistency: As Gorm Rye Olsen wrote:

In 1996, the European Commission described its special aid relationship with Africa, the Lomé Convention, as 'one of the most important facets of the European Union's external activities'. This particular EU aid program nonetheless underwent considerable changes during the 1990s. First and most manifest, the real value of the financial envelope of the Convention was cut successively both in 1994/95 during the so-called mid-term review, and again in 1999 and early 2000, during the negotiations on the continuation of Lomé after the year 2000. Thus, there was a fall in the real value of EU aid to sub-Saharan Africa from US\$2 044 million in 1988/89 to US\$1 593 million in 1999, measured in 1998 prices and exchange rates. The reduction in Lomé aid becomes even more striking when it is recalled that on 1 January 1995 three affluent countries, Sweden, Austria and Finland, joined the European Union.³⁰

This decline has to be contextualised within the contradictions and broader history of imperialism, militarism and multinational corporations, which consolidated 'traditional partnership'. With this in mind one can thus discuss Africa's partnership with the United States.

Partnership between the United States and Africa

It is through US foreign and economic policies that one can identify elements of the US partnership with Africa. The nature of the relationship between the United States and Africa had been shaped by several centuries of transatlantic slavery (which started officially in 1607 and ended in 1886), the development of capitalism and the rise of the United States as a superpower. Despite cosmetic changes, the essence of the relationship more or less reflects a consistent and conservative historic profile. This section is a reflection on the patterns of the relationship in a generalised descriptive perspective.

Before the two World Wars, the American attitude toward Africa was generally marked by relative lack of interest. No substantial interests or investments similar to those in Asia and South America were made in Africa. The latter was mainly considered an 'appendage of Europe', and African problems were associated with European colonial concerns. Michael Clough stated:

One of the major reasons affecting American policy toward Africa is the fact that United States has few tangible interests there. The existence of significant widely recognized economic and strategic interests, such as those the United States has in Western Europe, Japan, and the Persian Gulf states, directs and to a certain extent stabilizes policy ... Where interests are limited or ambiguous, as in the case of Africa, policy is much more sensitive to the changing moods of US domestic constituencies and the reaction of midlevel officials in Washington.³¹

The pluralistic American ruling elite in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century were facing many internal socio-economic problems due to colonialism, slavery and North–South racial and industrial conflicts. The political economy was still relatively weak in technology and management and it was the age of isolationism. Later neo-isolationism was based on the delusion that America could best provide for its economic and security interest by 'resisting entangling alliances and collective action'.³² This delusion was also entertained by the fear of other cultures and encouraged by the ethnocentric class of Anglo-Saxons, which contradicts what America is all about it—a multicultural society.

Before 1945, Africa was known in the United States mainly by the presence of black people in America and Europeans in Africa. The United States participated in the transatlantic slave trade as well as the 1884–1885 Berlin

Conference, where the European ruling elite divided up Africa for their own economic interests. In the early 20th century, American pronouncements on freedom and anti-colonialism were somewhat 'romantic'. The United States did not support any nationalist movements in Africa. For instance, the reactionary Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was fully supported by the United States with the mission to stop the establishment of a socialist government in Angola. The Cold War politics played a determining role in this support.

The contemporary economic history of Africa and the United States was not characterised by strong linkages. However, the expansion of the world economy and development of its productive forces, decolonisation movements, and the expansion of communist ideology brought the United States into action in Africa. In fact, beginning in 1945, the United States gradually and aggressively started to become one of the most prominent investors in the African and world economies:

In 1900, American private foreign investments were small by comparison to Europe's US\$500 m, to Britain's US\$12 000 m and France's US\$600 m. By 1930, the growth rate of America's foreign investments had already surpassed those of Britain, standing at US\$17 000 m against the latter's US\$19 000 m and way ahead of France's US\$7 000 m. America's foreign investment position was supreme by 1949, US\$19 000 m against Britain's US\$12 000 m, the level at which it had opened the century. France's level had sunk to US\$2 000 m. The First World War eliminated Germany's foreign investments and reduced those of France; the Second World War eliminated Germany, Italy and Japan. The American government, moreover, had added US\$14 000 m to its monopolists' US\$19 000 m of private foreign investments.³³

After 1945, a new international economic and political order was promoted, through which goods, services and capital moved with relative speed and freedom. Although the world system had already reached or altered all essential African social relations, direct American investments, trade and economic assistance were still minimal. Political elites in the United States began to project American power to almost all the areas outside of the communist bloc. This was driven by economics and strategy. After the emergence of the communist Soviet Union and China, the world became divided into blocs, making the search for alliances a necessity.

From John F Kennedy to Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, George Bush, Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack H Obama, American presidents have recognised that Africa has become a reality in the world political scene. However, the level of knowledge about Africa, its cultures and peoples in the United States is still meagre. Africa is still perceived very much as 'the dark continent', despite being part of the essence of the American fabric. American relations with Africa started to take a visibly different shape when John F

Kennedy became the chairperson of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As Arthur Schlesinger said:

In this capacity, he [Kennedy] warned his colleagues about the new energy bursting forth in the Dark Continent, call it nationalism, call it anti-colonialism, call it what you will, he said in 1959, Africa is going through revolution. The word is out and spreading like wildfire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects – that it is no longer necessary to remain forever in bondage. He advocated sympathy with independence movements, programs of economic and education assistance, and as a goal of American policy, a strong Africa.³⁴

The United States Senate in 1959 concluded that the dynamic character of the African people's drive towards self-government indicated that the colonial system in Africa, as elsewhere, was fast running its course and that US policy should be guided by the expectation of the primacy of Africans in all of sub-Saharan Africa. The movement of the United States toward Africa was not based on any form of real decolonisation efforts, rather on disintegrating the legacy of the colonial empires and replacing it with a new legacy of 'modern capitalism'.

In the early 1960s, for example, the United States was involved in joint actions in politico-military blocs to support its new client regimes. It supported actions of local political parties in the 1980s through trans-national financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. As Donald Snow and Eugene Brown stated: 'In Africa, for example, a disproportionate share of US assistance has gone to five states which at various times figured prominently in Washington's strategic objectives. Those five countries, the DRC, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and Somalia, actually posted lower economic growth rates than the rest of Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s.'³⁵ The majority of African countries, after earning their political independence, had tremendous economic problems. This situation permitted some significant American economic inroads. Classical relations between the United States and Africa ensured the supply of certain minerals and raw materials and their profitability to the United States. The patterns of relations are those of buyer and seller (patron-client).

African countries produce materials critical to the functioning of the US economy. Minerals are imported annually to feed US industries. For instance, in 1968, the United States imported 56 per cent of its manganese, 27 per cent of its cobalt, 39 per cent of its chromate, 79 per cent of its iron ore, 29 per cent of its non-ferrous metals, such as antimony, and 9 per cent of its copper from Africa. In the same year, it imported many other commodities: 15 per cent of its rubber, about 10 per cent of its fibre and 9 per cent of its oil.³⁶ However, during the Cold War era, US imports from and exports to Africa were generally minimal, as Michael Clough has stated:

Exports to Africa have never accounted for a substantial proportion of total US exports. US imports from Africa rose substantially in the 1970s, but this was almost entirely the result of a rise in oil prices and an increase in the volume of oil exported from Africa. By the late 1980s, US imports from Africa had returned to their previously low levels. The impact of economic considerations on American policy toward the continent as whole is further limited because US economic interests there are concentrated in a very few countries.³⁷

During the Cold War era, American policy on Africa had three main components:

- a priority for global political alliances;
- opposition to any political radicalism, especially communism or socialism; and
- expansion of capitalist commodities and the market ideology.

Until recently, the general US relationship with Africa was concentrated on seven main areas: liberalisation of trade, encouraging increased use of private capital and multinational corporations, stimulation of US private investment to meet the needs of client states, increasing support for the US non-profit sector in international fields, increased security of the world's food system, improvement of the effectiveness of development assistance from the United States, and opposition to revolutions of any kind, especially communist revolutions.

Two of the crucial questions here are: what have been the assumptions behind American policy toward Africa? And what kind of partnership does it cover? The premises of US foreign policy and aid are summarised in the work of Robert A Packenham, who suggested four principles: change and development are easy; all good things go together; radicalism and revolution are bad; and distributing power is more important than accumulating power.³⁸ American relations, including economic ones, have been guided by these premises and supported by an economic approach that is reflected in these terms:

There is a positive correlation between the level of economic development and the chances of democracy. More precisely, the higher the per capita GNP the more frequent the competitive political systems and polyarchies. Often, in the approach, economic development was seen as the main requisite or cause of political democracy.³⁹

The United States believed that economic assistance would lead to 'political stability'. Stability meant the capacity of the state apparatuses to function without any major disruption. It does not include the quality of performance and distributive mechanisms. Within such a premise, for instance, Ronald

Reagan believed in a policy of 'constructive engagement', reasoning that pulling foreign investments out of South Africa could hurt more black workers. It was assumed that if blacks became well off, they would either be assimilated into the dominant system or they would search for more peaceful means of solving their political conflicts.

Since 1994, the average overall cuts to the foreign operations budget have been 10 to 11 per cent. Africa has been the most vulnerable among the foreign recipients. In 1992, there were 39 USAID offices in Africa. The number dropped to 26 in mid-1997 and was expected to fall to 15 in a couple of years. Aid from the USAID's perspective was defined as highly concessional, less flexible and less predictable.⁴⁰

Bill Clinton focused on his programme: 'Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa', which was aimed at providing a new attention to the continent. It was articulated on 'trade and not aid' motto. In 1997, he introduced the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to Congress, which, despite criticisms, was eventually passed into law in May 2000.⁴¹ However, Lewis confirmed that while this was a continuation of existing agreements between Africa and the United States, it enveloped a new political tune.

At the end of Cold War, the United States continued to develop and protect its strategic interest in rare metals. The United States encouraged its transnational corporations to have access to Africa's natural resources, especially petroleum and minerals. After-11 September 2001, American foreign policy was based on self-defence and national security premises. This produced a legitimate claim for the United States to consolidate its unilateral militaristic perspective, as a country that was massively attacked, with the agenda of continuing to police the world in the name of the search for US enemies. The United States emphasised its new assumed responsibility to contain 'terror', defend 'the civilised world', and stop any 'wrongdoing' wherever it is being perpetrated by employing excessive military force. This new interpretation of imperialism eliminates political dialogue as a tool for establishing partnership. Thus, the United States military actions have two main purposes: to protect its geo-strategic interests and to menace or threaten any forces that may challenge the actualisation of these interests, and, second, to fight extreme Islamism. The United States sees its major interest in Africa as fighting transnational threats, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, narco-trafficking and humanitarian disasters.⁴²

The United States has maintained military alliances in countries such as those which are part of pan-Sahel Initiative, namely Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. It has bilateral defence accords in countries such as Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Egypt, Morocco, and several countries in southern Africa, to cite only a few. The United States has a military presence in more than 130 countries.

The United States' partnership philosophy with Africa is conditioned by the agenda of militarism, the deterministic policy to have access to strategic

resources, and the acceleration of neo-liberal integration of Africa into the world economy. With US\$5 billion of the United States' foreign aid to Africa each year starting from 2009, which President Obama promised to raise to US\$10 billion in 2012, will the United States move away from paternalism in its partnership with Africa?

National security interest, the market and mild interest in democracy are the important factors that tend to shape the nature of the United States' partnership with Africa. Within the existing economic crisis, it is doubtful that any positive change in budget allocations is to be made, especially in aid to Africa, unless the Obama administration succeeds to balance the US budget first, and secondly, the US economy starts to grow. It is within the historical development of Africa's partnership with the West that one has to posit the Nepad partnership.

New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) as a type of new partnership between Africa and 'traditional partners'

What is Nepad? How does it define the African problems? What kinds of solutions has it been proposing? In this section, the main objective is to identify and discuss the dominant characteristics of Nepad as a new typology of the traditional partnership between Africa and industrial countries.

The project is known as an 'African initiative' that should deal with development in its comprehensiveness. This final Nepad document,⁴³ with its 207 points (articles), written within a combination of progressive language, classical modernisation theory, and the reminiscence of the African nationalist agenda of the 1960s, has described Africa's conditions in very specific terms and how it intends to deal with these objective conditions. Its content is well elaborated as a general framework to project a new Africa into the world system.

It is necessary to locate my arguments about Nepad in the following related broad propositions. There are those who argue that Africa greatly suffers from the lack of integration into the world economy. The peculiarities of Africa's societies and economies, their cultures and dysfunctional states, bad governance and inefficient administrative practices have contributed to the acceleration of underdevelopment in Africa. Additionally, Africa, as a peripheral market and a provider of the raw materials, has suffered from purposeful marginalisation. Thus, based on neo-liberal policies of the SAPs, Nepad should promote the full integration of the African economies into the world economy through the global institutions. There are also those who argue that one of the problems contributing to much suffering and chagrin of African societies and their economies is the fact that they have been too anarchically integrated into the world capitalist economy. Thus, their economies have been

too open to the vagaries of capitalism. The solution is to have Nepad as a comprehensive approach to all the African maladies.

The embodiment of that optimism is that Africa can also produce its own capitalism as part of global capitalism. Nepad's objectives are summarised as broad and multi-dimensional. As articulated in the Abuja document:

The objective of the New Partnership for Africa's Development is to consolidate democracy and sound economic management on the continent. Through the program, African leaders are making a commitment to the African people and the world to work together in rebuilding the continent. It is a pledge to promote peace and stability, democracy, sound economic management and people-centered development and to hold each other accountable in terms of the agreements outlined in the program.⁴⁴

Nepad calls for the reversal of the abnormal situation in which Africa finds itself by changing the relationship between Africa and the industrialised countries. Africans are calling neither for further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions. It calls for a new partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations. Nepad seeks to build on and celebrate the achievements of the past, as well as reflect on the lessons learned through painful experience, so as to establish a partnership that is both credible and capable of implementation.

Through Nepad, African markets and economies ought to be integrated in a more systematic and deliberate manner into the global capitalist economy through the regional functional mechanisms. What concept of development is embodied in Nepad? Dani Nabudere describes Nepad as follows:

The New Partnership for Africa – Nepad, is a product of the continuing search by African people and their leaders to create pan-African structures that can lead to the social and economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly 'globalizing world'. On the one hand, Nepad is an instrument of contestation between Africans seeking self-determination in their development efforts and those forces that seek the continuation of the exploitation of the continent's resources upon which the accumulation of their wealth depends. The linkage that brings about this contestation is a historical one, but it is also a concrete one, in that it manifests itself in the continuing structures of imperialist domination of the African people through the post-colonial state, which continues to be a neo-colonial instrument of domination ... On the other hand, because of that lack of determination to trust the African people, it seeks the support of the enemy to assist in envisioning and implementing what they believe are people's aspirations.⁴⁵

As we stated elsewhere:

Since its adoption in October 2001, the optimists *vis-à-vis* the role and the mission of Nepad have argued that one of the reasons why the level of poverty has increased in Africa is the lack of a vibrant private sector, foreign investment gaps, lack of new partnerships between the private and public sectors, and lack of Africa's active participation in the world economy. There is a need to articulate a new role for the NGOs and the private sector. The UN, the G8, and the advocates of Nepad strongly believe that this new initiative will be able to significantly reduce the level of poverty by half by 2015.⁴⁶

Nepad has rightly defined the basic problems of Africa as they relate to the political history of colonisation, bad leadership, unequal North–South relationships and the fact that Africa has not yet been well and fully integrated into the global economy, to cite only a few. According to the supportive arguments advanced by Nepad proponents, Africa's segmented local, subregional and continental markets and the systems of production have not been sufficiently liberalised with conviction, and in respect to the dogma of privatisation. The very complicated premise on which Nepad articulates its positive disposition is that, if well-conceived and managed schemes of privatisation and liberalisation between the North and the South are established, they would engender policies and create conditions that could eradicate poverty and produce and support development. Development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance.

Nepad has identified poverty as the number-one enemy in Africa. In the introduction of Nepad's paper, poverty is defined in the following terms:

In Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, live on less than US\$1 per day. The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1 000, and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58 per cent of the population has access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 per cent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1 000 people in Africa, compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high-income countries.⁴⁷

Given the above conditions, the most important question is: who is in charge of raising financial capital for Nepad? African heads of state have made it clear that they are looking at the same political actors, especially the members of the G8 and the same financial institutions to intervene within the prescribed new guidelines. In the Abuja document (2001), it is stated that, 'The changed conditions in Africa have already been recognised by governments across the world. The UN Millennium Goals Declaration's adoption in September 2000 confirmed the global community's readiness to support Africa's efforts to address the continent's underdevelopment and marginalisation.'⁴⁸

It is clear that Nepad has described with eloquence the consequences of colonisation, global exploitation, the symptoms of underdevelopment and

internal administrative problems in Africa. However, how far would the so-called 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith and the so-called 'natural law of the market' go to promote Nepad's agenda? How are the advocates of Nepad and partners' rhetoric supporting gender equality in all social sectors, without which development will not take place in Africa?

Conclusion

The nature of Africa's relations with its 'traditional partners' and their policy implications are determined by the history of Euro-Anglo-American political domination, the subordination of Africa in the international political economy and the structural weaknesses of African states. Within the dynamics of the world political economy and its 'free market' dogmas, the need for Africa to develop and seek partnership with other actors is imperative. However, it is necessary to pay attention to the question of what kind of partnership would effectively and productively engage Africa to advance the values articulated in this chapter. Partnership has to be examined in relation to the dynamics of the global capitalist system and state-centric interests.

Despite the establishment of many market-based economic reform programmes, which have been supported by the 'traditional partners' in the post-colonial and post-Cold War eras, the total share of Africa's trade in the world reached, but has not exceeded the 7 per cent reached in 2007. Marginalisation of African economies is reflected in the lack of economic diversification in the export sector of their raw materials. With many countries that are still gaining about 60 to 80 per cent of their national revenues from one single item (a mono-economy), such as petroleum, copper, diamonds, etc, partnership has not significantly altered the position of Africa in the world. The fluctuation of the prices of the African main commodities is also accelerating the process of the marginalisation.

Furthermore, the implementation of such programmes as the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative, the debt-relief programme, supported by the World Bank, the IMF, the Paris Club and the G7, led to some reduction of the total amount of foreign debts in some 22 African countries. For instance, it should be recognised that the 1996 sub-Saharan Africa's external debt of US\$226 billion in 1996, and US\$205,7 billion in 1999 fell to US\$144 billion in 2007.⁴⁹ As of 2008, the debt service is still estimated at approximately US\$14 billion annually. Yet, the total number of people who are still living under extremely poor conditions—one or two dollars a day—has not declined. It is still more than one-third of the African population.

Partnership is a political activity driven by a republic-mandated agenda. It ought to be developed in the name of the people. Thus, African states must clearly define their national interests within the framework of a comprehensive plan of development and priorities. Confused nationstates without such

plans will not be able to compete effectively within the dynamics of realism of the state and liberalism of the world economy.

Existing partnerships have not considerably advanced African hopes for a better future. The central issue that African partnership with the industrial countries and their agencies has not been able to address yet is the question of how to eradicate poverty. Elections with poverty are not likely to lead to political stability and social participation.

Aid fatigue, the militarisation of Africa, the crisis of world capitalism, the lack of a functioning, politically defined, collective vision in Africa, and weak democracies are preventing Africa from taking advantage of interdependence and bargain effectively with industrial countries to gain access to world resources. Africans are not able yet to compete in the international political economy on their terms, as they are still considered junior partners.

Africa has been divided between partnership based on the imperatives of colonial history and partnership based on humanism and the universalism of the UN. Nepad is positioned as an African initiative, but its fundraisers are still the former colonial powers, plus Canada and Japan.

Within the framework of global liberalisation, Nepad does not seem to have any mechanisms to deal effectively with the issues of poverty. Efficiency and growth seem to be more important than solving poverty and inequality issues through distributive policies. However, for a project that claims to be developmentalist, its missing link with the peasants, farmers and the masses in general is an affront to Africans and is self-defeating. What really is *new* with this project?

The foundation of new partnership has to be the principle of economic democracy and political guidelines of a strong and caring state. To advance a project of social Africa, which should be the main goal of Nepad, there is a need to engage civil society and the whole of society so that they can define what kind of democracy is likely to be appropriate for them. The state must intervene in the national economies; and the state must buy the banks; and the state must create jobs and own companies.

The violent explosion of the recent economic crisis calls for a critical review of the nature of Africa and 'traditional partnerships' within the falling of 'cowboy-like' capitalism. This current system is dominated by a handful of oligopolies that control all the basic decision-making of the world economy. As Samir Amin has stated:

These oligopolies are not solely financial; such as the banks or the insurance companies, but include enterprises involved in industrial production, services, transports and the like. The way they are financialized is their chief characteristic. We must understand here that the main source of economical decision has been transferred from the production of surplus value in production towards the redistribution of profits between the oligopolies.⁵⁰

Partnership with oligopolies will not provide any political space for Africa to voice itself, organise its demands and society and its economies according to the principle of each according to his or her needs. 'The real partnership must be based upon not only common values and mutual respects but grow out of interdependent economic relationships.'⁵¹ The partnership should be guided by a vision of social Africa, genuine democratic pluralism, sustainable development schemes and the principle of self-reliance. It is through the revival of the Lagos Plan of Action, realist Pan-Africanism and genuine democratic alliances that this vision can be explored.

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CHAPTER 12

Africa and the Emerging Global South

Osita Agbu

Introduction

To discuss Africa alongside the Emerging Global South (EGS) implies that Africa is part of the South, but not part of the EGS. So, what is the EGS? And are all African countries excluded from the category of EGS? These questions are just food for thought as we delve into the subject of this chapter. Of course, there is really no way we can examine the subject without bearing in mind the context within which Africa is to be discussed vis-à-vis the EGS. It is a context characterised by the increasing enmeshment of nations, peoples and spaces, and in which distance ceases to be a critical factor in interactions among nations and peoples. Buoyed up by trade, communications technology and supersonic jetliners, it demands more intelligence, cooperation, communication and movement than hitherto was required. However, it is important to note that in recent times, globalisation has been increasingly enabled by the need to access inputs into production and profitably dispose of products of industrialisation. In other words, obtaining access to raw materials and accessing markets for sale of products. It is, therefore, within the context of nations cooperating to access raw materials and markets that Africa becomes significant in any discourse of international trade and global political economy. Further, the dynamics of globalisation have catalysed varied efforts at regional and even continental integration around the world. In Africa, apart from the subregional groupings, there are now talks about the African Union (AU) government all in a bid to respond effectively and proactively to the vicissitudes of globalisation.

Generally, the 'South' idea could be traced to the 7th Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975, in which a resolution concerning 'Development and International Cooperation' was adopted. Initiated by the semi-periphery group of countries, section V¹ of this resolution dealt specifically with cooperation among developing countries. In 1978, the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) was established by the General Assembly. Its primary mandate was to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation in the UN system and globally.¹ According to this unit, the term, 'South-South cooperation' refers to

the broad framework for collaboration among countries in the global South, thus defined by their political, economic, social, environmental and technical domains. South–South cooperation takes place at bilateral, subregional and inter-regional bases. In addition, ‘triangular cooperation’, refers to cooperation arrangements in which northern development partners and international organisations support South–South cooperation.²

The ‘South’ concept has both geographical and economic connotations. It is important to observe that whilst most, if not all, countries of the southern hemisphere are poor, underdeveloped or developing as the case may be, those in the northern hemisphere, Europe, America and Japan are mostly developed. It is also instructive that even among the countries of the South, there are significant differences in levels of development. However, this notwithstanding, the desire of the countries of the southern hemisphere to present a common front in addressing global inequality and inequities has contributed to the emergence of South–South cooperation.

To now talk of an emerging global South implies a special category of southern countries. Indeed, it is plausible to create and espouse this category based on certain assumptions. The first is that this category comprises countries that have risen from the gridlock of globalisation to become key players in global economics and politics, such as Brazil, India, China and, perhaps, South Africa and some other Asian economies. The second assumption is that these countries have transcended the backwardness, poverty and constraints characteristic of global South countries. And the final assumption is that because of this development, they are now in a position to assist or cooperate with other South countries towards enhancing their lot. But, to what extent are these assumptions true? What stops an emerging global South country from behaving like one of the developed countries of the North?

Today, South–South relations have deepened and widened to include monetary, financial, investment and trade arrangements, especially in the context of efforts made towards regional and subregional integration in the South. Civil society and the private sector have also emerged as significant players in South–South initiatives.³ The G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have served as mechanisms for consultation and coordination of South relations. At the Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held in Zambia in 2001, we saw the emergence of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), which, it can be argued, has the potential to enhance South–South relations, especially among African countries. Today, groupings of countries that feed into the South–South Cooperation framework include the 14-member Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 20-member Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the G15, and member countries of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

In Africa, it is debatable if South Africa can be categorised as a member of the EGS. Though it has the potential, the prevalence of unemployment

and other social malaises combine to raise doubts about its qualification as a country capable of displacing the hegemonic North countries from Africa. On the other hand, another country worth considering in Africa as a possible candidate for the EGS is Nigeria. This gigantic multi-ethnic country with rich human and material resources and significant political influence cannot at this time be categorised as a member of this club for some obvious reasons. These include the risk factors of political uncertainty, poor infrastructure, corruption and non-transparent leadership. This notwithstanding, Nigeria cannot be completely ruled out as a key South country in the power relations game between the North and South and between the Africa and the BRIC States (Brazil, Russia, India and China). More interesting are the possible economic and political permutations in relations between South Africa and Nigeria.

The African condition

Short of labelling the African condition irredeemable, it is important for us to see the condition as grievous and critical. A crisis of development in which political, economic and social issues have all converged at a particular conjecture in Africa's development, and are exacerbated by the constraints inherent in the global political and economic order. An order characterised by the rule of capital and motivated by profit over and above basic human welfare. An order characterised by the transcendence of industrial monopolies and the subservience of those parts of the world that remain 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'. Of course, those benefiting from the present global architecture find it extremely difficult to accommodate those who wish to belong to the club. It is therefore becoming increasingly essential, though practically difficult, to canvass for the unity of the South countries in matters of trade and finance as the final option to improve their participation in the global market place. But do the South countries have a choice? Yes, they do have a choice, it is a hard choice that involves, first, looking inwards and, secondly, mobilising to confront entrenched hegemonic forces in the protection of national, regional and group interests.

The African condition is presently one that either requires a reinvention, engaging in fundamental reforms or designing new and more innovative ways to address its numerous economic, social and political problems. With respect to engaging in practical South–South relations, in particular with the EGS, Africa needs to urgently address issues of poverty, infrastructure development, trade, science and technology, productive capacity, human resource development and research exchanges. To some extent, what many African countries have been doing is to try and engage the global economy and its leaders through individual efforts, especially in the business area. Therefore, the manner in which Africa has been trying to reform in conformity with the demands of the global economic system is not necessarily the right way to go.

For Africa and countries of the South, it has been attractive to engage in and facilitate South–South relations as a strategy for addressing the lack of capacity in global trade. In more recent times, this attraction has shifted to deepening relations with the BRIC states. This on its own looks innocent enough and in tandem with the desire for increased South–South relations and trade; however, the worry is that again, the new relations with the BRIC states are being consummated and fanned under a global capitalist architecture that had for years proved incapable of bringing South countries out of poverty and ensuring their development. Those countries that are today called BRICs and emerging markets did not achieve this status by wholly embracing the free-market mantra; instead, they deployed a combination of state-led economic strategy and private enterprise. The point, therefore, is that the new interest of the BRIC states in Africa need, to be engaged not from the standpoint of the present dictates of the global economic rules and regulations, but from a new architecture in which the concerns of the developing world are addressed. After all, what is trade and investment all about, or even development, if the basic interests and welfare needs of the ordinary peoples of Africa and the developing world are not met?

Nonetheless, in 2006, Africa ranked third, behind only Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the OECD countries in market-economy-induced reforms. Two-thirds of African countries made at least one reform, while Tanzania and Ghana ranked among the top ten reformers.⁴ Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria and Zambia also began to simplify business regulations with a view to attracting investors.

Though the development indicators for Africa in 2007 did not look good, this does not, however, mean that nothing has been achieved in terms of development in the continent. Increasingly, countries such as South Africa (categorised as an EGS), Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria have all been showing signs of growth within the context of reforms. In 2007, Nigeria posted a gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 6,1 per cent, Egypt 4,1 per cent, Algeria 5,3 per cent and South Africa 5,1 per cent.⁵ Overall, Africa's development indicators, though generally poor, show signs of potential if properly managed. Of its total population of 743,7 million, it had a GDP of US\$629,793 million in 2007 with 21,3 per cent of GDP as gross domestic savings, while receiving aid through partnerships to the tune of US\$30,686 million. This is in addition to being a beneficiary of debt relief committed under the highly indebted poor countries' (HIPC) initiative to the tune of US\$52,315 million.⁶

As a whole, we see African economies bedevilled by a myriad of problems that show certain symptoms, including large fiscal deficits; high rates of inflation; decreases in the volumes of exports, partly as a result of unfavourable trade terms; the disjointed nature of some sectors of the economies without forward and backward linkages; rapidly declining investments, especially from foreign investors in the productive sectors of the economy,

thereby creating armies of the unemployed across the continent; the domination of critical sectors of the economies by multinational corporations; a very weak industrial base that suffers from underuse of capacity, overwhelming external debts and excruciating debt-servicing; and the drainage of capital through financial outflows expended on external debts.⁷ Amidst these worrying dimensions of Africa's economic problems, which have subsisted into the 21st century, the concern is that the scenario has implications for governance and political stability in various countries. The question that then arises is whether Africa can integrate itself into the global system in the 21st century or is doomed to remain in the backwaters of civilisation.⁸ Africa could, indeed, integrate but based largely on its own terms. It does not necessarily have to conform to the dictates of the hegemonic global economic forces.

However, it is human nature not to remain negative, but to work and hope that invariably one's condition will improve for the better. Africa has the potential in terms of natural and human resources to engage proactively with the global political economy and improve its standing and the standard of living of the peoples in the continent. From this perspective, apart from urgently improving on the acquisition of relevant technology for industrial growth, the pooling together of efforts through integration of countries with common economic interests may be a way of not only relating to the North, but also the BRIC states.

The Emerging Global South

The EGS constitutes those countries of the South that have supposedly risen from the push and pull of globalisation to becoming key players in the global economy capable of overtaking the traditional players like the United States, Japan, Canada and Germany. The EGS is characterised by emerging markets. They include countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC states), and more recently, South Africa has been added (BRICS). It was economists from the London office of investment banking group, Goldman Sachs, in a research report that coined BRIC to signify the rising economic powers of these countries. According to the group, the first four countries mentioned have made such progress in the last two decades that they now threaten the global hegemony of current world powers.⁹ With an average annual growth rate close to 9,8 per cent since 1980, China definitely meets all the criteria for an emerging market economy. It is followed by India and Brazil, with average annual growth rates of respectively 5,8 and 2,4 per cent.¹⁰ Growth rates have been spectacular in China for almost three decades. In India, since the reform of 1991, the economy has achieved a growth rate of GDP that on the average is double average of the 30 years between 1950 and 1980. South Africa and Brazil have not had an equally rapid acceleration, but they are already middle-income countries and are noticed for their potential. Brazil's size

makes it a likely candidate as an 'engine' and South Africa's leading position in Africa makes it a country worthy of inclusion in this club.¹¹ By size, the quartet accounts for about 41 per cent of the world's population and occupies nearly one-third of the earth's land mass, with diverse natural resources. Much of the growth in China and India has been attributed to labour productivity increases due to the transfer of labour from low- to high-productivity sectors. Both countries have taken advantage of the climate for freer trade, reformed their trade regimes and taken advantage of market access to developed countries, even taking over the manufacture and exports of 'mature' industrial products.

Indeed, their progress raises serious questions about the present economic configurations in the world, in addition to the existing geo-politics. It is not as if they do not have their own share of developmental problems – there is a myriad of socio-political issues confronting them. However, their progress transcends the labour market and natural resources to include value-added productivity through the use of technological tools that are more accessible and cheaper. The four countries on aggregate have amassed an external reserve in excess of US\$1 trillion. China alone controls about US\$700 billion of that.¹² As expected, the economic growth of these countries will encourage them to seek better recognition and representation in international forums such as the UN and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Increasingly, poor countries are now partnering with the BRIC nations to challenge injustices inherent in global governance institutions such as the WTO, arguing, for example, against agricultural subsidies in the European Union (EU) and the United States.

The greatest motive for cooperation between the developing countries and BRICS is the commonality of interests between both sides. However, it is difficult to say what will happen when this commonality of interests ceases to exist. For now, the global financial crisis and the efforts being made to address this, including that by the G20 group of countries act as justification for increased relations and cooperation between Africa and the emerging market economies. Speaking at the Brookings Institute in Washington, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Dominique Strauss-Kahn, stated that after first hitting the industrial countries and then emerging markets, what may be regarded as a third wave of global financial crisis is now hitting the world's poorest and most vulnerable countries.¹³ In fact, the IMF, which itself is part of the problem, predicted that growth in sub-Saharan Africa including Nigeria will fall to about 3 per cent in 2009, resulting in a growing dependence on aid. According to the World Bank president, Robert Zoellick, to address the global financial crisis, a global solution is necessary. It is one that facilitates investment in safety nets, infrastructure and small- and medium-scale enterprises to create jobs and to avoid social and political unrest. Strauss-Kahn further explains that for the poor countries the problem is not their exposure to the toxic assets at the heart of the crisis, of which they have little. Rather it is their increased integration into

the global economy. And that while this integration brought many benefits when other countries were growing rapidly, it now means that low-income countries are exposed to the global economic slowdown.¹⁴

Arising from the G20 meeting¹⁵ held in London in April 2009, the leaders of the world's largest economies concurred on the debilitating impact of the current global economic crisis, especially on the developing countries, and agreed to fight the crisis with measures worth US\$1 trillion.¹⁶ While the world's low-income countries will receive extra aid to the tune of US\$50 billion,¹⁷ ironically, the IMF became one of the biggest beneficiaries of the G20 summit, as its resources to help troubled economies will be increased to the tune of US\$500 billion. According to the BBC, the final figures agreed upon were an extra US\$500 billion for the IMF, US\$250 billion for trade finance, US\$250 billion in new special drawing rights (SDRs), US\$100 billion for the multilateral development banks to lend to poor countries, and US\$6 billion in lending for the poorest countries by the IMF.¹⁸ According to the then prime minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, China contributed US\$40 billion to the IMF, the EU US\$100 billion and Japan US\$100 billion. The total US\$1 trillion package to the IMF is in addition to the US\$5 trillion of fiscal stimulus already announced by the G20 countries.

Generally, many of the short-term recommendations at the G20 Summit called for the fixing and stabilisation of financial institutions, in particular the disposal of 'toxic' or 'impaired assets' on banks' balance sheets; restoring inter-bank lending; improving financial regulation and transparency; harmonizing such regulation across member countries; and clamping down on tax havens. Also, it was observed that almost all institutions present called on the G20 to consider the plight of the developing countries, in particular the poorest African countries; and to retain their commitment to official development assistance (ODA) and resist further trade protectionism.¹⁹ These submissions to some extent influenced the subsequent agreement.

A close look at the membership of the G20 shows that the BRIC states of Brazil, Russia, India, China and in fact, South Africa, are included. But to what extent do the interests of these states represent Africa's voice at the summit? Though, the AU was invited, this does not seem to explain why only South Africa made it into this club. So while decisions were being made on how to salvage the global economy ravaged by the consumerism of the West, no black African nation was there during the decision-making process. Therefore, it is still germane to note that as far as far-reaching changes are not introduced in global economic and financial governance, the BRICS cannot, and will not be able, to represent the interests of developing countries at global forums.

Naturally, common interests exist between the BRICS states and leading economies of the North; at the same time, we should be equally curious and indeed, futuristic in our assessment of the character of economic relations between the *nouveau riche* BRICS states, Africa and other developing parts of

the world. Will the new relationship be based on mutual benefits or will it re-enact the age-long centre-periphery relations between the rich and the poor? According to the 'mutual benefits' approach, the notion is that it is natural that countries with a common past and with common problems of development will be able to assist each other. The thinking is that South-South relations are to be preferred among developing countries, as they involve less exploitation and dependence and more mutual benefits for the partners.²⁰

Related to this view in an interesting way is the issue of reverse globalisation that is said to have unleashed a new scramble in Africa, with the BRIC states as key participants. And one is inclined to wonder whether the new interest in Africa is for good or for bad. Already, fears are being expressed about China's aggressive moves in Africa and the fact that it may eventually result in the re-colonisation of the continent. Reverse globalisation took Western companies by surprise and involved companies from the developing countries targeting firms from industrialised nations for acquisition, a phenomenon not common under globalisation. At the forefront are companies from Brazil, Russia, India and China. Some of these include Tata of India in the field of technology and industry, Gazprom of Russia in the gas sector, Indian-owned Arcelor-Mittal in the steel sector (though based in the Netherlands), Companhia Vale do Rio Doce of Brazil in mining and Lenovo of China in computers.²¹

The reasons why emerging economies are able to engage in reverse globalisation include their higher investments in research and development (R&D), human capital development and the size factor. Dlamini noted that Brazil spends 1,04 per cent, Russia 1,28 per cent, India 0,84 per cent, China 1,31 per cent and South Africa 0,74 per cent of their GDP on R&D. This enables them not only to outperform Western competitors but also to target them for acquisition.²² In 2005 alone, the BRICS countries invested more than US\$63,8 million on information technology (IT) development.²³ Their commitment to technology is expected to account for well over 6% of total technology spending globally.

With respect to the scramble for Africa's minerals, the feeling is that there is the need for Africa to cooperate and create a structure or an organisation that will manage and regulate the exploitation of its abundant mineral resources to protect it from the West and the BRIC countries. This should involve the control of key minerals in a way that ensures lasting benefits for present and future generations of Africans. At the regional experts workshop on mining organised by the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja in April 2009, the Regional Head of Oxfam America, Ibrahima Aidara, noted that revenues from extractive industries in West Africa formed a significant part of the national revenues.²⁴ The meeting was aimed at formulating and adopting a common mining policy with the necessary legal framework for the region. In line with article 31.1 of the ECOWAS treaty signed in Cotonou in 1993, which states that: 'Member states shall harmonize and coordinate their policies and programs in the field of natural resources', the need to

harmonise mining policies in order to develop and strengthen capacities of national mining authorities in dealing with transnational corporations was underscored.

The need for cooperation in the management and exploitation of natural resources cannot be overemphasised. Botswana's history demonstrates that a developing country can, with proper management of its natural resources become prosperous, in spite of the assumptions of the 'resource curse' theory. With an abundance of natural resources, particularly diamonds, Botswana's economy has grown roughly 9 per cent annually since 1996, and citizens share substantially from gains made from the diamond mines. In Ghana, more than US\$5 billion was devoted to new mining projects over the past two decades, during which the national poverty rate fell by 12 per cent. Of Ghana's 138 districts, its four mining districts have the lowest poverty levels in the country outside the capital city of Accra.²⁵ Therefore, the scramble for Africa's minerals by the BRIC states should be addressed with all seriousness, as lack of vigilance may result in the loss of substantial revenues, impacting on the sustainability of the environment.

Africa and the BRIC states

The EGS powers are now in the vanguard of those rushing to gain new influence in Africa. Among them, the BRIC countries are in the forefront. Russian and Brazilian presidents and the Indian prime minister were all in Africa in 2006. The main reason behind the new romance with Africa, however, appears to be related to spectacular economic growth elsewhere. Russia, Iran, Qatar and Kuwait are looking for new places where petrodollars can be exchanged for power, prestige and property; with Moscow backing several enterprises that are seeking out mining concessions in Africa, peddling nuclear technology or exploring gas partnerships, as in Algeria and Nigeria.²⁶ Again, the new investors in Africa may not necessarily consider it a peripheral market in this age as Western countries tended to view it, but a lucrative partnership. Africa is seen as posing fewer political obstructions in terms of operations, since it is not expected to uphold the same standards as elsewhere.

For the BRICS, India, Brazil and South Africa have for many years been nurturing national mining rents, and now appear ready to exploit Africa's rich mineral deposits through the opportunities provided by globalisation. On the other hand, China's interest in Africa is not new. Between 1995 and 2006, China's share in Africa's trade volume surged from 0.9 to 10 per cent.²⁷ It has been securing vast supplies of raw materials such as oil, mineral ores, timber and cotton, while at the same time successfully turning Africa into a vital consumer market for its own manufactured goods. Globalisation has a lot to do with this, as it is increasingly forcing the West to outsource its resource-intensive activities to Asia, which, in turn, is empowering the

large oil and gas producers, thereby creating new centres of economic power. Unfortunately, Africa is the new playground for the economic Cold War now brewing between the United States and China. Not to be outdone, other countries such as Russia, India and Brazil are turning their African missions into diplomatic nerve centres. They are increasingly becoming part and parcel of the deliberation parties of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU.

For Africa, the relationship and activities of the BRIC states have not been all rosy. There remain tremendous gaps to fill in terms of Africa benefiting maximally from the relationship. And this is only possible with increased cooperation among African countries. Again, this is where the various ongoing regional integration efforts in the continent are important. For instance, in 2005, only 19 African countries were able to declare positive trade balances with the BRIC states, and all of them were important exporters of oil and mineral ores. Angola, Nigeria and Sudan between them represented more than 35 per cent of China and India's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Those African countries that tried to diversify their range of exports by giving priority to their own industrial needs found themselves facing extremely tough competition from Asian factories. Therefore, the modest investments that China has made in secondary sectors in Africa do not make up for the loss of thousands of African jobs in the textile, leather and furniture industries.²⁸

This is not to say, however, that the investments from the BRIC countries do not have a positive element. It is a case of ensuring a fair balance between what is taken out and what is gained. Therefore, the fear is real that the BRIC states may behave exactly as the transnational corporations from the West did in respect of the exploitation of Africa's resources – in an inequitable manner, and that even encouraging more South–South relations may eventually replicate the same features embodied in North–South relations. Nonetheless, what may be different is that South countries, and even the BRICS, have now witnessed the result of the old style of relationship, and the attendant global economic and financial crisis this caused. This is a denominator that may force the BRICS to be more open and reasonable in the present relations with Africa. But is this possible under the present global economy? While the answer cannot be an absolute no or yes, it implies that fundamental changes are required in the global economic order to achieve equity and harmonious global economic relations that are people-centred.

There is, however, little doubt that the appetite for African raw materials is generating new opportunities in many African countries. Whether it be minerals or ores, oil, crocodile leather or tuna, Africa's exports are increasing and revenues rising. The BRIC states have between them invested more than US\$3,5 billion in Africa in the past five years. African countries are today playing themselves off over the numerous bidders for contracts and concessions. The Belinga iron mine in Gabon, which for decades remained fallow,

suddenly came to life with China and Brazil rushing in with bids surpassing US\$2,5 billion.²⁹ In Mozambique, it was a case of Indian investors accessing the coal mines in return for investment in public infrastructure. In Nigeria, it was another case of Indian investors being invited to partake in the lucrative oil and gas sector in exchange for their investment in the development of the country's poor infrastructure. The Indian firm ONGC had promised to spend US\$6 billion to build a 180 000 barrel-per-day refinery, a 2 000 MW power plant and a railway line connecting eastern and western Nigeria in exchange for awards to explore two oil blocks in 2006. This arrangement is yet to commence.³⁰ This is beginning to look like a common trend in Africa and would not have been possible under the trade relations that existed with Western traditional partners prior to this period.

India is becoming increasingly visible in Africa in terms of its investments in the continent and engagement with various countries in Africa. One only has to observe that in the recent past, India has succeeded in improving its productive capacities, especially with respect to manufacturing, and could be strategic to Africa's desire of growing a competitive economy in the next 20 years or so. Its growth of indigenous industrial technological capacity and experience in the nurturing of small-and-medium scale enterprises (SMEs) are relevant to Africa's industrialisation if mutual engagement is sustained.

It is common knowledge that India's diaspora brims with creativity, innovations and ingenuity. Economically, India has a dynamic and highly competitive private sector that accounts for more than 75 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP). It also has a large consumer market, as large as the EU.³¹ A few years after India's opening up to the world, its economy has grown by nearly 7 per cent per annum – a rate that by the year 2020 may transform India into the world's fourth-largest economy after China, the United States and Japan. A series of bold economic reforms aimed at deregulating the economy and stimulating foreign investment moved India firmly into the front ranks of the rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, from an economic perspective, there is much that can be gained from Africa's relations with India. Note for example, in Nigeria, Indian companies have made substantial investments in textiles, plastics, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, paints, banking, manufacturing, packaging, brewing and consumer goods. The diversity of the investments is what makes India's participation in the Nigerian economy unique. Indeed, these companies employ a large number of Nigerians. Presently, India's major imports from Nigeria by principal commodities include cashew nuts, wood and wood products, raw hides and skins, natural rubber and non-ferrous metals. On the other hand, the principal exports to Nigeria comprise spices, guergum meal, miscellaneous processed items, drugs/pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, dyes, inorganic/organic and agro-chemicals, paints/enamels, rubber products, metal manufactures, machinery and instruments, transport equipment, primary and semi-finished iron and steel and cotton yarn/fabrics.³² There is little doubt therefore about

the vibrancy of economic relations between both countries. This is interesting considering the desire of enhancing South–South relations. However, caution must be maintained to avoid the replication of relations characteristic of the North–South divide.

Nigeria's trade with some of the BRIC states as at 2005 in respect of exports and imports indicates that whereas trade with Brazil was characterised by significant exports to the tune of ₦561,8 billion and imports of ₦25,7 billion in 2005; trade with China was rather alarming, as it showed exports of about ₦46,7 billion, but imports of ₦244,7 billion. This figure is likely to have increased substantially with China's aggressive push in the country, which has seen it investing in the oil and gas sector, railways and Space Technology partnership among others. Trade with South Africa is also significant and has been increasing since 2005. In 2005, though Nigeria exported ₦110,7 billion worth of goods, it only imported about ₦32,1 billion worth of goods with trade balance in its favour.³³ This is expected to change soon as South African companies have moved in aggressively into the Nigerian economy with interests in telecommunications and solid minerals as well as banking. Hence, the telecoms giant MTN is one of the key operators in Nigeria. There is also Multichoice in broadcasting, in addition to Stanbic Merchant in the banking sector, and Engen SA in the petroleum sector. Ideally, it is imperative for South countries, whether labelled BRICS or not, to consciously promote trade amongst each other on terms more favourable than are obtainable with the North. They should do this with the benefit of hindsight of the generally inhumane problems caused by the extreme implementation of a market-driven neo-liberal ideology.

India for example, has shown continuous growth in its exports to the developing countries. Its exports to developing countries rose from 38 per cent in 1995 to 52 per cent in 2005. However, India has not yet been fully successful in synthesising trade relations with Africa, which now accounts for only 6 per cent of India's global exports. India's trade with the world (by region), shows that, whereas it exported US\$23 120,38 million and US\$18 374,64 million worth of goods respectively to the EU countries and North America between 2005 and 2006, it exported only US\$1 898,99 million worth of goods to West Africa within the period.³⁴ This was only 1,84 per cent of India's trade with the world. Imports within the same period, were only US\$1 161,99 million for West Africa as a whole. Of course, there is no gainsaying that it is imperative for Africa to improve its export profile vis-à-vis India and other BRIC states. Being able to do this requires some understanding and partnership, which will be greatly assisted by the integration of comparative advantages.

In summary, what we should note is that the BRIC states are in Africa to maximise profit and to benefit from their various investments. However, they can also act as engines of growth if African countries facilitate activities with the BRICS in the sectors that they require most for their own development. It is possible to do this with the BRICS because they are also looking over their shoulders at what the United States and the EU countries are doing. Africa

could indeed be said to be the ‘beautiful bride’, at this period, but this bride must be smart and willing enough to exploit her beauty to her advantage before she becomes old, and as in many cases, irrelevant and discarded. In addition, there is a strong suspicion that Africa’s engagement with the emerging global South is largely elite-driven by its political leadership and compradors. To this extent, further engagement should be bottom-up, people-friendly and based on agreements that ensure that there is equity and social justice, especially for those individuals and communities directly affected by the activities of BRICS states.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by noting that the EGS will not be able to sustain the tempo of its activities or achieve its economic or even political goals without including Africa’s interests in its calculations. Engaging with Africa is imperative under new rules and regimes for growth to be sustainable. Africa on its own, due to its collective weakness, must pull resources together, human and material, as a negotiating and trading bloc to ensure that it benefits from the present opportunities provided by globalisation. Although, globalisation cannot easily be wished away, it could be engaged with in such a way that it is more humane and people-oriented. The BRICS have been able to emerge thus far because they seized the opportunities provided by globalisation. Though this is not the ideal, it could act as a stopgap until a new regime of trade relations is established through opposition and struggles against the hegemonic forces and institutions sustaining globalisation. It is not late for Africa to either engage with the BRICS as a group or individually as complementary partners under mutually agreed trading rules and regulations that are mindful of the excesses of capitalism, which have given rise to serious opposition against the WTO, the World Bank and even the G8.

For Africa, the challenges of product duplication, market dominance of the North, capacity, dependency, debt burden, poverty, technological lag and political will must be addressed collectively for Africa to be able to reposition itself at this juncture of fundamental global economic changes. Maximum benefits in relations between Africa and the emerging economies will be attained when both partners are able to exploit complementarities. The emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, and indeed, South Africa, could as a matter of necessity, if not solidarity, help Africa build-up trade and technological capacity. The trade capacity-building will help divert the attention of African countries away from Europe and the United States, while technological capacity will enable them to improve their infrastructure base, thereby enabling a conducive environment for business which the emerging economies will also benefit from. For Africa and the BRIC states, it should not be a case of exploitation or being smarter than the other party, but enabling both sides to attain their objectives

through mutual cooperation for mutual benefits in trade and in politics. However, this should not necessarily be consummated under the same global economic architecture that has been generally detrimental to Africa. In this era, continents are being connected to one another in a manner that has never been seen before threatening the living standards of substantial sections of the world's population in Africa and Asia, especially of less skilled workers. It is therefore important even as capital and labour move, particularly towards Africa, that we do not create a situation which at the end threatens world peace and security, as done by the West. The situation today is depicted by the mass movement of people from the developing countries towards the wealthy portions of the globe, sometimes involving suicidal migrations. The BRIC states should not repeat the same mistake. The lessons of the global economic crisis and the efforts made to salvage the present system should serve as a warning to the BRIC states that a new global architecture that has people at its centre is imperative for harmony in the world. Of what use is trade or capitalism if it does not improve the living standards of the people?

As observed by Dlamini, countries and continents that have successfully positioned themselves as winners in an increasingly globalising world have done so by identifying and leveraging their strengths while simultaneously acknowledging and effectively addressing their shortcomings.³⁵ Again, as observed by Peterside, every country has a chance of 'leapfrogging their way out of backwardness', but this is only possible when a country is able to build up production capacities, arising from the manner of organisation and management of education, and of science and technology.³⁶ This better ensures that there is no replication of the dependency inherent in North-South relations as Africa embraces the EGS.

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CHAPTER 13

Women and Gender

Beyond the Rituals of Empowerment

Irene Omolola Adadevoh

Introduction

In rethinking women's experiences and the rituals of their empowerment, feminist and gender researchers have continued to focus on gender relations and the consequences of segregationist policies despite highly sought after gender balance and good governance across the world. Using thematically the Nigerian-African example as its framework, this chapter looks at the rituals of empowerment in the biological, social and cognitive spheres, and interprets the marginality of women in their social roles. It shows how the gender nuances of social institutions largely receive their deified force from the misconceptions of rituals inspired biologically, psychologically and religiously in symbolic representations. The machineries for entrenching the rituals of empowerment subsist therefore in the domestication of women. Their containment via social control, violence and the wider structures of sexist power has cast serious doubt on the view that we now truly live in a properly gendered world. We therefore look towards feminist empowerment theory, fully understood by critical re-examination of illogical gendered structures of inequality and differences by sex segregation and disempowerment by institutional default. This re-examination is necessitated by the desperate need to negotiate the objectification of women and to understand the national and global tragedy of negative diversity. In this context, the research attempts to identify the indispensable institutions, strategies and conditions for the affirmation of justice and equity for women and argues that this transformation must emerge from a systemic deconstruction of gender incongruity far beyond the rituals of empowerment.

The state of gender and women in empowerment

The main thematic issue of this chapter, 'Women and Gender: Beyond the Rituals of Empowerment', refers to the principles of gender development, such as the rational guarantee of security, rights and justice. These principles need to be re-examined because with respect to social empowerment of women

they have been problematic. This is because men mostly define all forms of such social empowerment and such definitions tend to be seen predominantly in collective masculine terms, as opposed to the more viable personal and other models of developmental connotation. This is why there is a need to go beyond ritualistic or mere formalistic labelling in the establishment of justice and empowerment, which are construed as avoidance of conflicts as well as the preservation of fundamental human rights of the people, irrespective of their sex or gender in the society.¹ To this effect, just and secured gender empowerment refers to the assurances to ascertain one's rights and dues within the society. Hence empowerment is backed by the absence of any sexually induced inhibition, violence or segregation in the family, economic, educational, political and other spheres of social life.

In socially contextualising the state of gender and women in development, Mitchell argued that four structures of society needed to be institutionally transformed in order for women to be empowered and developed. These structures include those that affect the production, reproduction, sexuality, and the socialisation of children within diverse social networks.² All of these structures are embodied in the culture, family, economic, educational, political and religious spectrum of human-social relations. The study specifically focuses on cultural, religious, family, political, economic and educational problems, and centres on the productive and reproductive valuation of women as elicited by patriarchal mythical traditions.

Redefining culture and its basis of sexual polarisation

The imperative to redefine culture stems from the point of view that culture refers to a unique system in which gender development and empowerment can be either synthesised or desynthesised, because it is a social system that coordinates or segregates gender relations. Ordinarily, culture is a system abstracted from human and social action, in other words, it is a system of values, meanings or significances and symbols of human existence.³ This implies that culture gives us the perspective necessary to rethink the meaning of the terms of human and social relations; it also gives us the impetus to leap over inconsistencies in such relations and clear new paths for rational and sustainable development.⁴ While it is true that gender development and its subsequent empowerment strategy are a collective responsibility, the assumption of masculine dominance as imposed on culture by patriarchal superiority makes many social traditions elicit immoral values that will impair progress and hamper forward-looking development prospects. If patriarchal culture is used to refer to the totality of many African nations' basic orientation to life, then it follows from this idea that by universally applying a male-oriented culture, there is a hasty tendency to forget its sectarian posture, especially as presenting only a part of the spectrum of cultural possibilities.⁵

As such, patriarchal cultural and sexual polarisation imposes a closed resource of social meanings that is in every degree run by, for, and in the interest of male society. If the male part of a culture is deemed all-inclusive, and consequently, the framework upon which the interest of females can be drawn on, how does such culture mediate the contingencies or unforeseen events accruing from advocacy for equal gender development? In addition, how does patriarchy account for the feminine symbolisation of creativity and life? For instance, if the concept of femininity is used creatively to embody the generic notion of 'man' and 'woman', then the feminine drive is the basic and ultimate force behind all human behaviour. Therefore, shouldn't the goal of human creation be targeted towards the productive and reproductive realisation of the synthesis of 'being' or 'existence'?⁶

Diverse women's organisations have reiterated the fact that if patriarchy cannot synthesise human and social existence then it follows that the masculinisation of culture has its own inherent dangers. First, it can lead to the vulgarisation and erosion of core values of human existence and creativity, such as freedom, choice and responsibility. Secondly, it can lead to the promotion of discord, conflict and violence between the sexes. Thirdly, it also blocks the normal processes of heterogeneity in cultural growth. These reasons all pose danger to gender development and women's empowerment, because a culture with a patriarchal homogeneous sexist orientation negates the important aesthetic, creative and integrative functions of human development.⁷

In order to make culture sustainable, patriarchal traditions are not to be received without question; instead, the way of thinking and belief of its custodians should prove itself useful to each new person, group and generation. This means that the dynamism of culture should give each new person, community and generation reasons for ratifying or annulling what its ancestors incorrectly found to be valid. Therefore, to enhance gender development within cultural and indigenous traditions, there should be a philosophy of social and cultural change. This cognitive way of life must be founded on a basic trust in the ability of people, no matter how oppressed or impoverished, to improve their lives, to understand the social forces that affect them, and eventually to harness these forces towards attaining genuine human and societal development.

Reaching beyond the dogma of religion in empowerment

The need to reach beyond the dogma of religion in empowerment is necessitated by the unbridled fact that it constitutes a foundational import of patriarchy. In most religious dogmas the female person is defined in two ways: either as the exemplary woman, when she is associated with motherhood and purity, or as the disagreeable woman, when she is associated with insurgent sexuality and evil. Whiting observes such categorical demonisation of women

in many early American proverbial phrases such as 'no mischief but had a priest or a woman at the bottom', 'women are necessary evils', 'woman is woe to man' and 'women have no souls'.⁸

Hunter explains that images of woman as impediments to salvation in most religious myths, as well as the negative depiction of femininity, emanate directly from the patriarchal version of the Creation story. In this story, the woman was the last creation, who is held responsible for man's mortality and his fall from eternal dominion and grace.⁹ Taking the cue from this account, the religious problem of patriarchal culture is often rooted in its transcendental appeal to reason or by its appeal to authority and reality beyond what we perceive empirically in human natural life. In this religious guise, patriarchy simply universalises masculine expressions, feelings, attitudes, aspirations, beliefs and value systems as emanating from the supernatural and an eternal entity. Given this, Reinke states that patriarchy uses religious transcendental projection out of unequal gender order to establish masculine superiority and feminine inferiority in the relationship between man and woman.¹⁰ In this context, patriarchy projects itself by using religious principles of belief, faith subjectivism and emotionality. In which case, religion as contextualised in patriarchy is a theory of dependence of human beings on divine beings. Patriarchy itself is based on Kant's model of religion, which indicates that religion is the recognition of all our duties as divine command. Using this divine command theory, favouring males in patriarchal-oriented religion gratifies their lack and need from a transcendental superlative abundance.¹¹

In dissecting patriarchal biblical interpretations, Tribble observes that in life, humans upwardly strive for categorical imperatives that will improve their spiritual welfare. Therefore, it is worrisome that religious indoctrination remains a nebulous term because its unpleasant connotations make any discussion of the concept difficult. This is especially so when attempts are made to adduce convincing evidence of its practical relegation of women's spiritual leadership role.¹² Irigaray and Stone argued against the claim that stipulates that the creation of women was secondary and the modern assertions that 'God is a man'.¹³ They both opined that such conceptions are misleading, and as such, they disagreed with Daly's assertion that religious organisations from Buddhism and Hinduism to Islam, Judaism, Christianity, to secular derivatives such as Freudianism and Marxism are infrastructures of the edifice of religious connotation of patriarchal dominance.¹⁴ In considering religious problems in patriarchal hypothesis, there is a need to examine the traditional patriarchal postulations. These postulations, according to Stone, describe the religious context in which men suppressed women's religious rights with ceremonial goddess worship, giving their male counterparts traditional functional leadership rights.¹⁵

In Christian Catholic Church orthodoxy there is a religious discontentment in its view that God made man exclusively to lead. Reflection on these doctrines raises a very interesting question: can God create a woman as man's

'helpmate', thereby presupposing man's inadequacy, and not ascribe a form of authority to her? No matter how this is answered, it seems that there is at least one thing that even God cannot do in that framework of 'helpmate',¹⁶ that is, to give a woman an onerous responsibility to *compass* a man and yet leave her completely dependent on the same man. Jeremiah specifically directs the female person not to sink into the doldrums: 'For the Lord hath created a new thing in the Earth, A woman shall compass a man.'¹⁷ Given this compassing imperative, it seems then that all absolute and independent religious statutes of the male person are not only a puzzle, but an error that can only stimulate attempts by patriarchal culture to transfer the concept of God's omnipotence to the masculine gender.¹⁸ If such attempts succeed, they pose a notorious equivocation of God with man or of divine faith with masculine reason. This equivocation subsumes the existence of two functional roles, which are separate and distinct from one another. The problem generated by such equivocation is that patriarchy perpetrates gender difference and historically oppressive rules against the female sex right from its foundational sexist imagery within the family.

Refuting the sexist imagery of family empowerment

Lindsay-Cheney noted that the gender bias engendered by the patriarchal dominance within the family structure is used to deconstruct male-induced prejudicial dominance within social networks.¹⁹ Underlying the family problems engendered by patriarchy is an argument against the perverse and sexist notion it elicits. The deconstruction of the notion of male chauvinism is embarked upon with a single-minded design to overthrow the father at the source of his power and his own home. When a father loses the ability to dominate the family network, the resultant pathologies and the political results of that emasculation have far and incomprehensible effects in allowing for gender equity in other spheres of social networks. Based on this, it seems that the real work of cultural reconstruction, gender development and social order, has its foundation in the family. Here the analysis is restricted to the problems of patriarchy within the Christian family tradition.

The term 'patriarchy' is clearly religious, but it should not be intended for gender exclusion or oppression. Although Bird distinguished between two types of patriarchal practices as based on a true sense of biblical religiosity, its variations depict a series of gender perversions.²⁰ Given the biblical facts on patriarchal religion, Bird explains that the New Testament does not refer disparagingly to patriarchy.²¹ The word is ultimately derived from *pater*, 'father',²² but its closer derivation is *patria*, 'family'. Christian family doctrine did a lot to construct patriarchal oppressive disempowerment by positing that if its believers or family do not conform to the divine model of masculine leadership as described in the Bible, then spiritual paternalism will be replaced

by the masculine and human type. It follows from this that the biblical state is inescapably 'paternalistic'. Therefore, the word 'patriarchy' negates altruistic moral goodness and gender development because the biblical nexus of patriarchy adequately and simply expresses the form of egocentric social organisation that is religiously masculine. For instance, it seems absurd to the utilitarian paradigm of greatest good of the greatest number to bestow absolute authority to a male populace that is outweighed and outnumbered by a female one. Against this backdrop, the family cannot be made patriarchal even if its basic form of societal networking is predominantly patriarchal or is presumed to be ordained by God the Creator. For there is an antithetical position to the patriarchal religious command and control theory as repudiated by Paul's letter to the Galatians which states: 'There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.'²³

It should be noted, however, that the kind of family-centeredness required for gender development should not necessitate macho-male domination. This is why there is a need to comment on the 'motherly' characteristics of God²⁴ and the role of women in the apostolic age.²⁵ It argues that true gender power, authority and development should not be derived from masculine brute force.²⁶ The point we make is that the kind of father-centred dictatorship which some picture when they use 'patriarchy' is clearly a violation of biblical religious law. It is only when fathers violate the law of Christ and seek to become gods that patriarchy becomes oppressive and insecure. This is because the course of service warrants supportive and coordinate dispositions and when Christian fathers are called to serve it is not to be translated to the domination of humanity.²⁷ The 'patriarch' violates the sovereignty of both sexes within the nuclear family only when he attempts to be like worldly or gentile kings or even when he assumes God's role.

There must therefore be a rehabilitation of patriarchy to expose the irrational and destructive results of explaining it away as religiously inevitable. This means that only a victim of fallacious religious psychoanalysis would propagate ideals about the biological and familial inevitability of patriarchy, because as a social organisation, it does not depict logical and equitable development within the society or the family. More importantly, patriarchy valorises a socio-political terrain devoid of women's inclusive and competitive participatory rights.

Imperative for a vitiation of politics without women

The patriarchal political institution is problematic when it operates in tandem with a socialisation theory in which women are taught to be subordinate to men.²⁸ It also generates controversy when power is presumptuously considered the prerogative right of men. Given the patriarchal sexist domination in

political institutions, there are bound to be reactions. These reactions range from masculinised democratic culture, psychology of motherhood, political apathy to withdrawal, selective and concessional participation, etc. All of these, if situated within the democratic political ambit, depict a lack of political education and gender neutrality in the political arena.²⁹

The masculinised democratic culture, as exemplified by the patriarchal construct, emanates from the Athenian democratic background. This results in liberty and the right ascription to the sexes being prejudicial towards women. In addition, its preferences for the male are demonstrated in the Athenian connotations of political freedom as masculine opportunity to choose, be chosen or participate in choosing. Contrary to the Athenian masculinised democratic culture, political equality connotes that the choice of the citizen, as well as his or her opportunity to choose or be chosen is as good as that of any other.³⁰

Masculinised democratic rule to a large extent reflects an equality that presupposes the right to vote (for women) and the right to be voted for (for men). As a result, the constitutional guarantee of fundamental human rights under a patriarchal political network is in effect an outright attestation of men's liberty and women's subjugation. Hence, while we are ready for democracy, the patriarchal measurement being meted out under the guise of democracy is not safe for good interpersonal relationships, and is well anchored in liberty, equality, civility and justice.³¹

Gender inequality is often based on a psychology of motherhood, in view of the fact that the great majority of the civic populace are notably uneducated or uniformed women who, by virtue of their social procreative roles, and their attendant domestic constraints cannot participate effectively or at all in many strata of social network.³² Conceivably, there are several Darwinist-domestic reasons why women should not be in politics. These are based on the political psychological analysis of motherhood. Aristotle says that 'as between male and female, the former is by nature superior and ruler, the latter inferior and subject ... hence man is naturally fitter to command'.³³ Many others too have argued that political activities would 'unsex and degrade women, destroy domestic harmony and lead to a decline in birth rate'.³⁴ Their conception is built on the adaptive biological misconception that 'women are happy homemakers and they do not long for the factory, they do not long for the parliament. A cozy home, a beloved husband, a number of happy children, are far closer to their heart'.³⁵ Alternatively, it may be construed more bluntly and chauvinistically, as Schopenhauer did: 'women are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and teachers of our early childhood; by the fact that they are themselves childish, frivolous and short-sighted; in a word, they are big children all their life long'.³⁶

Given the erroneous psychological analysis of motherhood, political leadership roles are taken presumptuously to be masculine defined roles. Apparently, in discharge of their leadership right, men feel they have a right

to do what they like, even if this impinges on the women's desire, thereby conveniently triggering an offensive veto, that is, a domineering power, which they subject women to, thereby hindering women's development and political advancement. The failure of women to get their issues of agitation to the fore of the public political agenda has led to apathy and withdrawal. In view of the problem of women's representation as created by political apathy, political seats are reserved for them in parliament to encourage them.

Another discriminatory trend of selective and concessional rights in the political process of Africa is the institutional objectification of women. The government accentuates the perpetuation of gender disparity in the institutionalisation of the Ministry for Women's Affairs. This was first led by a man before it was seemingly reconciled by being handed over to a woman. This ministry is exclusively and selectively designed to cater for the interests of women. The recognition of these selective and concessional paradoxes has led to the call for broadening the notion of democracy to incorporate the social, cultural and economic enlistment of the masses to enhance the actual existential analysis of political freedom and leadership in a non-sexist way.³⁷ The point being made here is that through selective and concessional rights, political freedom, rationality, choice, competence and responsibility are eroded.

To mitigate the effect of women's flights or withdrawal from politics, different women's organisations, like the National Council of Women's Societies, Women in Nigeria, the media women, professionals and numerous others are fighting against the crises of inequality engendered by gender disparities and are advocating for selective, appointive and concessional participatory rights for women within the Nigerian democratic governance. This study argues that in order to ensure the equality of women with men, fixing the numbers or percentage of seats reserved for women contestants should be endorsed as a temporary measure to forestall either political apathy or regenerative mediocrity. This can be effected through the educational and political clarifications that lay claim to the fact that representational determinacy in politics should not be based on reparatory, redemptory or compensatory justice but rather should be based on political and economic freedom, as well as unbridled competitiveness and competence between both men and women.

Envisioning a philosophy of money for women's empowerment

Hoselitz and Simmel hold that the clarion call for gender or social development must be preceded by a form of philosophy of money as derived from their economic empowerment. Following this premise, any person's position on the economic positional ladder has a tremendous effect on their development.³⁸ Based on this, the debates about economic determination are hardly new, since

people's rights can be secured by the strategies of their economic capacity, as evident in the alleviation of economic encumbrance, such as making the facilities of credit, loans and market aid for economic empowerment available.³⁹

In addressing this issue, the 1985 UN Women's Conference in Nairobi recommended some reformative measures as the forward-looking strategies for improving the status of women. Upon it being passed, the African delegates set out to formulate modalities for its expansion and implementations. Unfortunately, in the discharge of these programmes, they were faced with the stark reality of the inadequacies facing the correction of the economic predicament of women in the society. Instead, the ugly heads of gender or class stratification and patriarchal exploitation were raised again despite the several appeals made to democratically vitiate their experience.⁴⁰

Nigeria is a vividly good prototype of patriarchy incapacitating economic drive. Despite the fact that the country enjoys a tremendous oil boom, the economic empowerment and strategic development of women remains stagnant. They have had to contend with ever-recurring controversial exclusions with regard to property acquisition and inheritance, revenue, employment and cultural rights.⁴¹ Consequently, many efforts made by African women to put themselves at the helm of the national development plan are relegated to the background despite the formidability of their aims and objectives.

The Women in Nigeria (WIN) document listed the following as examples of the diverse economic-related problems women face:

- Rural work discrimination
- Urban work discrimination
- Educational discrimination
- Legal discrimination
- Association discrimination
- Media discrimination
- Family discrimination
- Religious discrimination
- Health discrimination

All the forms of the abovementioned discrimination have either direct or indirect correlation with the sustainability of women's economic autonomy. For instance, at the rural level women are denied access to land and many other factors of production. Social amenities and consideration in development plans were also considered the prerogative right of the men. In the same vein, at the urban level their specialisation in petty or small-scale trading makes them earn meagre incomes. As a result, 'they form only 8% of the waged work force while they top the wageless'. Similarly, only 6% of its adult female population is literate as opposed to 25% of males.⁴²

Rosenfeld and Kalleberg further explain the urgent need for entrenching the politics of women's economic independence in social politics to facilitate

empowerment.⁴³ Bihagen and Ohls had earlier expressed a corroborative view when they maintained that the glass ceiling on women's career prospects in both the private and public sector must be given economic value.⁴⁴ In other words, women's economic emancipation and educational enlightenment should be seen as important in rethinking occupational integration.⁴⁵

In envisioning a viable and positive philosophy of money for women's empowerment, other social institutions wherein their economic empowerment is sought can be redressed. These include the appalling imagery given women in the mass media in which they either play behind-the-scene-roles, or act as derogatory characters, and in many instances are depicted as the 'economic squalor and spendthrift of the society'. Similarly, in the legal sphere the Constitution guarantees equality, yet elements of patriarchy in the English, Islamic, Christian, as well as customary laws extensively operating in Nigerian patriarchal society deny women the privilege of economic rights. This act of economic denial is perpetrated through deviant practices and erroneous interpretations, suggestive of blanket subservience, particularly in matters affecting marriage, inheritance and property. For instance, Nigerian property inheritance laws particularly disadvantage women by disinherit them. Moreover, when they are somehow granted inheritance titles and deeds they are only done so superficially. It can be said therefore that to a very great extent 'patriarchal economy' has shaped the socio-political as well as economic life of women in Africa.

The capitalist-economic structure to which many countries subscribe, works to preserve this same economic sexism through diverse patriarchal indoctrination, but most particularly through financial means. The US, for instance, is basically bourgeoisie; right from its inception, sexism held sway and the political leadership of the 'man and money' had always been the order of the day.⁴⁶ Similarly, in patriarchal economic culture, the men are culturally trained to be more economically productive than the women. In addition, any form of economic buoyancy that a few notable women have managed to muster has always been considered as inadequate. This bias is propagated in policies of the government and development agencies, and where coupled with some element of patriarchal cultural factors, they are largely responsible for the economic, political and particularly social epistemological gaps between men and women.

Empowerment as an epistemological groundwork 'to know and to be known'

The very essence of empowerment is to have a knowledge-based experience in which one can effectively demonstrate knowledge and be acknowledged for such cognitive demonstration. For Aguinis and Kraiger the benefits of training and developing individuals, teams, organisations and society are the

very parameter for their viability in human capital resources. Hence, the idea that patriarchal tradition and schools of indoctrination that incite cognitive alienation and victimise girls constitute unacceptable cultural and gender knowledge.⁴⁷ Accordingly, in patriarchal educational tradition, there is an enormous gap between males and females, which lead to females obtaining domestic and professional knowledge based on a misinformed and unequal educational concession. As a result, educational problems stem from disparities in standards of cognitive ability in patriarchal tradition.⁴⁸

In many traditional and contemporary school systems, men are characterised as stern, firm or authoritarian characters and women as weak and emotional, unable to control dignified vocations or incapable of actually transmitting any knowledge.⁴⁹ Based on this distinction, men were to have authority in relation to women and children. Moreover, it was only in relation to men that women were to enjoy freedom. Okin sees this fundamental opposition of reason to nature as a hindrance, and maintained that it gives little space to draw meaningful distinction between different levels of psychological and emotional experience in the educational sphere, in that it tends to be lumped together as inclination and treated as caprice.⁵⁰ Instead, it generates mythological dilemmas and an ironic eulogy of sexualdisparity in knowledge acquisition.⁵¹

Historically, and even in contemporary times, educational criticism was usually focused on the girls at the expense of boys. Many development educators noted that at many cognitive levels, boys have lower performance and merit achievement rates than girls. However, the reverse has also been true because due to the educational concession granted to girls, their performance and assessment rates have been ridiculously low. Although recent survey research in the oil-torn minority section of the Nigerian Igbo society shows clearly that it is boys, especially minority boys, who believe that instructors are not as apt to encourage them to achieve their goals or do their best.⁵²

Irrespective of this perfunctory exception, there is still insistence that these gender differences occurred because the schools were either too masculine or overwhelmingly anti-feminine. With these mythical biases, teachers were either unable to meet boys' learning needs effectively or consequently placed them on an educational pedestal of expectations that surpass their intelligence quotient. While the imposition and ascription of the myth of merit to males encourages many of them, for the mediocre among them, it poses serious learning problems. This means that the myths of masculine merit in education challenge the males either to good performances, or to cognitive self-pity. This is because males who were initially falling behind in educational attainment can be encouraged to perform better, knowing that they are supposed to possess the merit or mastery prowess. And those who have no capability for such meritorious or masterful cognitive ventures continue to lag behind and sink deeper into the doldrums because they simply cannot measure up to the merit or mastery standards.

Notably, many educational policies have enforced the myth of mediocrity against women by drawing attention to the gender gap designed to boost female performance with a presumptuous opinion that the boys will fit in naturally. It is with a bid to rectify this incorrect background that gender cognitive development opinions were raised in this study, which stipulate that schools need to be equally concerned about the problems of boys.

Buttressing this opinion poll, Halpern maintained that it is a biological fact that boys mature more slowly than girls.⁵³ For example, in many areas of skills acquisition, late-maturing boys can be stigmatised as poor learners and assigned to 'low-ability groups' – Although this late acquisitive skill is explained away by Zachary via the inaccurate fact that boys are more active than girls and are therefore more difficult for educators to handle. Consequently, 'bright, bored, and rambunctious boys' have been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder (ADD) and placed on drugs such as Ritalin.⁵⁴

However, more resoundingly, the study maintained that in understanding sexuality, the idea that femininity depicts mediocrity in educational pursuit is not only wrong, but also dangerously fallacious.⁵⁵ Mostly, patriarchal cognitive logic predicates excellence and the mastery of cognition for males against females and assumes an unequal or uneven knowledge acquisition and educational performance between the sexes. On this note, in both the public and domestic spheres, women have often had problems grounded in this familiar conception of inequality and vulnerability.⁵⁶ The quandary of women's educational relegation rests simply on the fact that they were discriminated against, oppressed and exploited in many ways that frequently benefit men. Bentley and Watts proposed a research programme on educational oppression, situating feminism on a school's development system that will allow girls and women to grow in a manner fitting their own reason and expectations, and not compellingly on the biological deterministic sense of housewifery and its associated dependency.⁵⁷

By virtue of the dysfunctional dichotomy between reason and nature, there is an implicit association of women with nature. This has also been the rationalisation given in support for their educational oppression by society.⁵⁸ Goldstein writes similarly about the hope for the female sex emanating from the recognition and importance of professional knowledge.⁵⁹ However, because professional knowledge in some ways confers power, Birke stated that there had been instances of professional commoditisation and commercialisation of women and their professional acquisitive prowess.⁶⁰ This is perhaps an oversimplified succor to the patriarchal educational problem and definitely distorts the main pursuits and assessment of emancipatory agitation for women.⁶¹

Contemporarily, a person is unlikely to become an 'expert' or a 'professional' without veritable accessibility to a wide and large expanse of knowledge. Presently though, only a few women have access to this kind of knowledge, which, according to Birke, is partly due to the mythological discriminatory practices that deny them entry to appropriate professions, as

well as the overwhelmingly male characteristics of the sciences.⁶² According to Jaggar, training, skill, competence and expert knowledge accredit professional strengths. Therefore, for Jaggar, women's mythological predicament lies in their eulogy of domesticity and biological cognition.⁶³ According to this mythological patriarchal predicament, they generally sell in the informal market-place the skills they normally practise in the home childcare and domestic services.⁶⁴ Nelson also pointed out that this goes a long way in ensuring their gross neglect in the scheme of good-ranking cognitive values in society.⁶⁵ The point being made is that there are problems inherent in patriarchal cognitive argument, especially related to providing women with skills and problem-solving capacities that will enhance their cognitively defective biological-professional determinism.⁶⁶

According to Walkerdine⁶⁷ the non-meritorious construction of the gender identity of women may well be seen as a socialisation strategy that equates them with poor performances in patriarchal social and institutional systems. As a result, the dilemma of training professionals who reinforce the non-meritorious dependence system, according to Latapi disseminates the idea of institutionalised gender disparity and implies a sort of dysfunctional capacity quotient.⁶⁸ According to Nussbaum, many of the patriarchal elements are due to a lack of a comprehensive approach to meritorious competence and the stereotypical lock-up of women into patriarchal welfare organisations.⁶⁹ Indisputably, the limits of empowerment that tilt towards the lower professional ranks and non-tenure track positions are self-destructive and provide a striking example of redundancy, underdevelopment and under-utilisation of potential.⁷⁰ The bottom line of intellectual sexism is that women are taught to idealise patriarchal command and control to become efficient in their social pursuits. This eventually becomes suggestive of an error equating masculinity with superior cognitive potential and intellectual strengths. Gender cognitive empowerment can therefore be ensured if knowledge acquisition and implementation serve their purpose as preservers of fundamental human rights, transformers of human value and dignity and conservers of human cognitive and social security.

Conclusion and recommendation

Gender empowerment is not targeted at generating a parochial social and institutional structure where either only women or men are involved in social policies and implementation of empowerment programmes. Instead, it seeks to create a complementary society in which both sexes would actualise their potential and work towards the free and responsible empowerment of each other. This means that to empower women of value and men of renown, there should be gender-integrative institutions within society, in which the biases of sexism in both patriarchal and matriarchal ramifications are deconstructed, and in which both the male and female gender are accorded the human

rational values and cogent existential recognition as coordinates. Unless this is done, Africa will sink deeper into the doldrums of underdevelopment and disempowerment. To avoid such a situation it is important to:

- redefine cultural-sexual polarisation and entrench viable cultural modalities for integrative gender development that will ensure peace, security, good political, economical, cooperation and integration between the sexes;
- reach beyond the dogma of religion in empowerment by specifically demystifying patriarchal religious dogmas;
- erode sexist imagery of family-empowerment by reordering an equitable basis within the family viable for the empowerment of both sexes;
- vitiate any form of politics without women's significant and sustainable participatory role;
- envision a philosophy of money for women's empowerment by mobilising resources that will eradicate poverty and increase pragmatically the funding and investment opportunities for women;
- re-establish modalities for effective and positive empowerment as epistemological groundwork to knowing and being known; and
- mitigate gender tokenism at all levels of social and institutional development.

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CHAPTER 14

The State of Space Science in Africa

Nceba Mhlahlo

Introduction

In the past 15 years there has been much deliberation, discussion and agreement on measures to promote science and technology across Africa. These include, on the one hand, the expressed need to coordinate space science efforts in Africa and on the other, declarations and policy on future direction of science in the continent.¹ Africa has seen an increase in the number of space science activities in the last 15 years, both in the arena of space-based and ground-based observations.

In the space-based domain, these activities have been marked by the advent of highly capable and yet low-cost micro-satellites. The micro-satellites transmit information from space and provide a variety of broadcast services on the ground (communication satellites) and they help us study the earth in a number of areas, for example, mapping, and to monitor, manage and protect the earth's resources and environment (earth observation satellites).

In the ground-based domain, there have been proposals for, and ongoing construction of, first-generation telescopes such as the Southern African Large Telescope (SALT), the High Energy Stereoscopic System (HESS), the Karoo Array Telescope (MeerKAT) and the much-publicised Square Kilometre Array (SKA), which when completed will be the largest radio telescope in the world. These large-scale facilities on the ground come with increased sensitivity and will enable scientists to carry out cutting-edge science and subsequently enhance our understanding of the universe. They also come with many opportunities for training and transfer of skills, especially for the youth and sustainable development.

The plethora of space-related activities do not bring about benefits in the areas of health, agriculture and water management only, but new challenges as well. Another major challenge is the lack of human capital for the utilisation of these increasing activities and programmes. This problem was highlighted by Ellis² as early as 1994 to warn scientists of its future consequences. Another challenge is finding a coordinated and integrated approach to harmonise these activities across different institutions, national facilities and government departments and agencies. To meet this challenge, a few

African countries have established space agencies that will also implement space policies and drive their space programmes and activities.

In this chapter space science activities in the African countries that have space programmes are discussed and then space science policy issues and challenges are examined. Finally, the social benefits of space science and technology are discussed and concluding remarks drawn.

Space science activities in Africa

Though much of the information on space science activities in a few African countries is provided here, accessing some of this information has proved to be difficult, and only a few institutions have websites that provide this information, while some of the websites are not active. Much consideration therefore has been given to the principal role players in space science in Africa. Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are the only African countries that have space programmes in terms of having their satellites lofted into space.

Algeria

Algeria started with its space venture in 2002. In recognition of the vital role that space science plays in a national economy, the Algerian government created a space agency, the Agence Spatiale Algérienne (ASAL), to promote and regulate the exploration of space. This country also has a thriving research community in astronomy and astrophysics. ASAL, through its main activity centre, the Algerian National Space Technology Centre (CNTS), has set its focus on space research and the production of micro-satellites. Algeria's first satellite, AlSat-1, was the result of a partnership between the CNTS and the Surrey Space Centre of Britain. AlSat-1 was launched into space in 2002. The satellite weighed 90 kg with a ground resolution of 32 m, meaning that at the altitude of the satellite (~680 km) two objects separated by a distance greater than 32 m would be discerned as two separate features. AlSat-1 operated in three spectral bands, that is in the green, red and near infra-red.³ The satellite had a designated lifespan of five years, but is still operational. Also, CNTS is constructing a satellite system, AlSat-2A and AlSat-2B for earth observation. AlSat-2A was scheduled for launch in 2009 with a better resolution of 10 m in four multispectral bands (blue, green, red and near infra-red).⁴

The CNTS is mainly responsible for the execution of the national research programme in areas such as water resource management, agriculture, telecommunications, transport and the environment. The centre has approximately 100 researchers organised into different divisions and research groups working on different projects. These projects are in the areas of micro-

satellite technology, space-based telecommunications, space instruments, space geodesy and geomatics and remote sensing.⁵

ASAL has a 15-year National Space Programme (2006 to 2020), which is aimed at strengthening the space infrastructure of the country by creating a number of centres: a satellite development centre (CDS), a satellite applications centre (CAS), a telecommunications satellite operations centre (CEST), and a Doctoral School of Space Technologies and Applications (EDTAS). This programme also seeks to increase the number and capabilities of Algeria's space system and develop national space capability.⁶

Most of the astronomy and astrophysics is done at the Centre of Research in Astronomy, Astrophysics and Geophysics (CRAAG), an institution that is involved with the promotion and organisation of research in physics, astrophysics and related subjects. Research done at CRAAG includes imaging through atmospheric turbulence and solar physics.⁷ In the Algiers observatory, one of the departments of CRAAG, most of the research work is done using the 15 cm refractor for solar activity studies. Other instruments that are used are the Doraysol instrument with a 22 mm telescope, solar-seeing monitor, which is a 12-inch Meade LX200 Schmidt Cassegrain and the ionosonde ionospheric instrument (AWESOME) to study propagation properties of the ionosphere.⁸ There were 14 astronomers and 22 engineers working in this observatory in 2007.⁹ Though few, this number of astronomers is significant given the fact that there is no university that teaches astronomy in Algeria.

Egypt

Egypt has had a number of satellites for non-scientific purposes, but in 1994 the Egyptian government established the National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences (NARSS), an organisation under the State Ministry of Scientific Research, to promote the use of space technology for sustainable development. Egypt also has a unique research institution, the National Research Institute of Astronomy and Geophysics (NRIAG), where research into astronomy and geophysics is carried out. It is one of the oldest research institutions in the country.

NARSS, in partnership with the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Ukraine, built and facilitated the launch of Egypt's first remote-sensing and scientific research satellite, EgyptSat-1, in 2007.¹⁰ The satellite weighed 100 kg, with a four-spectrum optical camera and an infrared camera providing an image resolution of 8 m. Egypt currently has three satellites in space for remote sensing and communication.¹¹ These activities are coordinated by NARSS, which has two sectors, one where maps and spatial data are produced from data provided by earth observation satellites (remote-sensing sector) and another where sensors to be mounted on satellites are developed (space sciences sector).

NRIAG is one of the scientific institutions in Egypt, and its focus research area include astronomy, geodesy and geomagnetism. NRIAG operates two observatories, the Kottamia and the Helwan. The Kottamia Observatory houses a 1,9 m reflecting optical telescope, which is equal in size to the 1,9 m telescope of the SAAO in Sutherland and the largest in North Africa.¹² The main programmes being undertaken with this telescope range from photometric observations of star clusters to extragalactic research. Work done in the Helwan facility involves the two areas of solar research and space sciences. The 76 cm reflector and the 15 cm Coude solar refractor, which are part of the small telescopes used in this institution, are mainly used for research programmes as well as education.¹³ There are other instruments in the solar station that are used for visual, photographic and spectroscopic studies of the sun, and they include a high-dispersion spectrograph, a 25 cm horizontal coelostat, which has a two-mirror system that follows the sun and reflects an image of the sun that does not rotate as the sun moves, and a special camera for direct photography of the solar disk.

The Helwan Observatory also has a satellite-tracking station both for visual and photographic observations, laser-ranging equipment for high accuracy satellite ranging and a new automatic laser-ranging station. There is also a small photo-electric telescope for photometric studies of night sky, zodiacal light and twilight. Other research done here includes studies of the upper atmosphere, observations of the moon, daily observations for sunspots and studies of the chromospheric phenomena.

Nigeria

The National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) is arguably the leading space agency in Africa. NASRDA was created to coordinate space science activities in Nigeria. It has six activity centres where two of them, the Centre for Basic Space Science (CBSS) and the Centre for Atmospheric Sciences and Astronomy (CASA), have unique roles to play.

NASRDA coordinated and facilitated the launch of Nigeria's first satellite, NigeriaSat-1, which took place in 2003 for earth observations and disaster monitoring, approximately a year after the launch of Algeria's AlSat-1. The instrument had a ground resolution of 32 m, with sensors in three spectral regions (green, red and near infra-red). This was followed by the launch of a communications satellite, NigcomSat-1, in 2007 to establish a strong communication point for Nigeria and to give remote communities access to the Internet and telephony.¹⁴ NigcomSat-1 had a launch mass of 5,150 kg and an expected service life of 15 years. However, the satellite lost both of its solar arrays and is no longer in operation.¹⁵

NASRDA also coordinates responsibilities for all of its six national space programme centres in Nigeria. One of these, CBSS, a university-based research centre, is responsible for coordinating all space research activities in

Nigeria. This institution is charged with the responsibility of initiating, fostering the growth of and conducting fundamental research in to space science as well as coordinating research activities in the universities and research institutes. It also looks at pursuing capacity-building and promotes collaboration between universities and the open use of facilities among researchers throughout the country as well as encouraging international cooperation.

CASA is another university-based space research centre that fosters collaborative research and development in basic space science and astronomy.¹⁶ With astronomy flourishing in Nigeria, the country has an established astronomy community and has built its first optical observatory with a 25 cm optical telescope, and is in the process of constructing a 25 m radio telescope, which is slightly smaller than the dish at HartRAO (see below).¹⁷

The Centre for Satellite Technology Development (CSTD) is focused on the development of satellite payloads for both geostationary and non-geostationary satellites, while the National Centre for Remote Sensing (NCRS) handles remote-sensing technology and the information obtained through this process for the assessment and management of natural resources as well as the environment. The Centre for Geodesy and Geodynamics (CGG) is aimed at developing capacity, manpower and hardware, and addressing national issues such as surveying, mapping and remote sensing for mineral exploitation. The Centre for Space Transport and Propulsion (CSTP) deals with the development of locally built rocket technology and is meant to drive the Nigerian space programme. The development and enhancement of skills and knowledge for university educators, research scientists and other personnel in focus areas ranging from remote-sensing and geographic information systems to basic space and atmospheric sciences technology is the responsibility of the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education (CSSTE).

Nigeria hosts one of the two UN African Regional Centres for Space Science and Technology Education-English (ARCSTE-E) at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.¹⁸ ARCSTE-E is aimed at developing indigenous capacity and capabilities in space science and technology at the local level. ARCSTE-E runs postgraduate diploma programmes in areas of space science and technology application at the postgraduate diploma levels which are Remote Sensing/Geographic Information System (RS/GIS), Satellite Communication (SATCOM), Satellite Meteorology (SATMET) and basic Space and Atmospheric Science (BSAS). Nigeria had 27 participants in 2005/2006, 13 in 2007 and three in 2008. The other ARCSTE-E centre is in Morocco.

South Africa

South Africa was the first African country to design, build and have its satellite lofted into space. SunSat was designed, developed and built by staff and students at the University of Stellenbosch as a private initiative, with its main aim being to train students in research in the area of electronic systems and

to do radio transmission. NASA put the satellite in orbit in 1999; it weighed 64 kg.¹⁹ The cameras provided 15 m ground resolution in three spectral bands (green, red and near infra-red). The design of a second South African satellite, Sumbandila which is a Venda name meaning 'lead the way' (formerly known as ZASat-002), has been completed, and the satellite, operating at a higher resolution of 6 m with six spectral bands, was launched in 2009. It will be used mainly for remote sensing, tele-education and radio communication.

The newly created National Space Agency will coordinate all space science activities in South Africa.²⁰ The agency seeks to make South Africa a key contributor in the space science arena, especially in the African continent. In addition, South Africa has a number of space science facilities that are spread across the country. The National Research Foundation (NRF), South Africa's national funding agency, operates these facilities.

The South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO) is a national facility for optical and infra-red astronomy and astrophysics in South Africa. It has five telescopes – reflectors with mirrors of 0,5, 0,75, 1,0, 1,9, and 10 m diameters at its field station in the Northern Cape. The largest of these instruments, SALT, was commissioned in 2003 and is the largest single optical telescope in the southern hemisphere. SALT is an international collaboration with approximately one-third belonging to South Africa, one-third to various US universities and the rest to a number of European countries. SAAO and SALT are used by researchers based in these facilities, and by students and staff from universities across the country for activities ranging from stellar astrophysics to extragalactic astronomy.

The Hartebeesthoek Radio Observatory (HartRAO) is a national facility for radio astronomy and operates the largest steerable radio telescope in Africa. The telescope is a dish 26 m in diameter and is used to detect radio waves from various objects, such as quasars in the wavelength band from 2,5 to 18 cm. Research done at HartRAO includes radiometry, spectroscopy, pulsar timing and space geodesy. The HartRAO telescope combines three geodesy techniques, very long baseline interferometry (VLBI), satellite laser ranging, and the global positioning system (GPS). The facilities using these techniques are located at the same site and this makes HartRAO a unique radio telescope in Africa, and is important for collaboration with radio telescopes on other continents for VLBI.

South Africa is one of the two finalists selected to host the SKA, a US\$2 billion international project to build a radio telescope, which, when completed, will be the largest and most sensitive telescope in the world. The other country on the shortlist is Australia. Once completed, SKA will be used to look far back in time (about 300 000 to 1 billion years after the Big Bang), when the early universe was in a gaseous form, before the formation of stars and galaxies. It is believed that new science will emerge out of this project. MeerKAT, a demonstrator of SKA, is being designed to address questions ranging from cosmic magnetism to the evolution of galaxies and large-scale structures

in the universe. The first seven antennas of the full MeerKAT array, KAT-7, were commissioned at the end of 2009. The full array of 80 or more 12 m dishes covering the frequency range of 500 MHz to 2,5 GHz are expected to be ready to undertake scientific activities by 2012. SKA will be involved in the search for dark energy and dark matter and for extra-terrestrial life. Also, the telescope will be used for extra-solar planets and gravitational wave detection. SKA dishes and panels will cover a combined area of approximately one million square metres, thus making SKA more sensitive than any existing telescope in the world. It is believed that construction will start in 2014.

The Satellite Application Centre (SAC) is a facility run by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). This facility provides services and products in the space industry to local and international clients and supports regional initiatives. The services include the tracking and control of spacecraft from the satellite tracking station at Hartebeesthoek. SAC is also responsible for the capturing of the satellite image data into a high-speed memory system, and processing and archiving of the data.

The Hermanus Magnetic Observatory (HMO) is a magnetic observatory that monitors and models changes in the earth's magnetic field, and carried out magnetospheric studies. Active areas of research include geomagnetism, space physics and technology.

The geomagnetism group at the HMO uses the data from stations in Hermanus and Hartebeesthoek in South Africa and Tsumeb in Namibia and from 40 secular variation field stations distributed over southern Africa, as well as measurements from low earth-orbit, magnetic-field satellites, for the modelling of the geomagnetic field.

Space physics research is done to better understand plasma behaviour in the earth's ionosphere and magnetosphere and its impact on earth. The current research fields in space physics include theoretical studies of waves in dusty plasmas, studies of ultra-low frequency (ULF) waves using ground-based and satellite data and ionospheric characterisation and modelling using phase delay in GPS satellite radio signals. The technology group provides quality-controlled magnetic field and sensor-related services to clients in the defence and aerospace industries on a commercial basis.²¹ There is also a science outreach group that is responsible for the development and implementation of science awareness programmes, particularly for schoolchildren and educators.

South African universities are also very active in the space arena. A significant number of universities in South Africa run space science-related activities, of higher intensity in some universities than in others. The University of Stellenbosch, for example, initiated a programme to launch South Africa's first satellite, SunSat, into space in 1999.

The National Astrophysics and Space Science (NASSP) is a structured programme aimed at training students at honours, masters and doctorate levels in astronomy and astrophysics, using research specialities of scientists who are based in eight different universities and three national facilities around

South Africa. NASSP was established in order to address the shortage of research students, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds. It was realised that the academic population was ageing and new PhDs were needed for continuity. NASSP is a truly African programme, since it has attracted students from a number of African countries, namely Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.²²

South Africa's neighbour, Namibia hosts the most powerful gamma-ray telescope in the world. The High Energy Stereoscopic System (HESS), an array of four 13 m gamma-ray telescopes, is a new version of the HEGRA (High Energy Gamma Ray Astronomy) initiative that is currently running on the island of La Palma in the Canary Islands, Spain, but is more sensitive by approximately one order of magnitude than HEGRA.²³ The atmospheric Cherenkov detectors of HESS are capable of detecting high-energy gamma rays (100 GeV), and are suitable for observing and studying phenomena such as gamma-ray-induced air showers and to help answer the question of the origin of cosmic rays. Germany has a large stake in this instrument, followed by other European countries. A larger experiment, HESS II (27 m), is under construction and will have an enhanced sensitivity by a factor of two.

Space science policy issues in Africa

The greatest challenges faced by society and the space science community are the lack of human capital and indigenous capacity development and training, which are fundamental to the success and sustainability of national African space programmes and for the betterment of the lives of African people. This is because, noble as they are, some of these policies fail because of a lack of commitment and funding to drive their implementation and management. A lack of personnel is hampering scientific research in Africa.²⁴ Africa has the lowest number of researchers, with 48 researchers per 1 million inhabitants, in contrast to Europe, which has more than 2 000 researchers per 1 million inhabitants. In 2002 sub-Saharan Africa had 0,6 per cent of the world's researchers.²⁵ This is a threat to the future of science in Africa, as it also affects scientific production output. Africa's world share in publication, for instance, was 1,6 per cent in 1991 and after a decade (2001) it was down to 1,4 per cent.²⁶ At the current pace of change this situation has not changed or may be worse due to the fact that countries such as South Africa are not producing enough doctorates to replace its ageing academic population.²⁷

Furthermore, programmes that were meant to address the problem of human capital development in Africa seem not to show any success (as can be seen from Tables 14.1 and 14.2). The National Astrophysics and Space Science Programme (NASSP), which was South Africa's response to the problem of the lack of human capital, has not attracted many students.

Table 14.1 NASSP honours student uptake, 2003–2007

Year	Male	Female	Black	White	Total
2003	7	5	5	7	12
2004	7	3	7	3	10
2005	8	3	7	4	11
2006	14	2	8	8	16
2007	9	4	9	4	13
Total	45	17	36	26	62

Source Whitelock (2008) 'Astrophysics in southern Africa', 991 *AIP Conference Proceedings*, p 44 and current NASSP statistics

The rate at which students are graduating from this programme is low at an average of 12 students per year (Table 14.1) – too low for a national project that involves eight different institutions and three research facilities. Even worse, the number of black South African honours students per year graduating is very low. There were two in 2003, 2004 and 2005 and only one graduate in 2006.

Another capacity-building programme that does not seem fruitful, as shown by statistics, is the UN programme under ARCS TE-E, the postgraduate diploma programme. Only 11 out of 14 countries that were supposed to be participating in the programme, took part in 2005–2006. The numbers then went down to five countries in 2007 and up to six in 2008 (Table 14.2).

Table 14.2 ARCS TE-E countries and number of students, 2005–2008

PGD programme statistics 2005–2008			
Country	2005–2006	2007	2008
Cameroon	4	7	3
Kenya	3	Nil	Nil
Uganda	1	Nil	Nil
Ethiopia	2	Nil	Nil
Sudan	3	3	2
South Africa	1	Nil	Nil
Liberia	1	Nil	Nil
The Gambia	1	Nil	Nil
Zambia	1	Nil	Nil
Malawi	1	2	2
Congo	Nil	1	Nil
Zimbabwe	Nil	Nil	1
Tanzania	Nil	Nil	2
Nigeria	27	13	3
Total	45	26	32

Source <http://www.arcsstee.org/pgprogstat.htm>

Half of the programme's participating countries had only one student enrolled during the period 2005 to 2008. Even more disturbing is that out of the 45 students who participated in the programme in 2005 and 2006, only four did basic space science, and there were none in 2007 (out of 26) and in 2008 (out of 32). The rest did remote sensing/GIS and satellite communication (Table 14.3). This is very critical for Africa because without the balance between basic research for knowledge production and application, Africa will not succeed in achieving its research, developmental and economic goals.

Table 14.3 Number of participants for each ARCSTE-E course in 2005–2008

Courses	2005–2006	2007	2008
Remote sensing/GIS	27	18	21
Satellite communication	14	8	11
Basic space	4	Nil	Nil

Source <http://www.arcsstee.org/pgprostat.htm>

There are other capacity-building programmes, such as the Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMRD) and the Regional Centre for Training in Aerospace Surveys (RECTAS), that focus on training students in a number of areas in space science. RCMRD is an Intergovernmental organisation that promotes the development and use of geo-information and information technology (IT) by assisting in human resources and institutional capacity-building. RCMRD offers training to students from its member states and other African countries in a number of fields that include surveying and mapping, remote sensing, GIS and natural resources assessment and management. The centre also offers services ranging from resource mapping (vegetation, soil and land use) to use of GIS in the management of resources/utilities. They also undertake engineering surveys (roads, pipelines, dams, etc) and cadastral surveys using modern GPS digital photogrammetric mapping. RCMRD has trained up to 3 000 students since its inception in 1975. RECTAS is a non-profit intergovernmental organisation that provides theoretical and practical training in the fields of geo-informatics, integrating photogrammetry, remote sensing, geographic information system, cartography and airborne geophysical surveys. As at December 2002, the centre had trained more than 1 200 public servants at various levels since it started in 1972, excluding short-term training, from 27 African countries. There is not enough information, though, to decide whether these programmes have been successful or not.

More commitment towards the implementation of space science policy is required. Recruiting and graduating more students in space science is one of the most serious challenges to the initiatives such as NASSP,²⁸ as noted above. Increased focus at university entry level on attracting black South African students to astronomy is required. The proposed Institute of

Astronomy may be able to achieve this, since one of its primary goals is to stimulate an interest in undergraduate and honours students in postgraduate studies. The sustainability of space programmes in Africa requires local scientific expertise and training of students.

One of the Cairo Declaration²⁹ commitments was to maximise the effective use of locally based scientists to ensure this sustainability. But without building institutional capacity and strengthening the mechanisms that are meant to ensure that this takes place, specifically at regional levels, and without political commitment, this undertaking cannot come to fruition. Efforts to promote astronomy and space-science research, such as the Working Group on Space Science in Africa (WGSSA) and the proposed Africa Institute of Space Science (AISS), need to be strengthened. The African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST), which has capacitybuilding as one of its focuses, in collaboration with these capacitybuilding programmes and others in the African region, should find more practical and creative ways to deal with the issue of human capital development and capacitybuilding.

In recent years, most efforts have been focused on the millennium development goals (MDGs) and education for all (EFA) goals, which, among other things, seek to reach universal primary education (UPE) and gender parity by 2010.³⁰ Even though there are huge challenges facing the attainment of these goals, there are indications that some countries, particularly in Africa, are increasing their enrolment rates as a result of policy intervention. They have abolished school fees, recruited more teachers and built more schools. The same commitment should be shown to address the challenge of human capital development in space science. More students should be recruited and trained en masse, fees should be reduced and more universities built. On the other hand, the attainment of UPE and universal secondary education is important, particularly for science, as these global initiatives are a long-term solution to the same problem of a lack of human capital.

A lack of funding is another major policy obstacle. Economic development certainly depends on the scientific and engineering skills to discover and invent, and to develop innovations. Policy should identify the need to produce these skills, to increase the number of scientists and engineers and to increase their funding (via the programmes mentioned above and at all levels, that is, at school and tertiary levels and in research facilities and agencies that run these facilities). Increased funding will mean that more young people are trained in space-science technology and basic research. It is said that India has a very successful capacity-building programme because it adequately funds its own capacity-building programmes, whereas other countries rely on outside donors for funding.³¹

Typically, African nations contribute less than 1 per cent of GDP to scientific research. Though South Africa spends more on science development compared to other African countries, in the financial year 2007/2008 it spent 0,95 per cent of GDP, followed by Morocco at 0,8 per cent. In roughly the

same period, Algeria spent 0,5 per cent, followed by Nigeria and Egypt at 0,4 and 0,2 per cent, respectively. South Africa and Morocco are closer to reaching the AU's 2010 policy target for minimum allocation to R&D, science and technology of 1 per cent.³² Other countries, however, are far from this target, which in itself is low when compared to that of developed countries. Finland, for example, has an economy the same size as South Africa and yet it spends 3,5 per cent of GDP on scientific research. There is, therefore, no doubt that substantial financial inputs and stronger political commitment are needed for African countries to achieve sustainable development and growth. If space science benefits are to be obtained, national education spending needs to be increased, especially in developing countries with poor investments in education.³³

The social benefits of space science

Space science benefits are vast, and so are the problems that are faced by the African countries. These problems are environmental, geological and socio-economical, and have prompted a number of African countries to realise that science in general – and space science specifically – has great potential for helping Africa solve its problems and achieve its developmental goals. The environmental challenges these countries seek to tackle include erosion, desertification (which in Nigeria proceeds at 3 km per year), deforestation, industrial and marine pollution and vanishing forest resources. Geological challenges include petrology, oil and natural gas exploration and cartography for land use, whereas socio-economical challenges include urban growth, health, water-resource management and food security. Most of these challenges fall within the scope of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) priorities for development, and can be monitored best from space using remote sensing and mapping.

The realisation by African countries that space can help address some of Africa's problems echoes the recommendations of the implementation plan from the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). During WSSD, the world community resolved to fight the scourge of poverty and disease that affect the world's poorest and most vulnerable, particularly Africans, and to as restore and protect the global environment.³⁴ Science and technology have a role to play in achieving the MDGs and sustainable development goals in the areas of energy, food security, environment, health, water management and security and agriculture, to name but a few.

These realisations and plans were endorsed at the UN Millennium Development Summit (MDS) where nations committed themselves to MDGs which are to reduce poverty, improve healthcare, promote global partnership and peace, education, human rights, gender equality and environmental sustainability.³⁵ The target for addressing these challenges was set at 2015.

Following these major global developments, African countries have made it their prerogative to lead the struggle for Africa's emancipation and address Africa's developmental challenges by establishing some regional and national development initiatives such as Nepad. In line with the WSSD and MDGs, the Nepad programme, which was integrated into the AU structures and processes,³⁶ prioritised disaster management, food security, health, infrastructure, land-use and water-resource management as areas that need serious attention.

In the area of disaster management, space technology has proved to be beneficial in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters, such as fires and floods.³⁷ It has also benefited agriculture when it comes to food security. Locust plagues have been predicted and prevented, for an example, in Algeria, using remote sensing and mapping. Furthermore, in Niger, a facility known as the Interstate Forecasting Centre (IFC) was established in 1985 to assist a number of African countries to protect their citizens and to minimise the catastrophic effect of drought and flood by augmenting food security and hydropower. Nine countries benefited from this initiative: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Chad and Nigeria.³⁸

Through remote-sensing micro-satellites and communication satellites, African countries are also benefiting from space in the area of health. Health hazards such as vector-borne diseases can be monitored by predicting regions where mosquitoes, ticks, tsetse flies and other disease-carriers breed, preventing diseases such as malaria.³⁹ Space-system-based tele-medicine and tele-education are also proving to be of significant benefit to many communities, especially those in rural areas that find it difficult to access health and education facilities.⁴⁰ The remotely sensed data can also be used to provide the basis to model and predict urban growth patterns. This is essential for many African countries where there are outflows of people from rural to urban areas, and from less developed to more-developed countries, to compete for scarce resources.

Conclusion

While some members of the community often complain that the funds spent on space science programmes could be utilised for poverty alleviation, scientists correctly argue that space technology is an effective tool to fight poverty. Space benefits are vast and can undoubtedly address the developmental needs of Africa. Capacity building through the development of human and budgetary resources, however, is still a challenge that has to be tackled head-on by research agencies, government institutions and all those who are involved in space-related activities. It is recommended that AMCOST, ISSA, WGSSA and other initiatives make the problems of capacity building and human capital development areas of common focus and

collaboration. More efforts need to be focused on policy implementation, funding and management, and there needs to be a strong political commitment from governments.

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CHAPTER 15

Conclusion

Confronting Africa's Developmental Challenges

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The picture painted by this volume reveals that Africa is not moving forward; it remains the poorest continent on earth, having been left far behind by Asia with which it was almost at par in the early 1960s. In some analyses the situation is painted as worsening. This gloomy picture is captured by the statement in Chapter 10 that 'life in most African countries except in North Africa remains nasty, short and brutish with a life expectancy that has marginally improved since the 1970s'. Life is made nasty and brutish by the continuous conflicts in which civilians are killed, maimed and raped at will by the various contenders for power. Among the consequences of this are large numbers of refugees as well as millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), who have nowhere to flee as the borders of the neighbouring countries are closed to them. The problem of IDPs and refugees is highlighted in Chapter 4, which deals with human security. To the above picture of suffering, one should add the millions of people dying from the HIV/Aids pandemic that is running like wildfire across the continent and taking with it the youngest and strongest, just as slavery did in the 1800s. Thus, people in Africa are left helpless and frequently hopeless as they are crushed under extreme poverty and starvation, disease and slaughter from the gun.

In this concluding chapter we raise two basic questions. The first question is: who is to blame for Africa's plight? The answers to this question are many and varied depending on one's ideological position. But overall, this volume offers two broad answers to the question. At the one extreme, colonialism and imperialism are blamed for Africa's poverty. This is the position of Petrus de Kock in Chapter 2. At the other extreme, the blame is placed on African leaders and their greed. They are accused of assisting the continuous rape of the continent's resources by outsiders, giving credence to the concept of the elite consensus/compact, as elaborated by Margaret Lee.¹ This argument is underscored by the evidence of the massive embezzlement of the continent's products, resources, and larger proportions of whatever comes from outside in the form of aid, to support it. Furthermore, African leaders are accused of lacking vision and commitment to move the continent forward. It is this lack of leadership that is blamed for the failure of the African integration project. The second question is: what is the solution or the way out of the

underdevelopment pit? The second question is interlinked with the first. The answer given to the first sheds some light on the answer to the second.

In all honesty, there are no straight answers to the two questions. What will be offered here are some suggestions and points of departure from which one can develop the way forward. Our discussion starts by noting three important facts about the continent. First, one has to acknowledge the fact that Africa is a fragmented continent and therefore there is no single answer for the entire continent. This does not mean that one has to abandon what has been termed 'continental solutions for continental problems', which lies at the heart of the African Renaissance discussed in Chapter 7 by Okolo, but to accept the existing realities that limit the creation of pan-African governance (discussed by Uzodike in Chapter 6) and the growth of inter-state relations, particularly in the form of trade mechanisms that are at the centre of regional organisations.

Secondly, one has to acknowledge that the state remains a critical piece in the puzzle of Africa's development project. For this reason, unless the current state weakness and fragility is addressed, progress on the continent will remain uncertain and slow. The changing vision of the role of the state in Africa, its reach, sovereignty and legitimacy remain central to Africa's future. Matlosa in Chapter 1, 'Managing Diversity and Competitive Politics', and De Kock in Chapter 2, 'African Post-Colonial/Post-Adjustment State', both address the central question of the role of the state in Africa. Ogom in Chapter 3, on the other hand, addresses how the state has responded to the challenges to its power by the creation of opposing war machines.

Thirdly, the acceptance of the emerging global changes that, on the one hand, are challenging Western economic hegemony with dynamics that may spur negative unintended consequences or provide opportunities for Africa. The rise of the Eastern dragons, China, India and Japan, threatens Western hegemony and is producing the global realignment of forces. It has also, however, created the so-called 'new scramble for Africa' in which the East and the West court Africa for its natural resources. This includes Europe's attempt to capture the desert sun as its new source of energy and explores the notion of the Mediterranean countries and their special relationship with the EU. This is aimed at drawing North Africa into Europe. The realities of this new scramble for Africa are described by Agbu in Chapter 12, who argues that 'Africa is a beautiful bride at this period, but this bride must be smart and willing enough to exploit her beauty to her advantage before she becomes old and in many cases irrelevant and discarded'. In the pages below we explore these three realities in more detail.

Africa as a fragmented continent

Africa is often regarded as a single entity with all the countries on the continent facing the same fate. While there are commonalities, such as the history

of slavery, colonialism, external exploitation and a desire for change, there is also a wide differentiation on the continent. The most acknowledged differentiation is, of course, the north and south of the Sahara. The common statement is that when one talks of Africa one is talking of sub-Saharan Africa. This is the view shared by most authors in this volume. North Africa, which in part because of religion, is commonly identified with the Middle East and is now, as noted above, being pulled into Europe for which it has supplied cheap labour for decades.

There are variations and growing differences in sub-Saharan Africa itself, as demonstrated by the following distinctions:

- The resource-rich countries include Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Nigeria and South Africa. With the exception of South Africa, the last country on the continent to gain its freedom, the other countries have been both politically and economically unstable. Angola has had a long-drawn-out civil war and it is only now that it is beginning to rebuild its ravaged economy. The DRC's negotiated peace is still fragile and the eastern part of the country is still at war. Sudan has been in turmoil for decades, with an on-and-off war between the north and the south. And now there is the Darfur drama still unfolding. Nigeria after decades of military rule is still faced with insurgency in its oil-rich regions. Thus the abundance of natural resources on the continent appears to generate conflict. The resource curse has thus become a common factor on the continent even in smaller countries, such as Sierra Leone and Chad.
- Poor, politically unstable countries have witnessed conflicts of all sorts. Prominent on this list is, stateless Somalia, which that has suffered continuous civil war since 1991 with the fall of the Siad Barre regime. To this list one should add Rwanda, Burundi, Guinea Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Central Africa, the DRC and many others.
- The politically stable but marginal countries that have been marking time include Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland and many others.
- The countries where democratic breakthroughs witnessed in the last decade and a half are at risk or in recession following crises that threaten disintegration include Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Senegal.

Given the above differentiations, there is definitely no continental blueprint for economic development. This is what was wrong with the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in the 1980s and their poverty-reduction strategies in the 21st century. Solutions have to be sought first at the level of the state/country in Africa. This, naturally, challenges the various attempts to create regional economic groupings and the dream of a continental common market. As it has been

pointed out in Chapters 7 and 9, little trade exists between African countries. The level of development and the orientation of economies produces limited complementarities or trade attractions. In many cases, national economic and trade practices are akin to competition.

It should be further noted that the mode and level of external interaction among African countries remains different and is dictated largely by resource endowments, political leadership and level of stability. It is therefore not possible to have a common strategy for Africa's interaction, with either its so-called traditional partners (discussed in Chapter 11) or its emerging partners (discussed in Chapter 12). A common strategy that was envisaged under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) is not likely to emerge both as a result of selective engagement between the West and Africa as seen within the context of the G8 and a result of political and economic interests of the African countries themselves. The differentiation that we have seen taking place in Asia that has produced both winners and losers is likely to repeat itself on the African continent. Choices taken at the national level seem to take precedence over those agreed to at the continental level. This contradiction needs to be addressed if Africa is to succeed in its attempt to find solutions to its underdevelopment challenges.

The function and role of the state in Africa

It is generally acknowledged that the state in Africa has been weak both in terms of its reach or control over its territory and also in terms of its legitimacy or acknowledgement of its power. The conflicts on the continent are in fact challenges to the state. This is the focus of Chapter 3, which describes the existence of military machines challenging state power. The weakness of the state is, on the one hand, attributed to the external imposition of the state and, on the other, to the failures of African leaders. The external imposition thesis argues that the *raison d'être* of the state was to serve the colonial interests and now the imperialist interests. The state in Africa has thus remained external and lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. It is this reality that has dictated the state–society relations on the continent. There is therefore a call for the total transformation of the state to a people's state. This involves changing the very foundations of the state.

The snag with the above has always been who should undertake this transformative process and the motives for this group to do so. The answer to this goes back to the colonial struggle days and to Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral. For them the transformative process was to be undertaken by the African elite, *petite bourgeoisie*. The expectation has always been that this group will commit class suicide and side with the masses. The reality of the last 50 years of independence is that of the betrayal of the masses. Two solutions have been advanced in the face of this dilemma. One has been the drive

towards the creation and expansion of an indigenous bourgeoisie/middle class with an interest in the functioning of the state and the local economy. The indigenisation/black empowerment laws are aimed at creating such a class. The past experience of these efforts, however, has been negative and has produced a comprador class that is rapacious and exploitative. Ostentatious consumption and the open flouting of riches has been the hallmark of the new 'fat cats'. This cannot form a solid basis for economic transformation on the continent. Second, has been the renewed hope in the emergence and growth of civil society on the continent as a counterweight to the all-powerful authority of the state. The West has been keen to support the creation of civil society as part of the push for democracy on the continent. The outcome, however, has been contrary to this envisaged end. Although this alternative space has had positive impact, it has also provided opportunity for the mobilisation of ethnic sentiments against the state, sometimes resulting in conflicts. It has also resulted in the emergence of civil society entrepreneurs that have taken advantage of the available external resources and enriched themselves at the expense of the poor. The harshest criticism of civil society is that it has failed the organic test; it has been organised away from and above society and at times derived its agenda from its sponsors (who are mainly outsiders), thereby failing the legitimacy test. This factor is exemplified by the multiplicity of urban-based civil society that claims to work for the poor in the rural areas. It is also evident in the number of political parties (usually opposition) on the continent benefiting from external democratic support, which have nothing to do with democracy.

Despite all the above negatives, it should be stated that the hope for Africa lies in the mobilisation of its citizenry. However, the mobilisation of the citizenry for their political and social rights is feasible only when they have gone beyond focusing all their attention on mere survival. Mobilisation can take place only when the people have reached a certain level of economic development. Citizen mobilisation will materialise when the level of literacy has extensively improved. This means that the main focus should be on advancing education and economic growth, which brings us back to the discussion around human security and how to ensure that all people or a majority of the people are safe, meet their basic needs and are able to realise their full potential in life. This would require rethinking the manner in which the developmental needs of society are defined and addressed at the national, regional and international levels. Critical to this is the need for African theorisation to place the people within the global debates on security, economic development, etc, as well as the production of knowledge that offers alternative options of development paths that are endogenous.

The second discussion on the state in Africa has come to focus on the function and role of the state. The two roles of the state have been identified as either a watchman or driver of development. Matlosa's discussion in Chapter 1 captures the state's dilemma which is framed in the context of the

appropriate relationship between the state and the market. The free-market triumphalism of the 1990s that forced states to scale down their economic and social expenditure and engage in privatisation of state enterprises did not help the situation on the continent. Besides making the state irrelevant to the majority of the population, it was an attack on its legitimacy. At the time when the people were in most need of the state, it abandoned its responsibilities. Equally, there was pressure on the state to become lean and efficient in two basic ways: by managing the scarce state resources and external aid. At the same time the state was required to maintain law and order and regulate economic relations. This required a strong and capable state. The two could not be done together and not surprisingly, the state failed dismally to do either. Currently the buzz word is to create a 'developmental state', that is a state that should spearhead economic development by providing the economic vision and managing partnership between itself and the private sector. What needs to be emphasised here is that, given the very low level of economic development on the continent, the state must play a leading role in ensuring economic growth. This must go beyond the provision of a conducive environment for external investments. Thus, the increasing focus on the state in the last decade has taken us nowhere, as the discussion in Chapter 9 indicates. There must be a complete rethink not only on the economic path being pursued, but also on the appropriate role of the state in steering the African development project.

The new scramble for Africa

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a highly marked capitalist/market triumphalism. It saw the rise of the United States as the unchallenged superpower and the rapid growth and expansion of the EU. The only important country outside the Western world was Japan, a staunch ally of the United States. Twenty years later, the world is changing completely, as the US economic hegemony is challenged by the rapid rise of China and India. The myth of its military might was shattered by the events of September 11, and an ensuing global crusade against terror is draining its military resources. Tukumbi in Chapter 11 highlights the growing US military engagement on the continent and, whereas the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan are proving to be its nemesis, its impact on the African continent in the future remains unclear. The economic bubble that burst in the United States in 2008 has engulfed the rest of the Western world and has had ramifications that have dulled the shine of the free market. Most significantly, today, the world stands at a crossroads in terms of defining of a new world economic – and perhaps political – order, but Africa's footprints in this process are at best, light. Africa remains invisible and its concerns are hardly visible on the global platforms where watershed discussions take place.

It is within the above context that one should try to understand the new scramble for Africa, which is characterised by the West's defence of its interests on the continent – interests that had for long gone unchallenged. The fact that China, and to some extent India, can offer economic aid and investments to Africa is seen as a challenge to Western hegemony on the continent. Aid and investments from China and India offer African countries an escape from the stifling conditionalities imposed by the West. As this shift grows, there are fervent warnings from the West that the aid from China will increase Africa's indebtedness and worsen its financial position. Africa is also repeatedly reminded that this aid might not be sustainable. Interestingly, the continent has not offered any cogent response to these warnings either at the national, regional or continental levels. This leads one to the conclusion that there is no common position on a development that will, without doubt, have a significant impact on the future of the continent.

What should be noted here is that, while the entry of China and India as investors and aid donors has increased the available resources to the continent, it is how these resources will be utilised and managed that will dictate what happens on the continent. This brings us back to the state's role and efficacy. The broad understanding has been for China and India to work out a general framework of cooperation with the continent. The operationalisation of these frameworks takes place at the national level and not all African countries are going to benefit in the same way, since China's main focus is the exploitation of natural resources, given its ever-growing demand for them. This is likely to lead to selective investments that are dictated by resource endowments. India's interest is more of finding a market for its growing industrial sector and an investment outlet for its growing domestic capital. It is equally likely to be selective.

In short, the new scramble for Africa is likely to result in the growing differentiation of countries, with few winners and many losers. It is this that African countries should be worried about. The aim should be to increase the winners and minimise the losers. However, this will remain unlikely if Africa is not driven by an enlightened interest that reflects the aspiration for the whole, rather than individual national interests. Of concern is the lack of common African positions, strategies and frameworks to engage with both the new and old partners. Undoubtedly, African leaders need to shoulder a large part of the blame for the state of affairs. However, critical in explaining the gap is the lack of theorisation and generation of new knowledge that could underpin and inform decision-making from an African interests' perspective. This is an indictment on the African intelligentsia, in particular those in scholarship, a group that needs to lead in terms of the conceptual development that is required in terms of grounding Africa's aspiration of a united, peaceful and prosperous continent.

This volume has signposted a number of issues that African intellectuals need to expend critical thinking on, such as the nature and role of the state

in Africa's development, leveraging and mobilising the African citizenry for the development of the continent, pan-Africanism and its actualisation in the current global order and growing inter-African trade to support Africa's integration and growth.

Note and reference

- 1 Lee, M.C. 2009. 'Africa belongs to us: The continent's current development paradox'. Lecture delivered at the AISA Ambassadorial Lecture Series, at Burgers Park Hotel, Pretoria. See also Satgar, V. 2009. 'Global capitalism and the neo-liberalisation of Africa' in Southall, R. & Melber, H. eds. *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*. Pietermaritzburg: KwaZulu-Natal, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

The *State of Africa* series project was conceived by the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) during its 2003–2004 financial year for purposes of mapping out on a regular basis critical issue areas relating to intra- and inter-African as well as extra-African relations. The first and second volumes of the series were published in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Volume 1: *The State of Africa: Thematic and Factual Review* served as an exploratory piece and covered a broad range of issues relating to politics and governance, millennium development goals (MDGs), peace and conflict and regional development. Volume 2: *The State of Africa: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development* focused thematically and examined – from critical and comprehensive perspectives – issues associated with post-conflict in Africa. The volume was grounded on the continent’s quest for conflict prevention, management and resolution as a means of creating an enabling environment for the consolidation of democracy and reconstruction of societies affected by crisis in general and war in particular. This volume, Volume 3: *Parameters and Legacies of Governance and Issue Areas* takes a multi-pronged and multi-faceted approach to some of these issues by providing in-depth analysis of dynamics at national, regional, continental and international levels. The global transformation in the 1980s and 1990s, which witnessed the crumbling of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and opened a window of opportunities for East–West bipolar rapprochement, particularly between the United States and Russia, also had impact on Africa at the national, regional and continental levels. Focusing on conceptual units, such as the state, indigenous organisations, regional and continental organisations as well as selected priority issues – in particular gender and empowerment, the global South, and space science – the chapters in the book provide useful insights into the nature and impact of the transformation and its impact on the socio-economic and politico-security situation in Africa.

